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The management of congestible recreation resources has been based largely 
on the concept of satisfaction. This concept is poorly defined and often does not 
reflect objectives f or management of recreation resources. One way of addressing 
these problems is to define and use measurable objectives for management of 
recrea tion resources. One such objective is economic efficiency. 
The concept of efficiency is defined and economic theory developed to 
identify: efficient allocations of congestible resources, the efficient capacities of 
resources under different allocation mechanisms, and the efficiency costs of use of 
lottery-based allocation mechanisms. The usefulness of this body of economic 
theory in allocation of backcountry recreational resources is addressed through 
investigation of ability to measure demand for congestible resources, and the 
problems associated with use of surrogate measures of demand. 
Theoretical models of efficient management of congestible resources cannot 
iii 
be applied with the current state of knowledge because existing non-market 
valuation methods are not able to identify Hicksian-compensated demand functions 
for congestible backcountry recreation. Use of Marshallian demand measures 
introduces the possibility of resource misallocations of unknown direction and 
magnitude. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Public agency decisionmaking 
The essence of resource management is determination of the optimal rate 
of use and the allocation of scarce resources. In other words, decisions must be 
made regarding how much resource use should occur at any point in time and, since 
for most resources demand1 outstrips supply, decisions must be made as to who is 
permitted to use resources and how much use they may make. 
"Optimality" implies there is a set of objectives which resource managers 
are pursuing. An optimal resource allocation is the allocation that "best" meets 
those objectives. In the presence of more than one objective and more than one 
potential resource user there consequently arise problems in making inter-personal 
welfare comparisons and in trading-off competing objectives. 
Resource allocation methods determine (or influence) who uses a resource 
and how much use they make of it. The optimal methods for allocating scarce 
resources amongst potential users differ depending upon the objectives of the 
resource administering agency and the number and characteristics of those wishing 
to obtain rights over scarce resources. When resource control is held by 
commercial organisations profit making is an important objective. Consequently, 
resources are allocated by any of a number of revenue-generating pricing tools, 
including: fixed prices, discriminatory prices, and auctions. 
If there were no costs incurred by consumers from use of the resource. Costs include, but 
are not restricted to, monetary costs. 
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While price allocation mechanisms are necessary to meet profit objectives 
and can often be shown to meet efficiency goals, the reasons underlying provision 
of many of the goods and services administered by public agencies are not profit 
or efficiency based. Goods allocations may be directed at distributional matters, 
often to meet some minimum standard, or to supply services to which society 
considers some or all individuals have inalienable rights. Consequently, many 
public agencies that are primarily concerned for distributional objectives allocate 
resources by mechanisms other than pricing. Social welfare and health services are 
often distributed on merit, and there is usually a well defined order for meeting 
demands; severe head injuries, for example, are likely to be treated bef ore in-grown 
toenails. Other services are provided free of charge and without any other form 
of restriction (e.g. street lighting, foot access to national parks), while others are 
distributed by queuing (state housing), or lottery (hunting permits). 
Many New Zealand resources previously allocated by public agencies using 
non-price methods have recently been, or may soon be, transferred to price 
allocation, either directly (e.g. the implementation of backcountry hut fees) or 
indirectly by· entrusting distribution to commercial organisations or state-owned 
corporations (e.g. agricultural advice). 
The place of distributional matters in the ways society chooses to allocate 
resources is emphasised by Zajac (1978, p.l): 
Governmental intrusi,)n in the market place in the name of equity 
or social justice is widespread. Minimum wage and child labour 
laws, occupational and ~afc(y standards, environmental protection 
regulations, ceilings on interest rates for home mortgages are but 
a few examples. There arc also obvious forces at work to make the 
phenomenon more ,viuesprcad. The natural desire to right 
apparent wrongs creales pressures to pass laws and regulations to 
ensure justice is done. But the creation of a law or regulation in 
turn usually both intcrf._1Ts with the efficient operation of markets 
and creates a class ;)1' pcrS,)J1S \vho gain. The gainers then of course 
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fight any attempts to repeal the law or regulation. 
Zajac's comments are directed at government regulation. They indicate that 
society is concerned about distributional matters and will go to great lengths to 
address perceived injustices, including the sacrifice of efficiency. But, regulations 
are not the only things to influence the actual distribution of resources and their 
benefits. Resource allocation procedures cause dramatic variations in the 
allocation of goods and benefits. A lottery, for example, will nearly always result 
in a different allocation to an English auction. 
Public agencies concerned with addressing distributional matters may be 
required to cover the costs of providing services from income received from their 
provision, and may also be concerned with matters of efficiency. Choice of a 
resource allocation tool will therefore need to be made in light of the relative 
revenue raising and efficiency characteristics of the tools available. These 
characteristics may act as constraints to adoption of tools which best meet 
distributional objectives. 
In general, therefore, one would expect that public agency adminstrators 
face a more complex set of objectives than the profit-maximising decisionmakers 
commonly encountered in the business sector and extensively analysed in the 
financial and economic literatures. The additional number of objectives alone does 
not contribute to the difficulty of decisionmaking if those objectives are easily 
measured (in the manner that profits may be measured) and a relationship detailing 
how those objectives are to be constructed into one objective function is available. 
In that case, the resource manager could act as a technician to determine which 
allocation maximises the objective function. 
In reality resource managers cannot act as technicians. They are often 
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required to evaluate outcomes against some unknown social objective function. 
One of their tasks may be to identify objectives. Objectives such as fairness are not 
commonly measured, nor are there well recognised trade-offs between (say) 
fairness and efficiency or profits. Resource managers are therefore often in the 
position of not knowing wha t inf orma tion to obtain or how to evaluate it. 
W elf are economICS has a strong tradition of focusing on efficiency 
maximisation as a single management objective. A major finding of welfare 
economics is that individual pursuit of the objective of profit maximisation will lead 
to an efficient resource allocation if markets are perfect. Analysis addresses the 
efficiency costs of imperfect markets. Markets for public agency provided goods 
and services are seldom perfect. The public agency generally acts as a monopolist, 
or at least a major actor in the market, and its administrators are not answerable 
to shareholders if they do not produce sufficient profit. Public agencies therefore 
have the opportunity of selecting from a wide range of resource allocation 
mechanisms. 
1.2 Congestion 
Congestion is a negative externality. It arises where individual resource 
users do not have the right to exclude others from resource use and use is partly 
rival. That is, one person's use of a congestible resource or facility does not 
prevent others from obtaining benefits from that resource or facility, but the 
benefits obtained from any given unil of use are inversely related to the total 
number of resource users. Congcstible goods are neither public goods nor private 
~', 
goods. Because resource users Jo not face the full costs of their use there is a 
tendency for congestible re:::ourccs to be overused. 
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Economic analysis of congestible goods has concentrated on: their 
valuation, identification of efficient prices, and identification of efficient use levels 
assuming that prices would be used to allocate use. There remain unanswered 
questions regarding the efficiency costs of alternative market structures, the 
efficiency costs of non-price allocation mechanisms, and efficient use levels when 
non-price allocation mechanisms are employed. Resource sociologists have 
described several behavioural changes that occur with increased levels of 
congestible resource use. These behavioural changes have not been explicitly 
modelled in an economics framework. 
1.3 Congestion in backcountry recreation 
Backcountry recreation commonly refers to resource-based activities such 
as: tramping, hunting, climbing, fishing, and picnicking. These activites have many 
welfare-influencing characteristics associated with them. Of particular interest is 
that many participants in these activities prefer solitude or low user-density 
experiences, leading to the search for optimal carrying capacities for particular 
backcountry recreation activities in particular locations. Much of this research has 
been directed toward identification of carrying capacities without first identifying 
either the objective function or the method of resource allocation. This methodolgy 
is therefore theoretically flawed. 
Application of economic theory to the analysis of congestible resource 
management requires knowledge of demand for those resources. This knowledge 
may be available where goods are allocated via markets (e.g. commercial skifields 
or toll roads), but is generally unavailable for public agency provided backcountry 
recreation facilities because they are open-access resources for which no price is 
charged. Non-market valuation methods have been developed to value public 
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goods, and in some cases can identify demand curves. The application of these 
methods to congestible backcountry recreation resources, which are neither public 
nor private goods raises a further issue in their management. 
Analysis of congestion in backcountry recreation is clearly within the realm 
of economics. It is a problem of allocating a scarce resource amongst competing 
users. The key difference to allocation of private goods is that; with a private good 
the amount of resource (level of use) is exogenously determined and need only be 
allocated amonst potential consumers, while optimal allocation of a congestible 
1\ 
good requires a decision as to how much use to allow. Pure public goods, on the 
other hand, present no problems of rivalness so there is no allocation problem, just 
a need to determine optimal quantity to supply. 
1.4 Outline of this dissertation 
Problems which arise in managing congestible resources can be classified 
as general or economic in nature. The general problems relate to the deficiencies 
in existing models of the backcountry recreational experience. Existing models and 
their limitations are reviewed in Chapter 2, leading to development of a new model 
in Chapter 3. 
There are many problems of an economic nature. Existing theory does not 
cater adequately for: the problems of more than one type of resource user, 
behavioural adaptations to increases in user density (displacement and 
rationalisation), or the role of the allocation method. The first two of these are 
addressed in Chapter 4. The role of objectives other than efficiency is introduced 
in Chapter 5. The lottery is introduced as a resource allocation mechanism capable 
of ensuring process equity. Efficient carrying capacities and efficiency costs for 2 
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variety of lottery mechanisms are then derived. 
While Chapters 4 and Slay the theoretical foundations for management of 
congestible resources, implementation of that theory requires knowledge of 
r0 
demands for congestible resources. Chapter 6 reviews available non-market 
valuation methods to assess whether these demands are measurable or not, while 
Chapter 7 analysis the implications of using imperfect estimates of demand to 
determine carrying capacities for congestible resources. Empirical verification of 
the findings is presented in Appendix A. 
Chapter 8 summarises the economic theory findings and relates them to the 
model developed in Chapter 3. The practical impJications for management of 
congestible back country recreation resources are then investigated. The chapter 
concludes with discussion of the limitations of the models constructed here and 
future research needs. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CARRYING CAPACITY 
2.1 Introduction 
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This chapter reviews the history and current thinking with regard to 
carrying capacity determination. It traces the concept from its roots in ecology to 
the theory and methods used in its application to current management of outdoor 
recreation. 
2.2 Ecological roots 
Ecologists have long been interested in the relationships between the 
number of organisms in an environment, the physical condition of individual 
organisms and the rate of change in the total number of organisms in populations. 
Many authors (e.g. Odum, 1959) report that, with very low numbers in a 
population, growth in numbers is slow while the population becomes established. 
As numbers increase growth becomes more rapid, but eventually slows as 
environmental conditions restrict the ability of the population to expand further. 
These conditions include such factors as disease, lack of food, and social reactions 
to higher densities (Dasmann et al., 1973:32). This is the sigmoid pattern of 
population growth. Many authors claim that the upper asymptote of the sigmoid 
growth curve is the carD'ing capacity for that species in that environment (Odum, 
1959; Ricklefs, 1983; Dasmann. 1959; .:vioen, 1973). Carrying capacity is therefore 
the maximum number of individuals of anyone species that can be supported in a· 
given habitat. Other forms !)[ population growth functions are also considered, 
notably the J-form. In this elSe popuiarion growth is also initially slow, followed 
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by a rapid increase, but "stops abruptly as environmental resistance becomes 
effective more or less suddenly" (Odum, 1959). Carrying capacity is defined as the 
population level at which this sudden cut-off occurs. 
Dasmann (1964:181) suggests three ways 1U which the term "carrying 
capacity" is used in the wildlife literature: 
1) the number of animals of a given species that a habitat does 
support. 
2) the upper limit oLpopulation size above which no further increase 
can be sustained. 
3) the number of animals that a habitat can maintain in a healthy, 
vigorous condition. 
The first two of these uses are positive, and it may be possible to observe 
or experimentally determine them. The third use is normative, being dependent 
upon the definitions of healthy and vigorous. This (third) notion of carrying 
capacity corresponds to that population level which Dasmann describes as optimum 
density (Dasmann, 1964:184), and at which; 
Body size, health, growth, and fecundity will approach the maximum for the 
species. Productivity will be near the maximum. Relative to the logistic 
curve, this level resembles the inflection point of highest yield. .... Since 
essentially no factor is limiting at an optimum density, it is consequently 
not a level at which a population would remain except where it is controlled 
by predators, or by human hunting, or where the behaviour of the animals, 
through the operation of territoriality, prevents further increase. 
Other density levels which may be important in determining population size 
include: subsistence density, the level at which there is just sufficient food to 
maintain the popUlation; tolerance density, the level at which intraspecific 
tolerance permits no further increase; and security density, the level at which a 
popUlation is normally held by predation or hunting. Dasmann (1964) concludes 
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that it may be possible for optimum density to coincide with either tolerance or 
security density, but that this is unlikely. Consequently, wildlife managers must act 
if populations are to be maintained at optimum densities. The carrying capacity 
concept has been applied to human populations, leading to the conclusion; 
populations can either increase to a subsistence density, a level where 
human suffering and general misery will be a maximum, or they can be 
levelled off by self-imposed restrictions on growth, at or near an ·optimum 
density. (Dasmann et a/., 1973:34) 
2.3 Human recreation 
The carrying capacity concept was extended to the field of human 
recreation as early as 1951, by J.V.K. Wagar who stated; 
Forestry, range management, and wildlife management are all based upon 
techniques for determining optimum use and limiting harvest beyond this 
point. Forest recreation belongs in the same category and will be more 
esteemed when so treated. (Wagar, 1951:433) 
Wagar made it clear that he was not solely concerned with preventing 
resource degradation, but was also concerned with quality of the recreational 
experience. To maximise quality he suggested that "Recreational use must be 
stopped in one place and flowed into another." (Wagar, 1951:434). This concern 
was further elaborated by J. Alan Wagar (1964) who was concerned that "When too 
many people use the same area, some traditional wildland values are lost." (Wagar, 
1964:2). As a result, recreational carrying capacity was defined as "the level of 
recreational use an area can withstand while providing a sustained quality of 
recreation." Realising that it would be possible to sustain many different quality 
levels, each associated with a particular carrying capacity, Wagar (1964:4) 
concluded that every carrying capacity must be associated with at least some 
implicit management objective, so that; 
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recreational carrying capacity must be considered as a means to an end, not 
an absolute limit that is inherent in each area. 
In recognising that freedom of access may reduce quality and enjoyment, 
and that imposition of use restrictions would be necessary to maintain these, Wagar 
(1964) appears to be confirming Dasmann's (1964) hypothesis that an optimum 
density is unstable, and implies that unless the (user) population is managed it will 
increase to its tolerance, or subsistence, density. 
Since carrying capacity is dependent not only upon environmental durability 
and rehabilitation characteristics, but also upon demands for naturalness and 
solitude it was apparent to Wagar (1964:6) that, to determine an appropriate 
carrying capacity, it was first necessary to determine the relationship between 
recreational satisfaction and crowding. The use of the word "crowding" instead of 
number, or density, of users may have been unintentional, for it appears from the 
context in which Wagar repeatedly used it that he was referring to "number of 
people". However, these concepts are not identical and their treatment as such in 
ensuing analyses has caused considerable mis-understanding. 
2.4 Tragedy of the commons 
Understanding of the mechanism by which a population approaches its 
subsistence density was popularised by Hardin (1968) in a paper titled "Tragedy of 
the Commons"!. The conceptuai foundations for the tragedy of the commons are 
attributed to Lloyd (1833) wIll) ;irst used the example of many people grazing cattle 
Dasgupta (\982. pp t:i-! ol; ,",,';';toc'S some important errors in Hardin's analysis. Rational 
actors will consider all their co;", ,-:. ,d"incc CldJitional cattle (not only their reduced output from 
existing cattle) and will comp;lJ'c :it)',c' ::l the value of output from the additional beast. 
Consequently, it is possible tila! ::'C;;;,1i,1011S will be overused but not ruined. 
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on a comnion to illustrate the need for checks to human population growth. Hardin 
describes the operation of the tragedy as follows; 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly 
or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me 
of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and 
one positive component. . 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one 
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the 
additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing 
created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are 
shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular 
decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another .... But this is the conclusion reached by 
each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the 
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all. (Hardin, 1968:1244) 
Like Lloyd, Hardin was primarily interested in determining the optimal size 
of the human population. He recognised that defining the optimum would be an 
extremely difficult task. In choosing "the maximum good per person" as his 
definition of optimality Hardin never tackled the issue. of what is good, or how 
good should be measured. He has, however, made the implicit assumption that 
"social good" is "mean good" regardless of to whom that good occurs. This 
objective function reflects Hardin's particular view of the world. Other views 
would suggest alternative objective functions and hence different carrying capacities 
(Wagar, 1964). 
Hardin viewed the tragedy of the commons as being applicable to things 
other than biological populations. Amongst these are pollution and recreational 
resources - "we must soon cease to treat the '[national] parks as commons or they 
will be of no value to anyone." (Hardin, 1968:1245). Hardin's suggestions for 
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possible solutions to overuse of national parks include turning them into private 
property and allocating restricted rights to enter. While finding these options 
undesirable, Hardin finds the alternative (destruction of the national parks) even 
less desirable and so condones mutual coercion through laws, taxes, and other 
means as appropriate ways to prevent the tragedy occuring. This theme is 
continued in a later paper (Hardin, 1(69) where the relative merits of different 
methods of allocating wilderness in cases where demand is greater than optimum 
capacity are discussed. 
2.4.1 ¥athematical exposition 
A more general description of the tragedy of the commons may be provided 
mathematically. Suppose there are k individuals who have rights to graze cattle on 
a common. The number of cattle grazed by individual i is nb and the total number 
grazed by others is Nj, where; 
k 
N j Lnj - ni 
j=l 
Selfish individuals attempt to maximise the benefits they each obtain from 
the common (income from sale of meat, meat for personal consumption, prestige 
associated with size of herd, ctC.j by -::hoosing the number of cattle they will graze. 
The individual's benefits (B;) are also dependent upon the total number of cattle 
others graze on the common, as well as other factors. 
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where, 
OBi 0 
-< ,Vi 
aNt 
It will be to the individual's advantage to add cattle as long as the net 
private benefit of doing so is positive. Hence, at equilibrium, given the number of 
cattle grazed by others, and as long as other conditions are constant, the net benefit 
to individual i of adding further cattle is zero. 
OBi 
=0 ,Vi 
However, since there will be less feed available for other people's cattle, their 
condition will deteriorate and others' benefits will decline. 
Social welfare (B) is assumed to be some function of the welfare of all 
individuals in society. Adopting the concept of a Pareto improvement in welfare, 
society'S welfare is unambiguously increased (decreased) if the welfare of any 
individual, or subset of individuals, increases (decreases) while no-one~s welf are is 
decreased (increased). 
where, 
It therefore follows that, 
t aB. aBj < 0 
j=l aBj ani 
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Individual i grazes too many cattle on the common. There is nothing 
special about i, all other individuals have the same incentives to overgraze from a 
social viewpoint and so; 
dB < 0 W' 
, v) 
dnj 
In other words, everyone has more than the socially desirable number of 
cattle grazing on the common. This result is dependent upon the assumption that 
benefits experienced by one individual are inversely related to the number of cattle 
grazed by others, other things being equal. This is the congestion externality. 
There is partial rivalry for grazing. While the presence of one grazier's stock does 
not preclude the possibility of other graziers using the common, it does reduce the 
benefits the other graziers obtain from doing so. 
It should be noted that the socially optimal level of grazing (optimum 
carrying capacity) cannot he determined unless the social welfare function [B =: 
B(B], B2, ..•• , Bk ) - Wagar's (1964) management objective] is known. Hardin's 
(1968) objective of "maximum good per person" is a special case, in which the 
number of users (k) is chosen to maximise the following expression; 
A further special Ch<': ,;uci:.li welfare function (the Benthamite social 
welfare function) sums the hcnc:1L:, lll'taincd by all individuals to determine social 
welfare. i.c.: 
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Adoption of the Benthamite view of the world implies that society is only 
interested in total benefit, regardless of to whom it accrues. One person obtaining 
one million units of benefit is just as valued as one thousand people obtaining one 
thousand units each, or one million people obtaining one unit of benefit each. 
Alldredge (1973) used a Benthamite view of the world to identify the optimal 
carrying capacity for a hypothetical wilderness. All (potential) users have identical 
tastes. Their benefits from a wilderness visit (measured in enjoyils) are dependent 
on the number of other concurrent users, as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Recreation experience, the simple wilderness case (Alldredge, 1973) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
No. of Per Person Total Public Incremental 
Visitors Enjoyment Enjoyment Total 
V (Enjoyils) Enjoyment 
0 0 0 0 
1 36 36 36 
2 34 68 32 
3 32 96 28 
4 30 120 24 
5 28 140 20 
6 26 156 16 
7 24 168 12 
8 22 176 8 
9 20 180 4 
10 18 180 0 
11 16 176 -4 
12 14 168 -8 
13 12 156 -12 
14 10 140 -16 
15 8 120 -20 
16 6 96 -24 
17 4 68 -28 
18 2 36 -32 
19 0 0 -36 
20 -2 -40 
-40 
21 -4 -84 -44 
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With the addition of successive users to the wilderness the incoming users 
not only receive less enjoyment than those already there, but also reduce the 
enjoyment of present wilderness users. If the wilderness use level is not managed 
use will increase whenever benefits of use for the marginal user are positive. Since 
individual marginal benefit is equal to per person enjoyment (average benefit) 
nineteen visits will occur, where average benefit is zero. Total public enjoyment 
is zero, and incremental total enjoyment (marginal social benefit) is negative, 
indicating that the wilderness is overused from a social perspective. 
In terms of Dasmann's (1964) definitions of use levels Alldredge's 
wilderness will be used at its subsistence capacity. Optimum (Benthamite) capacity 
is identified by the use level which maximises total public enjoyment - the use level 
where marginal social benefit is zero. The Benthamite optimum occurs at ten 
visits, at which average benefit is positive. Using Hardin's (1968) criterion of 
"maximum average good" would imply setting optimal capacity at one visitor per 
time period (the number of visits which results in the maximum in column 2). This 
example illustrates how optimum capacity can be identified once the social welfare 
function is known. It also illustrates the degree to which the optimal outcome 
changes with alternative social welfare functions. 
The Alldredge example is vastly simplified for several important reasons. 
The first is that, for many types of recreation, participants may actually gain 
increased benefits from the first few encounters. This may occur for reasons of 
loneliness, education, or safety. Second, it is most unlikely that individuals wishing 
to use a resource will all have ::.imiiar tastes. In a wilderness, for example, some 
hikers may principally bc~ccking \olitudc while others may be seeking a more 
social trip into a pristine cnviJ"()nmCD t. In other cases conflict may arise between 
different types of user. _-\n c.·;~n:;-!c :if this is the incompatibility of bathing and 
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waterskiing. Third, each individual, whether a user or not, may be concerned with 
several different aspects of the resource or experience. The value of a trip into the 
wilderness may depend on much more than the number of encounters. Location 
of encounters, the nature of the terrain, condition of flora and fauna, amount and 
type of litter, weather conditions, and so on may all be strong determinants of 
enjoyment of the wilderness. The effect of number of users on all of these factors 
must therefore be considered when determining carrying capacity. Hence, the 
function describing benefits for each individual is far more complicated than that 
proposed by Alldredge. 
That is; 
where; 
and; 
B; = B; (weather, litter, trail encounters, camp 
encounters, flora, fauna, others) 
litter = g(number of users), 
trail encounters = f(number of users), 
camp encounters = h(number of users), etc. 
2.5 The satisfaction model 
Because use levels affect social welfare by several different, often complex, 
paths the simple models introduced by Hardin and Alldredge may need 
considerable development to be of use in guiding management of backcountry 
recreation resources. To this end much effort has been expended on developing 
what has come to be known as the satisfaction model (Heberlein & Shelby, 1977). 
The simplest specification of the satisfaction model, illustrated in Figure 1, is 
provided by Manning and Cia Ii (1980). 
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CROWDThIO 
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Figure 1 Satisfaction model 
Density, the number of pcople in a given area, is hypothesised to affect 
crowding which is defined as "a negative personal, subjective evaluation of some 
density level" (Manning and Ciali, 1980:330). Further explanation is provided by 
Stokols (1972:276), 
Crowding ... appears to arise through the juxtaposition of density with 
certain social and personal circumstances which sensitize the individual to 
the potential constraints of limited space. 
Although termed the satisfaction model, dissatisfaction is the dependent 
variable becausc "Quality is normally defined or expressed in terms of 
dissatisfaction on the part of recreation participants" (Manning and Ciali, 
1990:332). Beyond a certain level l)f crowding users are hypothesised to become 
dissatisfied. The implied management objective is thercf are to avoid dissatisfaction 
by controlling user dcnsity. 
The objective is vicwed differently by some authors. For example, Lucas 
and Stankey (1974:14) statc. "the goal of recreation management is to maximise 
user satisfaction." Whether lhi;, ilhjective refers to individual or aggregate user 
satisfaction is unclear in mnst ,;}SCS, although Manning (1986:8) alludes to 
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aggregate satisfaction when he states " .. " . total satisfaction of all outdoor 
recreationists might truly be maximised". This confusion is symptomatic offailure 
to determine an appropriate social welfare, or objective, function. 
2.5.1 Tests of the satisfaction model 
The satisfaction model provides the basis for three areas of research. 
These involve estimation of the relationships between: crowding and satisfaction, 
density and crowding, and density and satisfaction. Empirical work has 
concentrated on the last two of these and is summarised by Manning (1986). 
The relationships between the variables in the satisfaction model are either 
non-significant or very weak (Manning, 1986), implying that factors other than 
density and crowding are important determinants of satisfaction. Tests of the 
satisfaction model in its simplest form suggest that user density and crowding are 
not direct causes of dissatisfaction. This is not to say that they may not have an 
impact through intervening variables. Contingent valuation has been used to 
determine satisfaction (willingness to pay) as a function of number of encounters 
with other parties in the wilderness (Cicchetti and Smith, 1973), and number of 
people per acre of beach (McConnell, 1977). These approaches employ the same 
logic as Alldredge (1973), but use willingness to pay as a measure of satisfaction, 
rather than Alldredge's enjoyils. In both these cases there was no significant 
relationship between density and satisfaction (willingness to pay) unless other 
variables were controlled. Even then, the relationships were only of marginal 
significance. Controlled variables included: length of trip, income, sex, education, 
and number of weeks of paid vacation per year (Cicchetti and Smith); and family 
income, days at the beach per season, and air temperature (McConnell). 
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Asimilar study (Menz and Mullen, 1981) used willingness to travel, rather 
than willingness to pay, as the measure of satisfaction. It found that Kthe 
expectations of the recreationist concerning the number of interparty encounters 
affect willingness to travel to reach the site" and concluded; "that those who expect 
a high level of encounters are less likely to visit an area, ceteris paribus, may be 
an explanation for the zero or low effects of increased encounters that have been 
found on actual sites" (Menz and Mullen, 1981:38-39). In obtaining these results; 
family income, education, seasonal visits, days on site, years of experience, and size 
of party were all controlled. These economic studies compare density, or contacts, 
directly with satisfaction. They do not include crowding. Each suggests that 
factors other than density are important determinants of satisfaction obtained from 
backcountry recreation. 
2.5.2 Expectations and preferences 
Individuals evaluate recreational experiences against their own expectations 
and preferences for that activity (Absher and Lee, 1981; Bultena et ai., 1981; 
Schreyer and Roggenbuck, 1978). There is some evidence to suggest that pragmatic 
expectations are of more importance in determining satisfaction than are 
preferences for an ideal experience (Shelby et ai., 1983). Explanation is provided 
by Stankey (1972:101); 
If a person expects to find a beach quiet and uncrowded he might 
experience considerable disappointment if it is not. If, on the other hand, 
he expects it to be crowded, bustling with people, and it is in fact, he might 
not be happy with the situation, but his expectations have probably 
tempered his reaction even though he would have preferred to find it 
uncrowded. 
Expectations and preferences are likely to vary amongst individuals and be 
directed towards different aspects of the recreation experience. Some people may 
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prefer meeting many others, while others pursue lower density experiences, or 
solitude. Others may be most concerned about wildlife, peace and quiet, game, 
natural resource conditions, scenery, or the weather, leading to the conclusion; 
"How one defines the environmental situation at hand in terms of the functions or 
tasks one prefers to perform greatly influences perceived crowding." (Hammitt, 
1983:314). One implication of the importance of expectations is that dissatisfaction 
may be reduced by allowing recreationists to form more accurate expectations of 
the conditions they are likely to encounter, and so direct use to more appropriate 
locations. This could be attained by better dissemination of information on 
facilities, alternative opportunities. and likely conditions. 
2.5.3 Contacts 
Shelby (1980) indicates that the correlation of density with encounters is not 
perfect. For a sample of Grand Canyon river runners density explained only about 
half of the variation in contacts. In a hiking environment which allowed greater 
choice of route Bultena et al. (1981) found an even weaker relationship between 
density and contacts (r= .26 - .30). Number of interparty contacts may therefore 
be an important intermediary between density and crowding or satisfaction. 
Diff erences in actual and reported contacts may be large (Shelby and Colvin, 1982), 
with perceived contacts being the relevant variable in the determination of 
crowdedness (Shelby ct al., 1983). 
Characteristics of contacts also appear to be important in determining their 
effect on satisfaction. Import:mt ,:ncounter characteristics identified to date 
include: the mode of travel c·l lh()~c encountered, e.g. whether with parties 
travelling on foot or by hor~;c. b~ [l()\vcrboat or canoe (Cicchetti and Smith,1973; 
Lucas, 1964; Stankey, 197:' j: ic)Ci[;(lll ()f encounters, e.g. on the trail or at a 
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campsite (Cicchetti and Smith, 1973; Gramann and Burdge, 1984; Stankey, 1972); 
size of groups encountered (Stankey, 1972); behaviour of those encountered 
(Gramann and Burdge, 1984; Jacob and Schreyer, 1980; Stankey, 1972; West, 1982); 
and situational variables, including degree of acquaintance interaction, and whether 
resource users are working or recreating (Cohen et ai., 1975). The explanatory 
power of the simple satisfaction model may be improved by including these other 
effects. 
People are not only affected by encounters with others, but also by evidence 
of other people having been in the area, as evidenced by: litter, trampling of trails, 
f ormation of campsites, fire rings, excretia, toilet paper, and polluted lakes and 
streams (Stankey, 1972; Bultena et al., 1981; West, 1982». This aspect of solitude 
suggests an intertemporal as well as an intratemporal characteristic to congestion 
effects and their management. 
2.5.4 Multiple satisfactions 
Many elements of the recreation experience are important in determining 
satisf action. Hammitt (1982) has explained the various components which interact 
to determine the nature of "wilderness solitude". These include: the presence of a 
natural environment, cognitive freedom, the intimacy of a small group of chosen 
friends, and freedom from societal expectations and obligations. The co-existence 
of many aspects making up the experience has been referred to as "mUltiple 
satisfactions". For example, the reasons an individual has for fishing might include 
one, some, or all of: sport, exercise, socialise, or to gather food. Recent references 
to multiple satisfactions (e.g. Vaske et al., 1986) allow for any number of 
motivations to be important for any individual. However, individual motivations 
may have relatively different levels of importance for different individuals, hence 
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people who outwardly appear to be doing similar things may in fact be pursuing 
quite different objectives. 
Schreyer and Roggenbuck (1978: 377) draw on Vroom's (1964) theory of 
expectancy to provide five conclusions which summarise the importance of multiple 
expecta tions. 
(1) People have a variety of expectations for participating in recreational 
activities; (2) the expectations for participating in one recreational activity 
are usually different from the expectations for participating in another 
activity; (3) people engaged in the same activity sometimes seek different 
outcomes; (4) different types of recreationists using the same environment 
sometimes seek different outcomes; and (5) such antecedent conditions as 
demographic, socio-economic, and environmental variables have seldom, by 
themselves, been useful in explaining and predicting the motivations of 
recrea tionists. 
Since all users are not the same, there anse difficulties in determining 
appropriate management objectives. These difficulties gain significance because 
of Schreyer and Roggenbuck's fifth conclusion, which implies that it is impossible 
to predict recreationists' objectives. It is therefore necessary to directly survey 
recreationists to determine their objectives. Stankey (1972) has developed 
"wilderness purism" scales to categorise wilderness users for management purposes 
according to their responses to survey questions, based on the assumption that 
members of each category will prefer similar types of opportunities. 
The recreational hunting literature has been surveyed by Vaske et ai. 
(1986) who identify three main types of satisf actions - bagging game, closeness with 
nature, and social. The relative importance of particular satisfactions varies with 
types of species hunted and hunting methods used (Bryan, 1979). Similar findings 
exist for backcountry hiking. ri~hing. climbing, canoeing, skiing, and birdwatching 
(Bryan, 1979). 
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The implication of mUltiple satisfactions is that perceived crowding might 
be an insufficient reason for an individual to rate the experience as unsatisfactory. 
Explanation is provided in discrepancy theory. Schreyer and Roggenbuck 
(1978:377) summarise this theory as follows; 
The discrepancy theory posits two major propositions: (1) satisfaction is 
determined by the differences between the perceived outcomes an 
individual receives and the outcomes he wants or thinks he should receive, 
and (2) overall satisfaction in any situation is influenced by the sum of the 
discrepancies that exist for each facet of the situation. 
Consequently, while a recreationist might feel crowded (i.e. there is a large 
discrepancy between the preferred and actual number of people present) there may 
be no discrepancies for other elements of the activity, such as: naturalness, success 
in taking game, within party intimacy, and climatic conditions. The discrepancy 
arising from crowding may be insufficient to cause the recreationist to rate the 
experience as unsatisfactory. It is, however, possible that crowding alone is 
sufficient reason for dissatisfaction. The relationship between density, or crowding, 
and satisfaction is therefore reliant upon the saliency of user density, or crowding, 
in the recreational experience (Stankey and McCool, 1984). 
Because individuals rank satisfactions from use of a particular resource 
diff erently, a cross-sectional study of users will not necessarily indicate any 
relationship between density and crowding or satisfaction. Furthermore, even if the 
experience is "crowded" it may still be judged "satisfactory overall" because of 
mUltiple satisfactions. 
26 
2.5.5 Displacement 
Potential and existing users who expect that they may be dissatisfied 
because of high use levels may decide against recreating at high-use sites. Those 
recreators who do not expect to be dissatisfied because of high use levels continue 
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to use the site: Consequently, crowd tolerant users displace crowd intolerant users 
in a process known as displacement (Nielsen and Endo, 1977). Displacement is 
reliant upon the self-selection of recreationists for activities and sites, and is "a 
move away from an unacceptable situation, rather than a move toward an optimal 
one" (Becker, 1981:262). 
If potential users are well informed about the conditions at various sites it 
is most unlikely that they would choose to go to a site with a low probability of 
providing conditions suitable for the type of activity or objectives they wish to 
pursue. Becker (1981:261) claims that "Dissatisfaction results from expectations 
which are not realized". Consequently, if recreators at high density recreation sites 
have freely chosen that site one should not expect them to be dissatisfied unless 
they have been misinformed about usc densities. Further, misinformed users of a 
site who expected one particular type of experience, but obtained some other, 
unsatisfactory experience would not he expected to return. Becker et al. (1984) 
cite Skinner's contention that "actions that are rewarded arc repeated, [actions that 
are 1 discouraged are extinguished" to explain the displacement of dissatisfied site 
visitors. Studies comparing satisfaction across sites which have different user 
densities, or even studies of the same site at different points in time, may show no 
relationship hetween user density and satisfaction if displacement has occured. 
The "Last Settler Syndrom~' has heen proposed as one mechanism by which 
crowd tolerant users may dispbcc those who are crowd sensitive (Nielsen et 
al.,1977). This hypothesis ~uggc~lS that individuals have different density 
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tolerances which, in part, are determined by conditions prevailing when first 
exposed to the activity in question. IT total use of an area increases new users will 
have accepted the prevailing conditions. Existing users may become dissatisfied 
with the now higher user density, considering conditions to be crowded when 
compared to their earlier experiences, and consequently become displaced. In this 
way, total use may increase over time without a decrease in average satisfaction of 
users. The question remains as to whether the increased satisfaction obtained by 
new users is sufficient to compensate for the loss of satisfaction of displaced users 
- that is, has social welfare been improved? 
Empirical confirmation of the displacement and last settler hypotheses is 
not conclusive. Nielsen et aZ. (1977) report evidence from only one study in 
support of the last settler syndrome. Nielsen and Endo (1977) divided 
river-runners into two groups, depending on whether they chose more or less highly 
used rivers through time, to test their density dependent displacement hypothesis. 
While some users displayed patterns of behaviour consistent with the hypothesis, 
most did not. Possible reasons include: the possibility of displacement on other 
f actors, such as seeking more challenging rivers; the supply characteristics of 
different types of river; otherfactors determining satisfaction from river trips (such 
as wilderness setting, trip length, or difficulty); and the possibility that "true 
displacers" were excluded from the sample because they had stopped using the high 
use area where the sample was obtained. 
In a study of two rivers within the same region, Becker (1981) found that 
recreators diverted their use from one to the other if they were concerned about 
use densities and considered these to be preferable on the other river, or if they 
perceived other environmental conditions to be superior on the other river. 
Roggenbuck et af. (1980) also showed that some canoeists avoided particular rivers 
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because they perceived them to be crowded. Attitude scores (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975) were used by Anderson and Brown (1984) to predict displacement behaviour 
of users of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. They concluded; 
displacement is likely to be caused by more than visual encounters with 
others. An additional implication is that encounters with others may not 
be as important to displacing users as other outcomes. (Anderson and 
Brown, 1984:71) 
Anderson and Brown's "other factors" in determining displacement include: litter, 
worn-out campsites, knowledge of available alternatives, propensity to explore new 
areas, as well as changes in lifestyle, income, and leisure time, amongst others. 
Failure to recognise the consequences of displacement can result In 
SUboptimal management of the resource. 
Decisions should be based upon the relative congruence of expectations 
with the management goals for the resource. If objectives are not set in 
terms of providing specific experience opportunities, then the assessment 
of crowding will be a function of the average perceptions of the present 
users, regardless of the nature of their expectations. Present users will 
have a low threshold of crowding if density-dependent experience 
expectations are most important to them. HQwever, a problem with such 
management strategies is that there is a competitive advantage for density-
independent experiences. In an open system with increasing overall 
demand, those who have experience expectations that are most independent 
of density will be able to stand increasing levels of use in an area and still 
maintain high degrees of satisfaction. Over time, such individuals will 
constitute a proportionately larger percentage of total users. Those with 
higher density-dependent expectations will likely seek other opportunities, 
as they will not be able to maintain their satisfaction. Assessments of the 
average perceptions of crowding of these groups over a time period will 
theref ore tend to su pport higher use levels. Thus, a decision not to manage 
to provide opportunities for specific experiences is in fact a decision to 
manage for density-independent experiences. (Schreyer and Roggenbuck, 
1978:391-392) 
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2.5.6 Rationalisation 
Leaving a crowded situation is not the only reaction that could mask a 
density-satisfaction relationship. An alternative is the adoption of "perceptual and 
cognitive modes of reducing the salience of restricted space". That is, "the person 
may modify his standards of spatial adequacy, enhance the attractiveness of the 
task, or attempt to achieve a greater degree of coordination with others in the 
group, as a means of alleviating the sensation of crowding" (Stokols, 1972:276). 
This course of action has been termed "rationalisation" (Heberlein and Shelby, 
1977), and "product shift" (Shelby et al., 1986). Rationalisation implies that 
resource users may report their experiences to have been satisfactory in cases 
where they were not, at least in terms of their initial objectives for the use. 
Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance provides the conceptual 
foundations for the rationalisation hypothesis. 
cognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs whenever an individual 
simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that 
are psychologically inconsistent. ... Because the occurrence of cognitive 
dissonance is unpleasant, people are motivated to reduce it; this is roughly 
analagous to the processes involved in the induction and reduction of such 
drives as hunger or thirst - except that, here, the driving force is cognitive 
discomfort rather than physiological discomfort. ... how do we reduce 
cognitive dissonance? By changing one or both cognitions in such a way so 
as to render them more compatible (more consonant) with each other, or 
by adding new cognitions that help bridge the gap between the original 
cognitions. (Aronson, 1976:88-89) 
One means of reducing cognitive dissonance is to change experience 
definitions. If, for example, more people than are desired are encountered on a 
wilderness trip the solitude seeker may redefine the experience to be 
moderate-contact and therefore remain satisfied (Shelby, 1980). The possibility 
that this person would be more satisfied with less contacts is not precluded. 
Manning and Ciali (1980) suggest that rationalisation may only be an appropriate 
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response where recreational users have made a considerable investment of time or 
eff ort to undertake an activity. They suggest that for routine, day use type 
activities there is little to be lost by admitting that the experience was 
unsatisfactory. In other words, cognitive dissonance resulting from unsatisfactory, 
low investment activities will probably be less intense than for unsatisfactory, high 
investment activities. 
2.5.7 Satisfaction 
The concept 'satisfaction' is not used consistently by all authors. Some 
imply that it alone can be used to rate an experience in a range from 'not satisfied' 
to 'very satisfied'. Others seem to treat it as a broader concept, allowing people 
to be dissatisfied as well as satisfied. Stankey and McCool (1984) conclude; 
"attitudes lie along two continua from, for example, not satisfied to highly satisfied, 
or not dissatisfied to highly dissatisfied, rather than one continuum from satisfied 
to dissatisfied." (Stankey and McCool, 1984:462). Heberlein (1977:70) suggests that 
the point of dichotomy between satisfaction and dissatisfaction is most important 
to field managers since "managers say they wish to provide for as many saOtisfied 
visitors as possible. Dissatisfied visitors are a problem for managers; so is turning 
away other visitors who might be satisfied with the experi~nce." 
The focus is different for different studies because of implicit acceptance 
of different management objectives. Some studies view the maximisation of 
individual, or mean, user sati~faction as their management objective, while others 
want to avoid user dissatisfactinl1. 
It may be appropriate to adopt a different name for the output from 
recreation experiences in order 10 overcome the ambiguity associated with 
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satisfaction. One possible choice is utility, or welfare, which is a continuous 
variable and still allows for the inclusion of the dichotomous satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction concept. The dichotomy may occur where net welfare is zero, or 
where the difference between expected and actual welfare is greater than some 
threshold. Objectives for management could be expressed in terms of maximising 
(for example) individual, social, or mean welfare; or ensuring that [one of] these 
reach certain minimum standards. 
Adoption of such a measure introduces problems not present with 
satisfaction. The measure would need to be cardinal to be used with each of the 
management objectives suggested above. Use of such a measure would force 
management to decide how benefits are to be measured in practice, and to express 
their willingness to trade-off benefits accruing to different types of user. It is 
easier to determine whether someone is satisfied, or not, than to find some 
theoretically non -existent cardinal measure of welf are. However, if 'being satisfied' 
is not an appropriate management objective the addition of cardinality cannot be 
avoided. 
2.6 Extensions to the satisfaction model 
Shelby (1980) and Manning (1986) have developed more comprehensive 
models which incorporate the elements explaining the failure of the simple 
satisfaction model to adequately model recreational behaviour. 
2.6.1 The Shelby model 
Shelby's (1980) model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Shelby's crowding model 
Shelby describes his model in the following way; 
(1) Encounters are a function of density, but other factors will also have an 
effect.. (2) Perceived crowding is a function of density, encounters, 
preferences and expectations, and situational definition. Preferences, 
expectations, and situational definition may have a greater effect on 
perceived crowding than density and encounters. (3) Satisfaction is a 
function of density, encounters, perceived crowding, and other factors; but 
other factors may have a greater effect on satisfaction than density, 
encounters, or perceived crowding. (Shelby, 1980:45) 
In testing this model for Grand Canyon river runners Shelby found that; 
Density has a substantial effect on interaction, accounting for almost half 
the vatiation in contact rates. Density and interaction have virtually no 
impact on perceived crowding, although individual expectations and values 
have a major impact, explaining 49% of the variance. Density, interaction, 
and perceived crowding are not strongly related to satisfaction. Other 
noncrowding variables explain 31 % of the variance in satisfaction. (Shelby, 
1980:50-52) 
Shelby's findings suggest that manipulation of user densities may have little 
impact on satisfaction obtained from recreation experiences. However, the model 
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is not adequately specified to make this conclusion, since two of the elements are 
not explicitly included. Rationalisation could possibly be included in 'personal, 
social, wilderness, and other factors', but displacement does not enter the model. 
Shelby acknowledges these points when he claims that; 
satisfaction is probably not a useful criterion for managing use levels .... 
It often appears that nothing changes at high encounter levels as long as 
people are satisfied and healthy. But it is clear that something changes and 
that 'something' is the nature of the experience. (Shelby, 1980;53-54) 
2.6.2 The Manning Model 
Manning's (1986) crowding model, illustrated in Figure 3, is remarkably 
similar to the Shelby modeJ, but includes the displacement process, and includes 
other factors which help explain the density/contacts relationship more fully. It 
also recognises that researcher perceptions of contacts and satisfaction are likely 
to be dependent on the methods of measurement, and 'therefore are likely to differ 
from user perceptions. 
DENSITY CONTACTS 
umPATIllRNS 
Figure 3 Manning's crowding model 
Manning's graphical model is at variance with his text. For example, the 
text clearly indicates that the researcher may not get accurate measures of contacts 
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because of the measurement techniques used (page 73), while the diagram suggests 
that the method of measuring density partially determines the actual number of 
interparty encounters. The measurement method employed will, however, 
determine the researcher's perception of the relationship between density and 
contacts. Similar problems arise with measurement of satisfaction. Manning claims 
(page 77) that ''The relationship between crowding and satisfaction depends on how 
satisfaction is measured". It is presumed that he refers to the researcher perceived 
relationship, in which case the ability to accurately measure crowding must also be 
brought into question. Errors in measurement of contacts, crowding and 
satisfaction may be reasons for the low explanatory power of the simple satisfaction 
model. 
An important error appears to have been made in relation to the 
displacement process. Manning suggests that displacement occurs only because of 
crowding. However, it is apparent from the literature that Manning cites (Neilsen 
and Endo, 1977; Becker, 1981; Anderson and Brown, 1984) that displacement 
occurs for a multitude of reasons and, further, that even if someone feels crowded 
they may.still be satisfied and consequently not be displaced. These arguments lead 
to the conclusion that displacement should be a result of dissatisfaction, whatever 
the cause, and not just crowding. While rationalisation is not explicitly included in 
this model it could conceivably be incorporated amongst 'other satisfaction 
variables'. 
2.7 Management models 
The Manning and Shelby models do not fully define the term satisfaction. 
Essentially, these authors have not clearly specified management objectives. Since 
the evidence upon which their models are constructed measures satisfaction of 
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individuals the objective of these models is assumed to be (maximum) individual 
satisfaction. This, along with the displacement process, reduces the usefulness of 
these models for making management decisions designed to provide satisfying 
experiences of a pre-determined nature. The need for clear management objectives 
is identified in two separate frameworks for carrying capacity determination. 
2.7.1 Limits of acceptable change 
Stankey and associates have formalised the "Limits of Acceptable Change" 
approach to backcountry management (Frissell and Stankey, 1972; Stankey, 1973; 
Stankey and McCool, 1984; Stankey et a!., 1986). Rather than attempt to decide 
how much use is too much, the limits of acceptable change (LAC) approach 
concentrates on the types of conditions required for specific activities. These 
conditions relate to both the physical state of the resource and the nature of the 
expenence. 
The basic premise of the LAC concept is that change is a natural, inevitable 
consequence of recreation use. Both environmental and social changes are 
involved. Acceptance of this premise immediately redefines the traditional 
question about carrying capacity from 'How much use is too much?' to 
'How much change is acceptable?' (Stankey et al., 1985;527) 
The shift of emphasis to conditions is a result of the complexity of the 
relationship between use levels and conditions. It emphasises the need for personal 
judgements to determine what is acceptable; as well as where, and to what degree, 
change should be allowed to occur. Stankey (1973) provides a pictorial 
representation of the LAC management process, reproduced in Figure 4. 
The LAC process recognises that both ecological and recreational aspects 
are important in wilderness, and that they are both subject to change from a range 
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Figure 4 Limits of acceptable change management process (Stankey, 1973:3) 
of factors. Once a decision has been made on the acceptable limits of those 
changes, techniques can be adopted to limit the factors causing the changes so that 
conditions remain within the acceptable range. A step by step procedure for 
implementation of LAC is reported in Stankey et aZ. (1986) and is presented in 
Figure 5. 
The LAC planning system involves nine steps. Step one involves deciding 
upon the important aspects of management to which the LAC process may be 
applied. Steps two through four indicate the potential for parts of the management 
area to be allocated to different types of recreational opportunity, that is, identifies 
the physical constraints upon management choices. Step five involves identification 
of specific standards for different opportunity types, while step six generates some 
possible allocation scenarios. Steps seven and eight involve evaluation of the 
Figure 5 
STEP 5 
LAC 
PLANNING 
SYSTEM 
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AL TERNATIV.E 
Limits of acceptable change planning system (Stankey et ai., 
1986:528) 
implications of alternative choices and selection of a preferred allocation of the 
resource amongst opportunity types. Implementation and monitoring occur in step 
mne. 
The LAC approach takes management beyond the sphere of identifying 
cause and effect type relationships, although these are also part of the approach. 
Emphasis is placed on the importance of the effects of use, forcing management to 
state explicitly the types of experiences an area is desired to provide. According 
to Graefe et af. (1984:421); 
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the definition of the type of experience to be provided in a given area in 
essence requires 'a decision favouring one user group over competing 
groups seeking different types of experiences. While resource managers 
may be reluctant to make such decisions explicitly, it is important to 
recognise that this judgement is inherent to the carrying capacity 
question and will occur by default if not deliberately introduced. 
Burch (1984) is critical of much of the carrying capacity research, believing 
it has been looking for technical solutions to a value judgement problem. He 
suggests that regulating access to public lands is a political, rather than scientific, 
matter because of class conflict and social equity issues. This view is clarified by 
Becker et af. (1984) who indicate that a computational (technical) solution to a 
problem can only occur when there is a "high level of concurrence on social values 
and on scientific fact". In the carrying capacity case 'scientific facts' include the 
relationships between use levels and encounters and physical impacts on the 
resource. 'Social values' include information on the relative values of different 
physical and social outcomes. Knowledge of scientific facts and social values 
varies according to the management problem, leading Becker et af. (1984) to 
suggest the strategies for decision formulation shown in Figure 6. 
SOCIAL VALUES 
Agree Disagree 
Agree Computational Political 
SCIENTIFIC 
FACfS 
Figure 6 
Disagree Judgemental Inspirational 
Strategies for decision formulation - the relationship between 
values and facts 
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Since social values for backcountry recreation are not obvious (Burch, 1984) 
then, even when the 'scientific facts' are known, determination of carrying 
capacities must remain a political decision. The proponents of the LAC approach 
argue that the scientific facts are so complex that it is unlikely they will be 
understood, but that social values should be provided to resource managers from 
some external source, such as government. This information structure forces 
decision making into the judgemental realm (for the area manager, since social 
values are given), where the scientific fact of 'use level is too high' is determined 
by monitoring key indicators of social and physical conditions. 
2.7.2 Shelby and Heberlein conceptual model 
A conceptual framework with close parallels to the limits of acceptable 
change framework is that provided by Shelby and Heberlein (1984); it is illustrated 
in Figure 7. 
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COMPONENT 
EVALUATIVE 
COMPONENT 
Figure 1 
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BVALUAllVE 
STANDARDS 
Shelby and Heberlein's conceptual framework 
Shelby and Heberlein's framework takes care to separate the descriptive 
and evaluative components of carrying capacity determination. Management 
parameters are those aspects of the resource, and its use, over which managers 
have control. These include: level of use, type of use, behaviour of users, 
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dispersion of use through time and space, education of users, as well as physical 
measures such as the provision of huts, tracks, campsites, signs, and so on. 
Management parameters are actions taken by managers which influence the 
condition of the resource and the types of opportunities that are provided for 
resource users. The characteristics and opportunities which eventuate are the 
impact parameters. Some examples of backcountry recreation impact parameters 
include: condition of trails and other facilities, displacement of wildlife, presence 
of litter, and number of encounters with other users. 
The evaluative component contains two elements. One IS the type of 
experience that is sought, either by llsers or by management. This element 
represents a general statement of the objectives for management. Given the type 
of experience desired (e.g. pristine. low density, low amenity) there is a set of 
evaluative standards which determines whether the desired type of experience has 
been obtained. These criteria arc measurable definitions of acceptable levels of 
impact for particular experiences. For example, a low density experience might be 
defined as having less than two interparty encounters per day. 
The descriptive comp()nent de~cribes the state of the resource and the 
physical conditions recreators will experience for given management parameters. 
The evaluative component describes the level of impact parameters appropriate to 
any desired type of experience. Both components are therefore necessary to 
determine carrying capaci,y i,)f (iny [larticular type of expenence. It is also 
apparent that limiting numbc,'" '·r "~cr" may not be the only means of achieving a 
desired level of encounter:). ,) :~1:.m;lgement parameters which may affect the 
encounter impact parameter ':j; .'l_. ,c11cduling usc, redirecting use, and providing 
extra facilities or altcrnaLlv.:r: n , ,~,uniLics for users. 
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The Shelby and Heberlein model, like the LAC model, places the 
determination of carrying capacity in a different light to the satisfaction models in 
that it includes some objective for management. Shelby and Heberlein clarify; 
the evaluative component critically considers the different objective states 
produced by management parameters in an effort to determine their 
relative merits, and it is here that values enter the model. Management 
objectives defining the things an area should provide are official statements 
of value judgements. '" Most carrying capacity conflicts do not revolve 
around resource questions, but rather around questions about values. 
Social carrying capacity is the level of use beyond which experience 
parameters exceed acceptable levels specified by evaluative standards. 
(Shelby and Heberlein, 1984:438-443) 
Shelby and Heberlein establish three conditions necessary to determine 
social carrying capacity. 
1) there must be a known relationship between use level or other 
management parameters and experience (impact) parameters 
2) there must be agreement among relevant groups about the type of 
recreation experience to be provided 
3) there must be agreement among the relevant groups about the 
appropriate levels of the experience (impact) parameters 
The second condition is important if carrying capacity is to be determined 
in a computational manner (Becker et ai., 1984; see Figure 6). However, it appears 
most unlikely that this condition will be satisfied in practice. Carrying capacity 
could still be determined in the absence of this condition, but would be reliant upon 
a value judgement as to the relevant objectives for management, requiring a 
political solution. 
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l.7.3 Comparison of management models 
The Shelby and Heberlein and LAC frameworks are two ways of looking 
ott the same thing. The LAC approach is more general in that it allows for a choice 
between different scenarios. whereas the Shelby and Heberlein approach relies 
upon a single statement of what the type of experience is to be. However, given 
the type of experience desired, the Shelby and Heberlein approach requires 
selection of a set of standards (evaluative standards) against which actual 
conditions (impact parameters) are compared. This determines whether actual 
conditions are consistent with the desired experience type, and hence determines 
if the number of users (or other things· management parameters) needs to be 
changed to provide the desired experience. The elements of the Shelby and 
Heberlein approach therefore match those of the LAC approach. 
Neither approach is dear on the source of the decision of appropriate 
experience type, although Shelby and Heberlein seem to imply that users should 
agree on this (their second condition for determining carrying capacity), while the 
LAC approach is suggestive l)[ a political decision. Burch (1984) believes that user 
agreement is unlikely to he forthcoming, necessitating a political decision'. 
2.8 Conclusions 
There have he en tW() majM approaches toward modelling the role of 
congestion in bac.kcounlry r,:;:~c:al.ion. The first is based on the satisfaction model. 
This approach has encouEk,;,l Jifficultics in implementation because it does not 
have well defined manugCn1C!,\ ,.,hic'~livcs. Satisfaction is an inappropriate objective 
because of difficult iC'ii;: ,:'- '.' ;:]i;;ing :,ocial satisfaction from individual measures 
of satisfaction, and hCC1L! .'-. ':;: '.ii~placement and ratibnalisation processes. The 
second major approa(L ;;:"":~;: in ~he area I have defined as °management 
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modelling'. These models idetttify the need for specific management objectives, but 
they do not describe all of the processes occuring at recreation sites, or all of the 
issues that must be addressed by managers. Consequently, neither of these model 
types is well suited for application to management of backcountry recreation 
resources. However, each model offers important insights into recreation 
management. Consequently, an extended model, incorporating elements of both 
types of model and addressing the concerns raised about them is deVeloped in 
Chapter 3. 
3.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER THREE 
A NEW MODEL 
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This c'hapter builds upon the Shelby and Manning models to develop a more 
comprehensive conceptual model of recreation. It would be possible to expend 
great effort developing sophisticated models which incorporate all impacts and 
fced-ba<;k loops. It is not the objective of this chapter to build such a model. The 
aim is simply to incorporate the major linkages and deficiencies identified in 
existing models to gain as clear as possible a picture of current understanding of 
the role of management in determining system outcomes. The reason for building 
such a model is to identify the arcas in which resource economics can offer insights 
into the understanding and evaluation of components of the management process, 
and to clarify the limitations of the role of current economic modelling as an input 
to congestion management. 
To be complete. a model must show the impacts of all salient factors on 
individuals' behavioural choices, the impacts of those choices on aggregate 
outcomes, and how well those uutcomes meet management objectives. Deficiencies 
in the models presented so far raise several important questions which must be 
addressed in constructing a C\lmpklc recreation model, including: 
1) How can JifL:".'nt aGlI/~lr multiple management objectives be 
2) .:; !c\ d Jetermined, and' how 'do managemen! 
actions infL·_ ::,.. .'< i'.:n.:l? 
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3) Management imposes costs, either in money terms or by consuming 
valuable resources, or more indirectly through the "environmental 
costs" of the impacts occurring because of management actions. 
Where do the costs arise, and how should they be incorporated into 
the model? 
4) Where do costs to resource users arise, and how do they affect the 
benefits obtained from the resource? 
5) How should the differences between actual, user perceived, and 
researcher perceived measures of impacts be incorporated? 
6) How can the displacement process be included? 
7) Displacement and price-induced substitution effects may induce 
price and demand changes for other resources. How should these 
changes be incorporated? 
3.2 Management objectives 
Management objectives and their inter-relationships may be specified in an 
objective function. The role of the objective function is to specify whose benefits 
and costs are considered, what ~ of benefits and costs are considered, how the 
timing of those benefits and costs is considered, and how trade-off s between 
categories of benefits !lnd costs are to be made l . The objective function provides 
a means of comparing the net social value of alternative sets of outputs. Its 
ultimate role is to determine which of a feasible set of management alternatives 
yields the greatest social benefit. 
Alternatively, how different categories of costs and benefits are to be aggregated into a 
measure of social benefit. 
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The specification of an objective function is a value choice and 
consequently can take only a general form in this theoretical analysis. The models 
reviewed in Chapter 2 identify only three major objective components. The total 
benefits accruing from a recreation site depend on: 
(i) net benefits obtained by specified individuals, 
(ii) environmental conditions per se, and 
(iii) net costs of managing the site. 
In other words, the objective function has the following specification: 
SW == f(B,E,NMC) 
where; SW is the (scalar) magnitude of social welfare, 
Bis a vector or individual net benefits, 
E is a vector of environmental conditions, and 
NMC is net management costs. 
This specification identifies the trade-offs between benefits received by 
different individuals and accruing to diff crcnt groups (individuals, the environment, 
and management). It also identifies whose benefits are included through 
specification of the "¢ector B. Sp<.:cified individuals may be: society in general, 
existing facility users. or a target group of (potential) facility users (e.g. 
mountaineers, horse trekkers. or family groups of walkers), amongst others. 
Individual net hcncfils rna\' he treated in one of two ways: they may be 
ascribed a value by the dcci<,jonm:.;!·:cr. ~)r they may be determined by the individual 
in accord with the doctrinc ,,( '~'·"':·.U;'1cr ~~lVereignty. In the second case, individual 
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net benefits are determined by individuals' utility functions, and the opportunities 
and prices faced2, i.e.: 
where; f; is individual i's utility function, 
0; is the set of opportunities available to individual i, i.e. 
the impacts at all sites, and 
C i is the set of costs faced by individual i, including time 
and money prices of facility use. 
The inclusion of the vector of environmental conditions and individual net 
benefits in the objective function suggests that environmental conditions have some 
role in social welfare apart from their contribution to human well-being. It 
theref ore follows that the contribution of environmental conditions to social 
benefits depends upon the decisionmaker's view on the relevance of intrinsic values. 
Various definitions of intrinsic value exist (Pauls, 1990). Here, intrinsic values are 
defined as those values which exist in the resource, regardless of the existence of 
humans to value it. Anthropocentric values include use and existence values, where 
existence values are the value 1Q humans of knowing that a resource exists in a 
specific state, whether that value is because of the benefits obtained by present or 
future generations (Krutilla, 1967). If management is concerned only with 
anthropocentric values, then all values are captured in individual net benefits, 
which are determined by evaluation of the state of the resource in relation to the 
individual's preferences. For some people benefits may come directly from use of 
Both the Manning and Shelby crowding models conclude that each individual's satisfaction 
from resource use is determined by a variety of impact parameters and the individual's norms for the 
activity. Impact parameters can be manageable (e.g. the amount of use by the individual, the number 
and type of interparty contacts, degree of trampling of vegetation, type and quantity of litter) or 
non-manageable (e.g. weather conditions, the presence of biting insects). 
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the resource, while others may receive only existence benefits. Combinations of 
benefit sources are possible. 
Management concern with intrinsic values3, as is required under the 
Environment Act 1986, causes some conceptual difficnlty (Pauls, 1990). There is 
no means of accounting for intrinsic values in decisionmaking - there is no metric 
with which to measure intrinsic value, humans have no means of determining which 
of two states yields more intrinsic benefits, and there is no way of determining how 
to make trade-offs between intrinsic and anthropocentric values. For these reasons 
intrinsic values are not addressed further. This study adopts a strictly 
anthropocentric view of the world and attention is focused solely on 
anthropocentric values, allowing the state of the environment to be left out of the 
social objective function. This should not be interpreted to imply that the state of 
the environment is unimportant, simply that all of its impacts are measured through 
individual human benefits. The foregoing relationships are presented in Figure 8. 
It may be argued that inclusion of both objective function and net social 
benefit elements in this model is redundant. This is not the case. The objective of 
management is to maximise social net benefits. Social net benefits are defined by 
the objective function. Changing the objective function may change the level of 
social benefits obtained from the resource, ceteris paribus. The objective 
function is a choice variable, and is therefore an input to this model. Net social 
welfare is an outcome. Changes in management parameters may result in a new 
level of social benefits when the objective function remains unchanged. 
Assuming an objectivist definition of intrinsic value. In other words. value that exists in 
an object irrespective of any values placed upon it by humans. An alternative form of this definition 
is: the value an object would have if there were no humans to value it. 
50 
forth. Since it is widely accepted that each rationing method has unique effects 
upon who is excluded (Stankey and Baden, 1977; Shelby and Danley, 1979; Cullen, 
1985), it is apparent that rationing methods affect not only the level of use, but also 
the type of user and patterns of use. 
Recreational site demand depends upon a range of factors, summarised in 
Walsh (1986). The most important demand determinants are: 
1) Individuals' tastes and preferences (utility functions), which are largely 
determined by socioeconomic factors such as: age, education, gender, 
income, and ethnicity. 
2) Constraints on individual use6 • Each individual has a limited quantity of 
inputs needed to produce recreational experiences (e.g. time and money) 
and different experiences use those resources in different proportions. 
These two factors comhine to constrain individuals' choice sets; they also 
imply that individuals with identical tastes and preferences may choose 
different recreational activities, locations, and intensity of use. 
3) Individuals' expectations with regard to the conditions that are likely to be 
experienced at the recreation "ite (impact parameters). This is often 
referred to as site :lttracliveness or quality, and includes congestion impacts 
(Walsh, 1986); 
4) Opportunities provided Cit other sites, or by alternative activities. These 
include the physical availahility of substitute sites and activities, their 
quality, and the costs (monetary and otherwise) of use of those sites. 
Hence, a gene:-]: >~;;'.d:.JJ.i demand model may be expressed 
mathematically as: 
Bialeschki and IlCIHlc" .j, • .',; .: ~clephone survey of randomly selected Wisconsin 
households to identify conSl;:! '''.. · .. ·:;::o11<1i trail use. The major constraints (in decreasing 
order of frequency cited) WCr~: :j"'.. ,', .;·,l:!!:()O, money, health, availability. safety. and age. 
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where; Q;j is individual i's demand for use of facility j, 
f; represents individual i's tastes and preferences, 
C; is a vector expressing individual i's endowment with 
inputs (e.g. time and money) necessary for facility use, 
P is a vector of inputs required for use of facility j and all 
other facilities (e.g. time and money prices), and 
E j is a vector of individual i's perception of impact 
parameters at facility j and all other facilities. 
Each determinant of demand has impacts on both type of user and type of 
use7• For example, a reduction in work hours could allow people to travel to more 
distant sites, spend more time at close sites, or penetrate further into remote areas. 
Alternatively, if people expect that a trail is poorly defined, whether it is or not, 
they will use this information when deciding whether to use the trail. Those 
seeking pristine conditions might well be encouraged to use the trail, while those 
seeking an easy walk are likely to be discouraged from use. 
Figure 9 illustrates the determinants of actual use. Use has several aspects, 
including: type of user, spatial distribution, temporal distribution, and type of 
activity. Many of these aspects will be important determinants of the impacts of 
an individual visit. Location, timing and type of use, for example, are all likely to 
greatly influence both environmental impacts (e.g. erosion) and social impacts (e.g. 
encounters with others). 
Type of user refers to groups of people undertaking the same activity. but who have 
differing objectives for doing so. Examples inciudebackpackers who may undertake their activity for 
social. escapist. or aesthetic reasons. Type of use refers to different activities, such as backpacking 
and motorcycle riding, which can occur at the same location. 
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Constraints 
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Figure 9 Determinants of actual usc 
3.4 Management costs 
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Costs of managing a resource mil)' be categorised as direct or indirect. 
Direct costs are those costs which fail upon the manager as a result of management 
actions. Indirect costs may ~:rise because of impacts of management actions on 
,)thers, for example in terms (If foregone resource user benefits. Direct 
management costs 3risc from [hrc~: in:lin ~ources; 
1) The supply of scrvic:..: .. ·r i',l;.:iiitics which are independent of use levels 
(fixed costs). Exa In !,j c. ; n c: :Jde il:J lionai park visitor displays and the initial 
provision of huts. lr:;;i' .. i:id.i!2:nposting in backcountry areas. 
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2) Other costs are dependent upon the amount, . location, and type of use 
actually experienced (variable costs). Rubbish removal, trail maintenance, 
and search and rescue costs largely fall into this category. 
3) Further management costs occur when management places constraints on 
use. Administration of quotas, issue of permits, and entrance fee 
collection, for example, are all likely to require expenditure of both time 
and money. Depending on the type of allocation mechanism adopted, 
varying proportions of fixed and variable costs will be incurred. The costs 
of administering use limits are determined by two main factors; the type of 
allocation mechanism chosen, and the number of people wishing to gain 
access to the resource. An example of the latter impact is provided by 
reservation. systems, where greater demand for access increases 
management costs because each application requires manager interaction. 
The same is not true for effort restrictions, such as closing-off access roads, 
whose costs are independent of demand. Some resource allocation 
mechanisms (e.g. entrance fees ) generate income for management agencies. 
When those tools are used, it is conceivable that net direct management 
costs could be negative -(i.e. the revenue generated from use of such a tool 
could more than cover the costs associated with use of the tool. For 
example, it may be necessary to build and staff entrance stations to collect 
an entrance fee, but the revenue collected could exceed those costs, 
generating a net cash inflow for management). 
It should be noted that direct management costs could be avoided by: not 
providing or maintaining any facilities, not informing or "cleaning-up" after 
recreationists, nor otherwise managing recreational use. To a large extent, 
management costs are determined by management obj~ctives in so far as they 
specify acceptable impact parameters and management supplied services. Total 
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management costs are therefore a function of management parameters and amenity 
use levels. 
3.5 Individuals' costs 
Those people who (potentially) gain benefits from a resource incur costs 
from a variety of sources. People not wishing to use a resource, but who obtain 
benefits from knowledge of its existence may incur costs in order to obtain 
knowledge about the resourcc. Costs may be incurred before any use takes place 
if potential users incur expenses, or effort, in obtaining rights to use a resource. 
For example, costs may be incurred in attempting to secure reservations at a 
campground even though those efforts are unsuccessful. The type of use allocation 
system imposed by management will clearly affect the nature and magnitude of 
such costs (Shelby and Danley, lY79). 
Actual use may crcate transportation. gear, and opportunity costs as well 
as direct costs imposed through site entrance and facility user fees (Walsh, 1986). 
Walsh indicates that the two most important costs associated. with outdoor 
recreation are the money costs of travel and the time costs of travel and site use. 
In hoth cases these costs arise hccau~c of the opportunities foregone by their use 
in this activity. Money could be used to produce other types of benefits, and time 
could be spent in other pursuits. including work and leisure. 
3.6 Actual versus ~nc:~sured impacts 
Shelby and Cuivin : ; '<':.' .',~\;; shown that the number of contacts actually 
occurring, the number me:h,; l .. : "\ ";::' .. ca rchers, and the number perceived by users 
can differ. Changes in m~il~::_-: ",~ ::;; j xiiI be reflected in changes in actual contacts. 
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However, Manning (1986:73) indicates that it is the "visitors perceived reality" that 
influences satisfaction, a view supported by the empirical evidence of Chambers 
and Price (1986). Regardless of whether user welfare is a function of actual or 
perceived contacts, if researchers estimate welfare as a function of researcher 
measured contacts, and these are different from actual and/or perceived contacts, 
the underlying relationship may not be well represented by the researcher's models. 
It is possible that existing relationships will not be identified by researchers. 
Consequently, such models are unlikely to be capable of identifying optimal use 
levels. 
Different methods of measuring satisfaction are reported to provide 
inconsistent results (Manning, 1986:75-76). It is unclear which is the correct way 
to measure the benefits of a recreation experience, leading Manning to suggest the 
need for consistency of measurement technique to allow inter-temporal and inter-
site comparisons to be made. 
Recent evidence (Anderson and Kanters, 1988) reveals that recreator 
reports on use levels are likely to be grossly inaccurate, suggesting that researcher 
information on use levels is more appropriately obtained by independent methods 
such as traffic counts and entrance records, wherever possible. 
The differences between perceived and researcher measured variables are 
not important in conceptual models which seek only to identify the underlying 
relationships which determine the outcomes of the recreation experience for 
recreationists. These differences do, however, become important when those 
relationships are subject to empirical modelling, especially if those models are to 
be used as a basis for making management decisions. Clearly, the existence of 
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measurement problems for so many of the key variables in existing models could 
easily hide important relationships. 
3.7 Displacement 
Displacement is the result l)f dissatisfaction arising from unrealised 
expectations (Becker, 1981). As long as people learn from their experiences, it is 
apparent that expectations will change when impacts (manageable or 
non-manageable) differ from expectations of those impacts - at least in the long 
runS. Each visit to the backcounrry provides rccreationists with more information 
on which to base expectations. Since expectations of impact parameters are 
important in determining individual use it is apparent that changes in expectations 
may cause changes in usc. When changes result in individuals reducing or 
discontinuing use those people are said to have been displaced. Dispiacement may 
therefore be modelled as a result of changed expectations, which arise from 
changes in perceptions of impact parameters. 
3.8 Partial/general equilibrium 
Management objectives may he specified for a single resource (site), or for 
a whole series of sites. or in rerms d aggregate social welfare obtained from use 
of all resources. In many C:.lSCS it is iikcly that management actions at one site will 
cause price changes at other\. ":)imilurly, displacement may cause changes in the 
nature of the experienc~ ,\I -.U("WUlC sites. In these cases, total social welfare 
impacts can only be cvaJu,Hcd ;". c,mparing the changes in benefits at all sites at 
which prices and/n[ cong'.:"" i,y' _if,_c,') change (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982). 
Expectations may '_::lJ:-,:--
supplied hy management. friend, __ 
impact parameters at thc sitC: h-,,-
-,,_, :,'>l1~-. other than experience. For example. information 
"_ -- "::".~~. may also be important influences on expectations of 
.. _ .• :::". :1ild at other sites. 
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Analyses which look only at the impacts on an individual site are termed 
partial equilibrium studies, while those that account for interaction effects are 
termed general equilibrium studies. Partial equilibrium models require that data 
need be collected for only one site, and far less modelling is involved. While 
general equilibrium studies are the conceptually correct approach in most instances, 
review of recreation studies reveals that partial equilibrium studies are the norm. 
Even if management objectives are specified in terms of the benefits from 
a single site, interaction effects are important. Actions at the target site may 
induce price changes at other sites. Since demand for any good is a function of all 
prices (amongst other things), such price changes can feed back to the original site, 
resulting in shifts in demand for that site. For example, imposition of an entrance 
fee to visit an un congested public forest makes use of other recreation facilities 
relatively more attractive and may result in many recreationists transferring their 
use to a neighbouring private forest. In other words, demand for the private forest 
increases as a result of an increase in price at the public forest. If the private 
operator responds to this increase in demand by increasing the price for use of the 
private forest, the public forest will become relatively more attractive. Demand for· 
the public forest will increase. This process may proceed through several cycles, 
until some equilibrium is reached, or may go on indefinitely. Benefits of use of the 
public site (at the high price) would therefore be somewhat higher after the price 
of use of the private forest was increased. Hence, even if management objectives 
are specified for only a single site, a general equilibrium model may be needed to 
make optimal management decisions. 
In many cases inaccuracies which result from use of partial equilibrium 
studies are expected to be minor, encouraging use of this more simple approach. 
Often a facility has either no close substitutes, or very many close substitutes. In 
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either case, management of the site 10 question has little, if any, impact on 
substitute prices, implying that partial equilibrium analysis is appropriate. Further, 
because backcountry recreation is so widespread, management actions at one site 
are unlikely to change input prices. For example, a complete ban on use of any 
single national park would be most unlikely to affect the price of camping 
equipment because many recreators would recreate elsewhere, and those who did 
not would probably constitute an insignificant proportion of the total market for 
camping gear. In many instances the price of inputs (e.g. fuel, one of the most 
important inputs to outdoor recreation (Walsh, 1986)) is determined on 
international markets, reducing further the probability of management actions at 
anyone site affecting input prices. 
A further situation in which partial equilibrium models are acceptable is 
when there are no congestion effects and prices of substitute facilities are held 
constant. This is expected to be true of many publicly provided outdoor recreation 
facilities, where fees are fixed for particular types of facility, or there are no fees. 
When congestion is present, partial equilibrium models are acceptable in those 
cases in which displacement occurs into uncongested areas in which the addition of 
the displaced users docs not push site use above congestion thresholds. In these 
cases neither price nor the quality nf the experience at the substitute site change. 
General equilibrium effects can be modelled by recognising that 
management parameters. incimiing constraints to use, of one site effect impact 
parameters at other ~itc~. Cli'l"cqucntly, expectations of impact parameters at 
other sites change, resultii1g i:1 \ :'~'/i;;d set of individual demands for all sites. 
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3.9 Revised carrying capacity model 
The elements identified in the preceding sections are now incorporated into 
a more complete model for carrying capacity determination, extending the 
contributions from Shelby and Manning. The model is illustrated in Figure 10. The 
objective of the revised carrying capacity model is to maximise social benefits, 
which are specified in some management objective (or. social welfare) function. 
Definition of social benefits may be provided by government or managerial decree, 
or through some form of aggregation of individual welfares. 
The variables which can be controlled by facility managers include: 
management imposed constraints to use, other management parameters, 
recreationists' expectations (via control of information - a management parameter), 
and the behaviour of users (through education an&'~egulation - also management 
parameters). Altering any of these variables has the potential to alter use levels, 
impact parameters, and hence social benefits. Derivation of the actual use level 
was discussed in an earlier section. The number of interparty contacts, categorised 
by where, when, and with whom they occur, is influenced by use levels, topography, 
and other management parameters. Other management parameters include factors 
such as: number of trail miles, number of trail intersections, restrictions on 
direction of travel, restrictions on campsite location, and so on. The actual levels 
of other impact parameters (e.g. trail condition and wildlife populations) are 
influenced by actual use levels (by category), other management parameters (e.g. 
trail maintenance), and non-manageable impacts, including weather, insect 
popula tions, etc. 
Individuals, who may be users or non-users, are unlikely to notice all 
impacts, and those noticed may not be perfectly perceived. Therefore, perceptions 
of impact parameters are likely to be different from actual values. It is on these. 
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perceptions that individuals judge the (gross) value of their experience, or the 
resource, and revise expectations of impact parameters for the future. Net 
individual benefits are influenced by gross individual benefits and individual costs. 
Social benefits are a function of individual (user and non-user) benefits and 
management costs. 
While these elements are sufficient to outline a conceptual model of 
benefits arising from backcountry recreation, it is important to incorporate the 
likely differences which are caused by measurement errors if the model is to be 
used for management in a practical setting. Important discrepancies may occur in 
measurement of impact parameters, and in measures of individual and social 
benefits. 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter has adapted existing carrying capacity models to develop a 
more conceptually sound model. Existing models were found to be deficient in 
several important areas, including" definition of objectives and the nature of factors 
influencing demand. 
In the next chapter the model developed in Figure 10 will be used to 
identify aspects of the resource management process to which resource economics 
can be applied, and interactions within the model will be structured in economic 
models. The model developed in Figure 10 serves as a reminder of the 
simplifications embodied in economic models of sub-sections of the recreation 
system. 
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Cl!APTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC MODELS OF CONGESTION 
4.1 Introduction 
Goods may be categorised on a spectrum from private to public. Pure 
private goods can bestow benefits only upon the person possessing them. The pure 
private good owner has the ability to costlessly exclude others from possession of 
the good. In a world consisting only of pure private goods, which are tradeable 
without transaction costs, (perfect markets) a Pareto optimal outcome is 
automatically achieved by the actions of selfish individuals. At the other end of the 
spectrum are pure public goods. These goods are capable of bestowing benefits on 
many people simultaneously. The amount of use (or level of benefits obtained) by 
one person does not affect anyone else's ability to use (or the level of individual 
benefits obtained from use of) the good. It is not possible to exclude anyone from 
using a pure public good. Because of their non-excludable nature, there is little 
incentive for private provision of pure public goods. A major role of goveniment 
is to coercively tax people to provide public goods. Public goods supplied by 
government in this way include: the legal system, defence, health services, 
transportation services, and preserved n.atura,l areas. 
Most goods do not fil ~ilhcr of these extreme cases. Exclusion is possible, 
but only at some cost to the ~xcluder. Transactions are not costiess, and 
externalities exist. Congestion is (mc form of externality. It is a situation where 
individuals are affected by 'h:.: ~lClions of others without being able to influence 
those actions directly. in 'lL ~im pIest case it is not the specific activities 
undertaken by others whicil (L::~.:!·:iic the experience, but simply the number of other 
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participants in an activity. Individuals may become congested by others pursuing 
the same activity as themselves (i.e. too many skiers on the mountain), or by those 
pursuing other activities (powerboats detracting from sailboaters experiences), or 
a combination of the two. Inter-activity congestion is often referred to as conflict. 
4.2 The economic model 
The simplest case to model consists of a fixed size facility catering for a 
single activity which is susceptible to in-group congestion. Examples of such cases 
would be. downhill ski areas and art galleries which cater for only one activity, but 
in each case the enjoyment of the experience is strongly influenced by the number 
of other users of the facility. At ski fields tow queues become longer and there is 
more risk of collision on the slopes, while at art galleries it becomes more difficult 
to obtain an unobstructed view as numbers of participants increase. The following 
analysis draws heavily upon the theoreticalf oundations laid by Dorfman (1984), but 
builds upon them to analyse the distribution of benefits, inter-activity congestion 
and efficiency of alternative allocation methods. 
The net benefit any individual gains from use of a facility is determined, 
inter alia, by the number of other users, the amount of use made by the individual, 
and the cost (to the individual) of use. This information is summarised in the 
individual's demand curve. When expressing demand in two-dimensional price-
quantity space it is necessary to draw a family of demand curves to represent how 
the individual is affected by the amount of use others make of the facility. Each 
of these curves is a constant crowding demand curve (Dorfman, 1984) - it 
expresses how much use the individual would make of a facility at any price, for a 
given level of use by others. 
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Individuals demand a level of use of the congestible facility (Xi) which is 
dependent upon the price of use (p) and the amount of use by others (X), holding 
other prices, income, etc. constant. 
Xi 4.1 
Equation 4.1 is the individual's demand function for the congestible facility. 
Equation 4.1 is a constant crowding demand function whenever X is fixed. Demand 
functions for non-congestible goods arc special cases of Equation 4.1 in which 
arijax=o for all X. In that case the demand function is simply the familiar Xi = 
Total use is the sum of use by all individuals. 
4.2 
= F(p,X) 
Equation 4.2 is the aggregate demand function. As with the individual case, 
the aggregate demand function may he expressed in price-quantity space by fixing 
X at a constant level, thereby defining an aggregate constant crowding demand 
function. It is also possible to express price, or marginal willingness to pay, as a 
function of use parameters - the inverse of Equation 4.2. 
4.3 
Only when Xd is equal ',0 X arc expectations fully satisfied, a necessary 
condition for equilibrium. Suhtiwiing the equilibrium condition in Equation 4.3 
yields the inverse market dcm<lnd r~Incti()n (Equation 4.4a) and the market demand 
function (Equation 4.4b). 
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p = 4>(X,X) 4.4a 
= 6(X) 
x G(p) 4.4b 
Although it is a simple relationship between price and quantity, the market 
demand function is determined by the crowding-dependent demand function l . 
Moreover, for common demand specifications the two types of demand function 
will have the same specification, linear crowding-dependent inverse demand 
functions, for example, imply linear inverse market demand functions (Table 2). 
When price is used to ration use, equilibrium use level is determined from 
the market demand function. Consumers' surplus benefits equal the area beneath 
the constant crowding demand curve corresponding to the current level of use, 
above the price charged. 
The introduction of the notion that contacts, rather than use level. are important in 
determining benefits does not alter the concept of constant crowding demand curves. With contacts: 
Marginal benefits = A(c,Q) where c is number of contacts, and 
Q is level of use demanded. 
But. the number of contacts is influenced by the number of people on site: 
c = f(k) where k is actual level of use (effective 
demand). 
Therefore. 
A = A(f(k).Q) 
= B(k.Q), as before. 
The equilibrium condition is k = Q. 
We now have the concept of a constant contact demand curve. Since the number of contacts (however 
defined) may be greater or less than total use (multiple and zero contacts with other users are 
possible). it is not possible to determine the relative locations of the constant crowding and constant 
contact demand curves !! priori. If resource users are well informed and there is no uncertainty in 
the relationship between use level and contacts, knowledge of total use (k) determines number of 
contacts (c), and either k or c may be used in analysis. i.e. 
A(c,Q) = B(k,Q). 
Analysis will proceed using the actual level of use as the independent parameter of the demand 
relationship, recognising that this may be interpreted at any point as the number of contacts. 
Table 2 Inverse demand specifications 
Crowding-dependent inverse 
demand specification 
<I> = a + bQ + ck 
<I> = a+b.log(Q)+c.log(k) 
10g(<I» = a + bQ +ck 
10g(<I» = a+b.log(Q)+c.log(k) 
<I> = a+bQ-l+ ck- 1 
<I> = a + ~)bjQj + cjk i ) 
Market inverse 
demand specification 
6 = a+(b+c)Q 
6 = a+(b+c).logQ 
log(6) = a+(b+c)O 
log(6) = a+(b+c)JogO 
6 a + (b+C)Q-l 
6 = a+I:(bj+cj)Qj 
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Figure 11 depicts the two types of demand curve and their relationship. At 
price p. the equilibrium level of use is X·. Rent accruing to the resource owner is 
Area A, and consumers' surplus is Area B. As others have indicated (e.g. 
Anderson, 1980; McConnell, 1980), the area beneath the market demand curve 
(Area A plus Area B plus Area C) provides an overestimate of total benefits 
obtained from use of a congestible good (Area A plus Area B). 
Benefits from use of congestible facilities fall into two categories; those 
accruing to resource owners or managers, and those accruing to resource users. 
The first category is termed producer's surplus, rent, or profits. It is equal to the 
difference between revenue earned and costs incurred by the manager. The second 
category of benefits is termed consumers' surplus, which is equal to the total 
benefits accruing to consumers less the costs of use incurred by users. Total 
benefits from resource use are equal to the sum of these two benefit types, in the 
absence of externalities which affect the welfare of those who do not use or manage 
the resource. In the absence l)f management costs, the different categories of 
benefit may be expressed malhematically as: 
Rent'" R = X.p 4.5 
= X.S(X) 
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$ 
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p - 6(X) 
c 
p* 
_-- p - <I>(Xd,X*) 
Xd 
X· 
Figure 11 Market and constant crowding demand curves. 
== G(p).p where G(p) is the inverse market demand curve. 
x 
Total benefits = B = J 4>(X rl,X)dX d wl1crc X = G(p) 
o 
Consumers' surplus 
x 
CS = J l4>(X d,X) - pldX d 
o 
x 
= J 4>(X d,X)dX d - X.9(X) 
o 
= B-R 
4.6 
4.7 
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While aggregate measures of benefit are likely to be of interest to managers 
(for example, in determining efficient use levels and the revenue implications of 
price rationing), per-capita measures are likely to be more important for individual 
resource users. It is these measures which, to a large extent, determine the 
popularity and/or acceptability of management programmes. Consumers are likely 
to be interested in their expected utility levels for alternative management 
approaches. Some per-capita measures which may be important are: 
(i) mean consumer surplus per open access unit of use2 (Equation 
4.8), 
(ii) mean consumer surplus per actual unit of use with rationing ill 
place (Equation 4.9), and 
(iii) mean consumer surplus per potential unit of use at the rationed 
level of use (Equation 4.10). 
eSa = CS.[G(p=O)]"l where G is the market demand function. 4.8 
eSb = CS.[XRr1 where XR is the rationed use level. 4.9 
esc = CS.[F(p=0,xRn1 where F is the aggregate constant crowding 4.10 
demand function for use level XR. 
4.3 The supply side 
Supply costs are important determinants of supplier behaviour and of total 
benefits obtained from resource use. Producer's surplus is the level of net revenue 
accruing to the supplier after deduction of supply costs. 
Care must be taken to differentiate between number of users and number of units of use. 
For some facilities these two measures will be nearly identical (for facilities which one would only 
expect to use once during the relevant time period, e.g. annual visits to the Grand Canyon by New' 
Zealanders). By choosing a short enough period, the two measures may always be made to coincide. 
For many practical situations this will not be possible. Expressing benefits on a per capita basis will 
require information on the distribution of (potential) use across the (potential) user population. 
Equations 4.8 to 4.10 are therefore expressed in terms of units of use. 
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Producer's surplus '" PS p.x - TC(X) 
where TC(X) is the total cost of 
supplying X units of the activity. 
For a social optimum total producer's surplus plus total consumers' surplus 
must be maximised. A necessary condition3 for a social optimum is Equation 4.11 
(Dorfman's condition 2). 
x' 
4> (X * ,X *) + f 4>2(X d,X *)dX d - MC(X *) :: 0 4.11 
o 
where MC(X) is marginal cost of 
supplying unit X. 
Equation 4.11 has a straightforward interpretation. The benefits accruing 
to the marginal user plus the change in benefits to intra-marginal users because of 
increased congestion must equal the marginal costs of supplying an extra unit of use 
for a social optimum. In the absence of congestion effects 4>2=0 and Equation 4.11 
reduces to the standard result, price equals marginal cost. 
A non-discriminating, profit-maximising, monopolist will allow the amount 
of use which equates marginal revenue (evaluated on the market demand curve) to 
the monopolist's marginal costs (Equation 4.12). 
MC(X) = P + X.[dpjdX] 4.12 
= 4>(X,X) + X·[4>l(X,X) + 4>lX,X)] 
Second-order conditions must also be met. 
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Comparison of Equations 4.11 and 4.12 indicates that monopoly supply will 
be socially optimal only if Equation 4.13 is satisfied. 
x f <l>iXd,X)dX d = X·[<I>1(X,X) + <l>2(X,X)] 4.13 
o 
This expression may be interpreted as stating that for monopoly to be 
efficient there must be an X such that the total cost to infra-marginal resource 
users of a marginal change in number of users is equal to the reduction in rent the 
monopolist receives from infra-marginal users with a marginal change in number 
of users. Equation 4.13 is different from Dorfman's condition for efficiency of 
monopoly (Dorfman, 1984: p.96). Dorfman fails to account for the equilibrium 
condition in determining the total derivative of price with respect to number of 
users. Dorfman interprets dpjdX to be tJpjax. This is incorrect because of the 
interaction between Xd and X, which must be equal at equilibrium. Therefore: 
~ c3<I> ax d + c3<I> =--.--
dX ax d ax ax 
= 4>1 + <1>2 since aXd 1 = ax 
A change in X causes two effects. First, it shifts the constant crowding 
demand curve (<1>2), affecting the willingness to pay of the marginal user. Second, 
it is necessary to change price (<1>1) to influence the marginal resource user's 
participation decision, that is, to change Xd so that it remains equal to X. 
Equation 4.13 is not satisfied for all demand specifications, but could be 
satisfied by many demand specifications. A special case occurs when <I> is constant 
with respect to Xd, that is, the constant crowding demand curves are parallel to 
each other and horizontal. As Dorfman (1984) indicates, no consumers' surplus is 
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obtained, total benefit is simply producer's surplus, and maximisation of producer's 
surplus will therefore maximise total benefits. Note that wheu this particular case 
is satisfied 4>1 =0 and Dorfman's condition for the optimality of monopoly is 
correct, bnt only as a special case of Equation 4.13. 
Equation 4.11 identifies what is commonly referred to as the efficient use 
level. The efficient use level maximises use benefits to society. Some of those 
benefits are in the form of rent, and some are consumers' surplus. However, 
efficiency maximisation may not be the sole objective of management. For 
example, a non-discriminating monopolist may wish to maximise revenue or rent 
obtained from a resource. Alternatively, it may be wished to maximise benefits 
obtained by resource nsers (consumers' surplus). 
The condition for consumers' surplus maximisation are identified by 
differentiating Equation 4.7 with respect to X and invoking the equilibrium 
condition, yielding Equation 4.13. Therefore, when Equation 4.13 is satisfied 
·monopoly is efficient and maximises the benefits accruing to resource users. In this 
case, monopoly control of congestible resources is efficient and is in the best 
interest of consumers. 
For many demand specifications. Equation 4.13 will have no solution, or 
will result in a minimum at X = O. In these cases consumers' surplus is maximised 
when use is maximised, i.c. when price is zero. Iuspection of Equation 4.13 
indicates that very few funclion~ \viii (esult in internal maxima. In these cases the 
open access situation yicids :.h-:...' p'c~ltest aggregate surplus to users. While a 
reduction in usc may incrca:.,c 1 ':)~,.~i :--,c~lefits, this will be at the cost of consumers' 
surplus - assuming that pric(:_'_ :uc '.r:-;,cQ to limit usc. 
72 
4.4 A simple example 
The linear case illustrates the findings of the previous sections. 
Let cp a + bXd + cX and therefore a = a + (b+c)X 
Assuming, for simplicity, that there are no supply costs and solving Equations 4.11 
to 4.13 yields the following necessary conditions for optimality: 
Total benefits are maximised when: 
Producer's surplus is maximised when: 
Consumers' surplus is maximised when: 
x = -a/(b +2c) 
X = -a/(2(b+c)] 
-bX = 0 
The first two conditions satisfy second order criteria and illustrate that, 
with linear constant crowding demand curves, monopoly supply is sub-optimal 
unless b=O. The consumers' surplus condition is satisfied when b=O (the special 
case of horizontal constant crowding demand curves), in which case there is no 
consumers' surplus implying that any X maximises consumers' surplus. If b*O then 
X must equal zero to satisfy the condition for maximum consumers' surplus, but 
this fails to satisfy the second order condition and yields a minimum. For the 
linear case, consumers' surplus is maximised when use is maximised, i.e. there is 
a corner solution which is satisfied when cp(X,X) =0. Solving this expression 
identifies the condition for maximisation of consumers' surplus with linear constant 
crowding demand curves, i.e. consumers' surplus is maximised when X = -
a/(b+c). 
In the linear case where prices are used to ration use the optimal level of 
use differs for each objective, i.e. 
Xmaximum PS < Xmaximum B < Xmaximum CS X open access 
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4.5 More than one type of use 
Let there be two types of use (activities), X and Y, each of which is subject 
to both inter and intra-group congestion. The inverse constant crowding demand 
functions for X and Yare <I> and -W respectively. Marginal use benefits (marginal 
willingness to pay) are determined by the actual amount of the use in question (Xd 
or y d) and by the total amount of each type of use expected (X and Y). 
<I> == <I>(Xd,X,Y) 
-W == -W(yd,X,Y) 
-Wi < () 
Vi 
Vi 
Benefits are maximised when X· and Y' are chosen to satisfy conditions 4.14 and 
4.15 (assuming an internal solution). 
X' y' 
:~ = <l>CX"X*,Y*) + f <I>::C·)dX d + I */.)dy d - MCOC*) 
o 0 
4.14 
= 0 
X' Y' 
~~ = 1\JcY*,X',Y') + I ¢l":,dX d + J *l·)dy d - MCcY*) 
o '-1 
= 0 
When selfish individuals have tlpcn access to a congestible facility for which 
no fee is charged, they will d1()()SC levels of use (xa and ya) to satisfy conditions 
4.16 and 4.17 when they perce::'.c ihc level of the other activity to be parametric (Xb 
4.16 
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4.17 
At equilibrium all expectations are satisfied, implying that Equations 4.16 
and 4.17 cannot hold simultaneously, resulting in the final outcome of Equations 
4.18 and 4.19. 
ct>(XC,xc, YO) = 0 
w(YC,XC,YC) = 0 
4.18 
4.19 
Comparison of Equations 4.14 and 4.15 with Equations 4.18 and 4.19 leads 
to the conclusion that: if the resource is not managed, users of each type will 
demand more than the efficient level of use for the level of the other activity. This 
situation is conceptually similar to two fleets exploiting a single fishery (Anderson, 
1986: pp.189-191), and may be analysed by a similar reaction-function approach. 
Three equilibrium outcomes are possible: activities X and Y can coexist, activity X 
occurs (no activity Y), activity Y occurs (no activity X). As with the fishery case, 
both activities may need to be managed to ensure an efficient resource allocation. 
4.6 A more general approach 
The preceeding section has addressed the allocation of a resource assuming 
that both activities occur throughout the management unit. Special case outcomes 
occur when the efficient amount of one type of activity is zero. In that case the 
management problem reduces to identifying the optimal amount of a single activity. 
A more general problem concerns allocation of the resource amongst 
different use types. That is, some of the resource may be allocated only to activity 
X, some only to activity Y, and some to both activities X and Y. The management 
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problem then becomes one of identifying (i) how much of the resource to allocate 
to each activity type, and (ii) how much of each activity should be permitted in each 
type of area. If pricing is to be used as the rationing method, the secon~ 
management problem can be viewed alternatively as identifying the optimal price 
to charge in each type of area. 
The complete set of resource allocation options is presented in Figure 12. 
Geo«al 
case 
Lv Lx Lv 
Bx.tr • ..q~1U 
Lx Lv 
Resouroe designated Lx I.a for use type X only. 
Resource designated Lv Is for u&e type Y only. 
~.,.........., ~ Is for both US<> types X and Y. 
Figure 12 Taxonomy of allocation choices. 
The ragged lines within the boxes indicate non-fixed boundaries of choice. While 
76 
the total amount of resource is fixed, the amount allocated to each type of us(,; is 
a choice. The most general problem is to decide how much resource to allocate to 
each type of use (X, Y, and mixed). Special case outcomes occur when only twp 
types of area are permitted. Extra-special cases occur when only one type of use 
is permitted. By definition, the efficient solution to the general case can be no less 
efficient than the efficient solution to any special case, which can in turn be no less 
efficient than the efficient solution to any associated extra-special case. 
For simplicity, assume there are no management or transaction costs. Total 
benefits are then simply the sum of consumer surplus and rent across all use area 
types. Let the quantities of the two activities be X and Y in the single-activity 
areas, and x and y in the mixed-activity area. Define the inverse demand functions 
f or each area type as: 
Activity X only area: 
Activity Y only area: 
Inverse demand functions for the area allowing both activities X and Yare: 
(i) 
(ii) 
where; 
e' 
Activity X: 
Activity Y: . 
_ (d EX • Y ) Y - Y x, ,e ,e ,Pw 
_(dEYxy) 
€ - € y, ,e ,e ,PY 
The expected density of type X recreators in the area 
allowing only activity X 
The expected density of type Y recreators III the area 
allowing only activity Y 
The expected density of type X recreators III the area 
allowing both activities Wand Y 
The expected density of type Y recreators III the area 
allowing both activities X and Y 
The actual amount of use by type X recreators in the area 
allowing only activity X 
The actual amount of use by type Y recreators in the area 
allowing only activity Y 
The actual amount of use by type W recreators in the area 
allowing both activities X and Y 
The actual amount of use by type Y recreators in the area 
allowing both activities X and Y 
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The price of access to the area allowing both activities X 
and Y 
Px 
py 
The price of access to the area allowing only activity X 
The price of access to the area allowing only activity Y 
Total value of the resource is then: 
x y , y 
V = f ct(-)dX d + f P(-)dY d + 
o 0 
fy(-)dx d + f€(-)dyd 
o 0 4.20 
The allocation problem is to find the optimal distribution of the resource 
to each of the three uses, subject to the constraint on resource availability, i.e.; 
where; 
amount of resource allocated to activity X only 
amount of resource allocated to activity Y only 
amount of resource allocated to both activities X and Y 
L total amount of resource available 
The numbers of facility users may be controlled directly (i.e. X, Y, x and 
yare the choice variables) or indirectly via price5 (Px, py, and PM are the choice 
variables. Since use levels are determined by price, optimisation of either leads to 
the same solution. For convenience, optimality conditions are determined f or the 
direct control case here. 
The Lagrangian is: 
First order, necessary conditions for an internal maximum are: 
aF 
ay 
y 
f ap(-) d aVl iN3 aV4 13(-) + --dY + -- + -- + --= 0 oaY ayaY ay 
aV2 
+ -- + 
ax 
iN4 = 0 
ax 
aF fY ae(-) d iNl iN2 iN3 
- = e(-) + --dy + -- + -- + -- = 0 
ay oay ay ay ay 
Vi, i e(X,Y,M) 
7f:1, 
4.21 
4.22 
4.23 
4.24 
4.25 
4.26 
"- is the marginal value of the resource. If use of the resource is not controlled 
only the first terms in Equations 4.21-4.24 will be considered by individuals. Only 
Equations 4.23 and 4.24 would be considered if the resource was not allocated to· 
separate use areas, resulting in satisfaction of Equations 4.18 and 4.19 which were 
shown to be inefficient. The potential gains from adopting a resource 
allocation/usc rationing scheme are found by comparing the total benefits under 
the alternative scenarios. Rationing would incur positive transaction costs, which 
would have to be considered to determine the efficiency and/or profitahility of 
rationing. 
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4.7 Introducing time: paths to equilibrium 
Following the analysis of Wilman et al. (1987) it is possible to construct 
functions which describe how different types of user change their levels of use of 
a resource in response to the conditions encountered during usc. Conditions 
include management parameters and the number of each type of user - either 
encountered, or in total4 • 
Suppose that there are two activities5 taking place at a resource. Resource 
users participating in each activity use the number of participants in each activity 
(x and y), as well as the vector of management parameters (m), to evaluate their 
recreational experiences. Let decisions about future usc be hased upon existing 
conditions, then these relationships may be expressed as: 
!Ix 
dt 
!Ix 
dt 
f(x,y,m) 
g(x,y,m) 
4.27 
4.28 
Assume decreasing marginal benefits of encountering other users engaged 
in either activity. Then, 
M /5x < 0, M /5y < 0, 5g/5x < 0, and 5g/5y < 0 4.29 
As the number of participants in any activity increases, resource users (who, 
by Equation 4.29, arc assumed to be crowd-averse) feci more crowded. 
In many instances it is possible that usc levels will affect environmental conditions, affecting 
futuTe usc and non-usc benefits obtained from the resource, consequently affecting future resource 
usc rates. Such problems require solution by dynamic optimisation methods. such as optimal control. 
For simplicity, the current analysis is restricted to the direct inter-personal impacts of use levels in 
a comparative-static framework. 
Each a distinct type of activity (e.g. swimmers and power\Joaters). Of may be undertaking 
variants of the same activity (e.g. fly anglers and spin fishers). 
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Consequently, the rate of increase of usc declines, and eventually becomes 
negative. Given a constant level of one activity (say x, so that x=k) and constant 
management parameters, the level of the other activity will remain static at the 
point where dy /dt =0. Setting Equations 4.27 and 4.28 equal to zero and solving 
each for y yields Equations 4.30 and 4.31. 
y F(x,m) 4.30 
y G(x,m) (or x = H(y,m)j 4.31 
Equations 4.30 and 4.31 indicate the levels of each activity, at equilibrium 
for that activity, for any given level of the other activity. Condition 4.29 indicates 
that: 
(i) the partial derivatives of F and G with respect to x will each he negative, 
(ii) dy/dt will be negative above the line y=F(x,m), 
(iii) dx/dt will be negative ahove the line y =G(x,io). 
An internal equilibrium (one in which both x and yare positive) can only 
exist if there is a solution to Equation 4.32, so that dy /dt and dx/dt are· 
simultaneously zero. 
F(x,m) G(x,m) 4.32 
Assuming some use will he made or the resource, four possible cases exist. 
(1) x > 0, y > 0 
(2) x = 0, y > 0 
(3) x > 0, Y = 0 
(4) x = 0 and y > () ill x > 0 and y = 0 
These arc the open-access outcomes that Anderson (1986:J89) describes for 
a two-fleet fishery. The r our cases arc illustrated in the phase diagrams of Figures 
81 
13 to 16. The arrows indicate the directions of change of x and y in each sector of 
each figure. For example, at Point A in Figure 13 dy/df<O and dx/dt<O, so both 
x and y will decrease. At Point B dx/dt<O and dy/dt>O, so x will decrease and y 
will increase. 
y 
~------------------------~--------~~~x 
Figure 13 Equilibrium, case 1. 
In Case 1 both activities are represented. A stable equilibrium occurs at 
Point R. In Cases 2 and 3 only one activity occurs at equilibrium. In Case 2 the 
activity occurring is activity y (Point S), and in Case 3 the activity occurring is 
activity x (Point T). Case 4 refers to an unstable saddle-point, where Equation 4.32 
is potentially satisfiable at Point U. Any deviation from Point U will drive the 
system to one of Points V or W, depending upon the direction of the initial 
perturbation. 
s 
y 
/ 
/
dx ... O dt 
~f -0 
L-------------------~----------~--~x 
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Figure 14 Equilibrium, case 2. 
These results are positive. That is, they describe how a system will behave. 
To determine desirable, or normative, outcomes it is necessary to introduce values 
representing the desirability of different outcomes. Section 4.5 showed that, when 
desirability is measured in terms of efficiency, too much of each type of activity will 
take place for the level of the other activity. That is, normative versions of 
Equations 4.30 and 4.31 (on social efficiency criteria) will be closer to the origin 
than the positive versions, i.e., 
. y 
. y 
F*(x,m) < y 
G"(x,m) < y 
F(x,m) 
G(x,m) 
4.33 
4.34 
where, the * superscript indicates an optimal (normative), but unknown 
relationshi p. 
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y 
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L-----________________ ~~ ____________ l.__~ X 
T 
Figure 15 Equilibrium, case 3. 
The socially efficient outcome is found by solving Equations 4.14 and 4.15. 
Because the differences between positive and normative reaction functions are not 
necessarily proportional for the different activities, the socially efficient amount of 
any activity could be greater than, eqQal to, or less than the naturally occurring 
level. However, it is clear that for the two, congestible activity case the socially 
efficient outcome will nol entail an increase in the levels of both activities. 
4.8 Displacement 
A common characteristic of outdoor recreation is the displacement of one 
group of users by another. Displacement can result in the same activity being 
pursued, but by a different group of people, as crowd-toterant individuals replace 
crowd-averse individuals. At a conceptual level, it is conceivable that the disutility 
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y 
v /~-o 
~----------------------~------~~~x 
Figure 16 Equilibrium, case 4. 
to those who have been displaced may outweigh the utility gained by the displacers. 
Displacement may occur because of an autonomous increase in user numbers, in 
which case the mOTe crowd-averse may choose to recreate elsewhere, while the 
more crowd-tolerant continue use of the original facility. Alternatively, changes 
in management parameters could influence user groups in different ways. Provision 
of high quality mountain huts, for example, may cause increased use of the 
backcountry by youth groups. This increase in use may be sufficient to cause those 
seeking solitude to recreate elsewhere. Clearly, the two causes of displacement are 
not unrelated - as at least one management parameter, the amount of facility use 
permitted, influences user numbers directly. 
Figures 17 and 18 present a simple example of the displacement process. 
Suppose there are lwo types of resource user. One type (y) is crowd-averse, and 
Figure 17 
y 
/!If-O 
~-o / 
, 
~----------------------~-------------·~~x 
T 
Before displacement. 
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one type (x) is crowd-neutr~l. Given the existing numbers in each group, a stable 
equilibrium occurs at Point C in Figure 17. Now, assume that for some reason, the 
potential number of crowd-neutral users increases over time (from Xl to X2 in 
Figure 18), while the potential number of crowd averse users stays constant. With 
activity x occurring at level X2, dy/dt<O for all positive y. Equilibrium moves to 
Point D in Figure 18. There is no longer any use by type y users. Type y users 
have been displaced by type x users. 
This outcome may not be desirable. If society places a high value on use 
y relative to use x\ there may be benefits from controlling use. This is exactly the 
same as the more general problem described earlier, however, it does highlight one 
This may occur for utilitarian reasons. For example, the aggregate willingness to pay of type 
y resource users in the initial state may be greater than the aggregate willingness to pay of type x 
resource users in the final (type y users displaced) state. 
y 
Figure 18 
I 
I 
I 
Ie 
I 
Use type y displaced. 
D 
.---------"--.--~ X 
X2 
important point. Given that outcomes are determined by the potential number of 
users of each type, management cannot limit their concerns to those currently using 
the resource. Some users who could potentially derive high benefits from use of 
a resource may already be displaced, or currently represent only a small proportion 
of total use. All demands OIl the resource must be considered to identify the 
opportunity costs of management. 
4_ 9 Characteristics approach to demand modelling 
Explanation of recreation behaviours is provided by Lancaster's demand 
theory (Lancaster, 196Ga, 196Gb, 1971) which is based on demands for 
characteristics. rather than demands for goods per se in the usual economic 
demand model (the "g.oods approach"). The demands Cor goods and activities are 
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derived demands, in response to the characteristics delivered by them. Consumers 
"produce" bundles of desired characteristics by combining "inputs" of goods to 
produce activities. For example; time, motorised transport, walking, the natural 
environment and camping equipment are all inputs to the activity "tramping", which 
delivers characteristics such as solitude, appreciation of nature and physical 
challenge. 
The "characteristics approach" has been employed to model demand for 
natural resources. Morey (1981) used a model closely based on the characteristics 
approach to explain distribution of skiers across 15 Colorado ski areas. Greig 
(1983) applied the approach to a group of Australian ski areas in order to illustrate 
the procedural possibilities and was able to model demand and welfare changes 
contingent upon changes in characteristics of the ski areas. 
Each good or activity can be described in terms of the characteristics it 
possesses. For example, a mountain climb could be described in terms of its scenic, 
botanic, wildlife, technical challenge, physical challenge, and social characteristics. 
Different climbs may provide these characteristics in different proportions, or at 
different costs. Other activities will also be able to provide some, or all, of these 
characteristics. 
The characteristics approach to demand modelling has an advantage over 
the goods approach in that it allows explanation of the complementarity and 
substitutability of goods. That is, it provides explanation of why people commonly 
consider hiking and mountain climbing to be close substitutes, while viewing both 
as very different to an activity such as stamp collecting. The characteristics 
approach allows prediction of behaviour when new goods are introduced, or when 
new or improved information on the characteristics of existing goods is received. 
8R 
This latter aspect allows the theory to explain the displacement and rationalisation 
processes. 
Lancaster originally used the term "satisfactions", but adopted the term 
"characteristics" because of "its normative neutrality ... satisfactions ... has too many 
connotations" (Lancaster, 1966b:14). The theory may be considered a formalisation 
of the multiple satisfactions concept, and is consistent with discrepancy theory7 
The following discussion is based on a simple graphical description of the 
characteristics approach, other sources describe its mathematical content (see, for 
example; Greig, 1983; Bockstael and McConnell, 1983). The purpose of this section 
is simply to explain the processes observed to occur because of increases in user 
density and to provide an economic explanation of those processes. Mathematics 
is necessary only if one desires to estimate actual demand changes or welfare 
impacts. Without wishing to discount the mathematical content of this model, the 
graphical approach is adopted as the simplest heuristic for explanation of the 
displacement and rationalisation processes. 
Assume, for simplicity, that consumers have only three goods available to 
them (say; wilderness, remote areas, and walkways). Each of these goods has two 
characteristics, scenic beauty and solitude, but these are delivered in different 
proportions for each of the three goods8• Wilderness provides the most solitude 
per unit of scenic beauty, and walkways the least. These proportions are indicated 
by the rays in Figure 19. 
The multiple satisfactions concept and discrepancy theory are both discussed in Chapter 2. 
Most goods and activities will actually embody many characteristics. See. for example. 
Manfredo, Driver and Brown (1983) for some of the characteristics output from outdoor recreation 
activities. By limiting analysis to two characteristics graphical analysis is possible. No substance is 
lost by this simplification. 
Solitude 
... 
o 
Figure 19 Characteristics rays. 
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wilderness 
remote area 
Scenic beauty 
The consumer's budget and the prices of goods jointly determine 
combinations of characteristics which fall within the consumer's budget set. If all 
of the budget were spent on wilderness characteristics combination B in Figure 19 
would be obtained. Similarly, combinations C and D could be obtained by spending 
all the budget on either of the other goods. Consumers have the ability to purchase 
combinations of goods, therefore linear combinations of points B, C and Dare 
available within the consumer's budget, resulting in a characteristics possibility set 
defined by area aBeD (not all the budget heed be spent)Q. 
Note that prices determine which goods or activities arc relevant to Ihe characteristics 
possibility set. If, for example, the price of remote area use was extremely high consumers would not 
purchase trips to remote areas since they could obtain the same characteristics combinations more 
cheaply by purchasing a combination of trips to walkways and wilderness. The characteristics 
possibility set is therefore always a concave set. See Lancaster (1966a) for explanation. 
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Characteristics are delivered in fixed proportions with constant returns, 
implying that if twice as much of a good is obtained the quantity of each 
characteristic received will be doubled. Lancaster's description of this approach 
to demand modelling implicitly assumes that all consumers face identical prices, 
and explicitly assumes that the characteristics of each good are objective and are 
perceived identically by all individuals. These assumptions ensure that all 
individuals face identically shaped characteristics possibility sets. These sets will 
differ in scale, however, according to the individual's budget. 
Since the price of using recreational facilities is often largely composed of 
travel expenses, the spatial distribution of recreational facility users implies that 
prices will vary amongst potential facility users. Further, individuals may have 
incorrect expectations regarding impact parameters, and may therefore believe that 
facilities provide characteristics in different proportions to those actually delivered. 
Different individual perceptions and prices imply that each individual faces unique 
perceived and actual characteristics possibility sets. Breaking Lancaster's fixed 
price and objective characteristics proportions assumptions allows better 
explanation of individual behaviours, without altering the essential nature of the 
approach. Each individual will face a characteristics possibility set determined by 
the prices faced by them, their individual budget, and their perception of 
characteristics embodied in goods. 
Consumers have indifference curves described in terms of characteristics. 
These indifference curves reflect the consumer's tastes, and conform with all the 
assumptions in the goods approach to demand modelling (Lancaster, 1971; Varian, 
1978). Assuming that more solitude and/or scenic beauty is preferred to less 
(ceteris paribus) implies that indifference curves are convex. Individuals may 
"view" the merits of characteristics differently, implying that each individual has a 
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unique set of indifference curves representing their personal tastes. Welfare-
maximising consumers will attempt to attain the highest indifference curve allowed 
by their budget set. Figure 20 illustrates the recreator's choice. 
Given tastes (represented by indifference curves) and constraints (indicated 
by the budget set), the best thing the recreator can do is purchase characteristics 
combination G. To obtain this combination a mixture of wilderness and remote 
Figure 20 
Solitude 
... 
o 
wilderness 
Consumer choice in characteristics space. 
remote area 
Scenic beauty 
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area hiking will be purchased lO • By geometry it is possible to ascertain that the 
fraction of therecreator's budget spent on wilderness hiking will be OX/OB (= 
YC/OC), with thcfraction OY /OC (= XB/OB) being spent on remote area hiking. 
Demand for a good (use of a recreational facility) is therefore dependent on the 
consumer's tastes (utility function defined in characteristics space), expectations of 
characteristic proportions f ot this and other goods (characteristics rays, 
alternatively impact parameters in Shelby's terminology), prices, and budget and 
other constraints faced by the individual. 
Lancaster assumes that characteristics of goods are fixed through time. He 
treats the introduction of a new good as the introduction of a new bundle of 
characteristics. A new good is represented by an additional ray, which will alter 
the individual's characteristics possibility set if the new good's price is sufficiently 
low. 
When a good is changed in some way, it displays new characteristics (for 
example, increased trail maintenance makes walking easier but probably does not 
affect aesthetic beauty or other hiking characteristics). Such changes may be 
analysed by introducing a new good with the revised characteristics, and removing 
the old good from the consumers' choice set. In terms of Figure 19, the 
characteristics ray for the altered good rotates about the origin. 
]0 Note that the consumer only consumes two of the three goods on offer. In general, the 
number of goods consumed will be less than or equal to the number of characteristics. In the case 
where the characteristics possibility frontier (BCD in Figure 4.10) is a straight line through three or 
more rays (or an n-dimensional plane through more than n rays) the consumer's optimal choice is 
indeterminate. For example, if BCD in Figure 4.10 were a straight line, the optimal characteristics 
combination could be achieved by choosing anyone of an infinite number of combinations of the 
three goods. 
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4.10 Displacement revisited 
Suppose there are two wilderness areas offering very similar combinations 
of characteristics, Wilderness A and Wilderness B. Wilderness A is much cheaper 
to use (it may be extremely close to the wilderness user population, reducing 
transportation costs, or a lower admission fee may be charged there). The 
consumer choice is illustrated in Figure 21. Suppose there are two types of 
wilderness user, one type values solitude relatively highly (Loners), while the other 
type is less concerned with the presence of others and values solitude relatively 
Figure 21 
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lowly (Socialites). Given the preferences illustrated in Figure 21, both types of 
wilderness user choose to use only Wilderness A 11. 
Assume that over time there is increased recreational use of wilderness 
areas in general (perhaps population grows). If all of the expansion of wilderness 
use was channelled into Wilderness A it would no longer deliver characteristics in 
the same proportions as before. For the same amount of scenic beauty, less 
solitude is available because user density has increased. The characteristics 
proportion ray labelled Wilderness A no longer exists. It has been replaced by the 
ray labelled Wilderness A. Point B12 is the bundle of characteristics now received 
if all the budget is spent on use of Wilderness A. 
The characteristics possibility set for an individual recreator, formerly area 
OCA, is now area OCB. Consumers are no longer able to purchase characteristics 
combination A. Socialites will continue to spend all, of their budget on visiting 
Wilderrtess A, and so will use Wilderness A at the same level as before (Point B). 
However, they do not gain the same level of utility as before the increase in use 
since they are now only able to reach indifference curve UI, but were previously 
11 To the individual solitude is parametric, while to society it is endogenous. Each individual 
is concerned with the density of other resource users. Whatever use the individual makes of the 
facility, the density of others does not change. The individual's decision affects others, however, 
because it affects the density of other users they encounter. Other users' characteristics proportions 
rays therefore rotate because of this individual's decision. If anyone individual chooses to increase 
their use of a congestible facility the characteristics proportion rays of all other individuals (and the 
aggregate market) rotate away from the solitude axis, and vice versa. Consequently, the graphical 
form of analysis of the characteristics approach to aggregate demand modelling for congestible 
resources is impractical. 
Since the slope of the characteristics proportion ray for a congestible good is a function of 
the total number of purchases of that good, the slope (alternatively the coefficient on the 
solitUde/crowding characteristic) is a function of all parameters determining use, such as: price, 
income, population size, and population preferences. Consequently, Figure 4.11 illustrates the stat liS 
qllO. The characteristics proportion ray "Wilderness A" shows the proportion in which characteristics 
are delivered with current preferences, incomes, and prices. 
12 Since scenic beauty at Wilderness A is unchanged, Point B is found where the perpendicular 
from Point A intersects characteristics ray A. 
able to reach UO. Loners now find that their best choice (Point C) is to pay the 
extra unit costs for using Wilderness B and recreate solely in that area13. 
Loners have been displaced (either partially or fully) from Wilderness A 
and their level of welfare has decreased from the initial situation. In the situation 
depicted in Figure 21, each Loner would need to have income increased by a factor 
of (OD)/(OC) to attain their initial welfare level with the new characteristics 
proportions14 • 
This example represents a vast simplification of reality where there are 
many characteristics, many substitute goods and a large range of prcf erences, hut 
is sufficient to illustrate the displacement process. By definition, Wilderness A has 
higher user density than Wilderness A. Since all Loners now usc Wilderness B, all 
usc of Wilderness A is by Socialites. Therefore, the composition of the user group 
at Wilderness A has changed. Socialites have displaced Loners. Displacement is 
a process which distributes congestion (and other undesireable impacts) amongst 
sites and user groups. 
An increase in use need not displace users only toward goods offering 
relatively more solitude. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 22. There arc 
now three wilderness areas, however Wilderness C offers relatively little solitude. 
As before, Wilderness A becomes more used, and the proportion of characteristics 
13 Note that as Loners transfer their use from Wilderness 1\ to Wilderness B the 
characteristics proportions ray for Wilderness A will rotate counter-clockwise. This rotation will 
continue until all Loners are using Wilderness B, or the characteristics possihility frontier is tangent 
to the Loner's indifference curve at Point C. Figure 4.11 presents the former, final-state case. 
14 The. increase in inconle by a factor of «)[))/«)C) represents the loner's compensating 
variation. Therefore it is tempting to think that, if indifFerence curves in characteristics space can 
be estimated, it would be possible to employ benefit-cost analysis to determine the optimal levels of 
farility lise hy different types of user. However, as use of Wilderness B increases the characteristics 
combination offered by Wilderness Bwill change. The characteristics npproach does not, therefore, 
provide a simple means of estimating welfare change. Further discussion on this topic is reserved 
until Chapter 7. 
Solitude 
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wilderness B 
~ wilderness A 
wilderness A 
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Figure 22 Displacement to more crowded areas 
obtainable changes to that illustrated by the ray labelled Wilderness A. The budget 
set alters from area OCAD to area OCBD, inducing consumption of characteristics 
combination D. Given the new budget set, consumers have decided that it IS 
worthwhile to accept gains III scenIC beauty at the expense of some loss III 
______________ 1~ 
The loss in solitude will be more pronounced than indicated as the characteristics 
proportion ray for Wilderness C rotates clockwise with additional use of Wilderness C. The key point 
is that li.0me use of Wilderness 1\ is transferred to Wilderness C. even though Wilderness C is more 
crowded then Wilderness 1\. 
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4.11 Rationalisation 
It should be noted that while the Socialites of Figure 21 continue use of 
Wilderness A, they suffer a loss in welfare because of the alteration in proportions 
in which characteristics arc delivered (an increase in income by a factor 
(OE)/(OB) would allow a Socialite to reattain his/her initial utility). The only 
users who do not suffer any welfare loss are those for whom solitude is not a 
parameter in the utility function, or for whom increased solitude brings disutility 
(those with vertical or positively sloping indifference curves). Because 
characteristics are delivered in different proportions than originally, those 
Socialites who have experienced both levels of use have seen a product shift. The 
outcomes from a trip to Wilderness A are different to those originally experienced. 
That this product shift is recognised by Socialites, yet they still consider that use 
of Wilderness A is their best option. is the essence of the rationalisation hypothesis. 
The rationalisation process implies that managers should not use the 
justification that site users arc "satisfied" to ignore the impacts of changes. It is 
apparent that even if facility users claim to be satisfied, they will not be "as 
satisfied" as before the product shift if their indifference curves are negatively 
sloping. 
4.12 Conclusions 
Many analyses of (~lrr'.'1DQ ,:apacity determination and the impacts of 
increased user density havc laKc:1 ~JL:clive demand to be the independent variable 
and individual satisfactinn :l:' ti,e dependent variable (Manning, 1986). Such 
approaches arc too narrow \(i :u--:imise social welfare because they ignore the 
distributional nature nf maE,j~c:IL:nt \)hiectivc functions. In many instances it is 
important to know who i-, hci:1C: <iu-,ficd. who is not, and to what degree. Such 
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approaches also fail to integrate evaluation of the outcomes with the underlying 
motivations for engaging in the activity. Consequently, they do not satisfactorily 
explain recreationist responses to changes in the nature of the experience, nor do 
they provide a sound conceptual basis on which to judge the welfare impacts of 
changes in user density. 
Demand modelling clarifies these deficiencies by providing a sound 
conceptual basis for the displacement and rationalisation processes. Displacement 
and rationalisation result in welfare losses for both former and current resource 
users (as long as they do not prefer greater user densities), so should not be 
overlooked in determining management strategies. They imply that the preferences 
of all potential resource users should be considered, and that management policies 
which aim to provide conditions in which individual users are satisfied do not 
maximise the benefits obtainable from a recreational facility. 
Modelling demand by characteristics also allows the prediction of 
behaviours of sub-groups of resource users contingent upon management changes, 
and is thercf ore uscf ul in identifying the distributional and social justice 
implications of alternative courses of action. 
Estimation of the welfare impacts of changes in price or permitted use 
levels of congestiblc (and other) goods is complicated by changes in these 
parameters causing changes in characteristics coefficients. Simple graphical models 
arc not sophisticated Cll(1UgtJ ;,' de;:: with this complication. However, extension 
of the constant crO\vdii1~ .L::'~\I1d curvc model provided by Dorfman, or 
mathematical modelling "I : l:'_ ~i]a rJcteristics approach have the ability to 
overcome this prohkm. 
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Guidance on the efficiency of alternative management programmes may be 
provided if it is possible to estimate monetary measures of value for changes in 
management parameters. The economic theories analysed in this chapter provide 
a conceptual framework which can be used to estimate value. To obtain such 
estimates it is first necessary to be able to estimate demand for characteristics or 
demand for congestible goods themselves. Neither of these tasks is likely to be 
straightforward and consequently discussion of approaches to valuation is reserved 
for Chapter 7. 
The economic models of this chapter are necessarily simplifications of 
reality. Further, they are simplifications of the model built in Chapter 3 and 
illustrated in Figure 10. The normal goods approach to demand modelling adopted 
by Dorfman and extended here deals with only a sub-set of the variables in Figure 
10. The variables entering these models are illustrated by the bold boxes in Figure 
23. The normal boxes are important aspects, but are not allowed to vary in the 
models investigated here, they are part of the ceteris paribus assumption. For 
example, individual utility functions are important determinants of individual net 
benefits, but in these demand models are considered constant and exogenous. The 
heavy dashed lines of Figure 23 illustrate the links from the actual level of use to 
individual benefits and revised expectations. There is no theoretical reason that the 
links through inter-party contacts and impact perceptions could not be incorporated 
(see Footnote 1 in this chapter), however, practical measurement problems appear 
to be large (Shelby and Culvin. 1982) and these links have been ignored in 
economic models to date. 
The box with double hoid borders represents the variable (management 
parameter) of interest and under control of management. In dealing with 
congestion problems by rationing usc. managers must choose what constraints to 
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use of a facility they arc going to implement. Use constraints coupled with site 
demands determine the amnunt of usc t)Ccurring, the amount of revenue collected, 
the costs incurred by management. and the costs incurred by potential and actual 
site users, c e {er i spar i hits. Actual usc and costs determine individuals' net 
benefits. Management revenue, management costs and individuals' benefits 
determine net wcial benefits of the facility. The equilibrium condition is captured 
by the link from effective demand through revised expectations to expectations of 
impact parameters at this sileo Equilibrium can only occur when expectations arc 
fully realised. 
The simplifications introduced by the characteristics approach outlined in 
this chapter are illustrated in figure 24. Rationalisation and displacement occur 
because of some exogenous chan~e in demand (box with double bold borders). 
This change results in change~ in effective demand and consequently to changes in 
perceptions of impact parameters. Consequently, individuals' net use benefits 
change, as do their expectations nf impact parameters at this site. This leads to 
further (endogenous) changes in ~itc: demand, until equilibrium is re-established 
when effective and expected demand arc equai. The model built in this chapter was 
concerned with explaining the rationalisation and displacement hypotheses and 
consequently did not addres:::o chang.c~ in management costs or revenue, or impacts 
on net social bcnefi ts. 
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Figure 24 Characteristics demand model. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
MANAGING CONGESTION 
5.1 Introduction 
103 
The distribution of benefits obtained from a rationed resource is dependent 
upon the rationing method adopted. For example, if pricing is used, those 
purchasing a right to use the resource obtain benefits as consumers' surplus. The 
person or~group selling those rights obtains monetary benefits, or rent. If other 
rationing methods are chosen the benefits are distributed differently. A pure 
lottery, for example, ensures that there is no rent. All benefits accrue to those who 
are successful in the lottery. 
The objective of this chapter is to determine the impacts, with respect to 
efficiency and the benefits obtained by consumers, of adopting alternative rationing 
techniques to control use of a congested facility. Chapter 4 showed that the open 
access outcome is not optimal in efficiency terms. That is, total net benefits 
obtained from optimally limited use (the optimal amount of use is less than the 
open access level of use) of a congestible resource are grea ter than total net 
benefits if resource use is not limited. This conclusion is derived under the 
assumption that prices will be used to ration use. 
The analysis of Chapter 4 showed that pricing can be an efficient rationing 
method, while lotteries are often claimed to be inherently fair (Hardin, 1969) in the 
sense of equality of opportunity. This chapter will compare the outcomes and 
optimality conditions f or these two tools. Analysis is restricted to price and lottery 
rationing. Because price rationing is efficient (but not necessarily fair) and 
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lotteries are fair (but not efficient) combinations of these two methods of resource 
allocation should allow resource managers to trade-off the two objectives. Two 
approaches to combining the two rationing tools will be analysed. 
The chapter will progress through a discussion of the concepts of efficiency 
and equity to review the main rationing techniques which could be applied to 
outdoor recreation. This will provide a context for the following analysis and will 
identify the narrowness of the objectives analysed here and the alternative tools 
which could potentially be used to satisfy the same objectives. The wide ranges of 
objectives and rationing tools preclude an exhaustive examination of them here. 
The remainder of this chapter analyses outcomes under various lottery allocation 
schemes and compare those outcomes to those under a pure pricing allocation 
scheme. 
5.2 Management objectives 
Resource managers, amongst others, are involved in the process of 
determining what actions or outcomes are best. "Best" is usually interpreted to 
mean most socially desirable. Adoption of this definition implies the need to 
specify the society of interest (e.g. a town, a region, a country, or subsets of people 
for whom the resource is to be managed, e.g. backpackers or horse riders), as well 
as the need to define social desirability. The latter task is problematic, the 
resource manager having to decide how much emphasis is to be placed on 
competing objectives. There is little guidance on how this should be done, although 
the Resource Management Law Reform has recognised the problem: "Above all, 
the law reform has recognised the need to identify and articulate the objectives of 
resource management .... In their management plans, decision makers will be 
expected to justify their selection of management tools, and to assess the intended 
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effect (including the environmental impacts) of what is proposed." (Ministry for 
the Environment, 1989: p.8). 
It is commonly accepted that efficiency and equity are objectives which are 
of concern to resource managers. There are, of course, many others but these two 
consistently arise. These concepts will now be defined. 
5.2.1 Efficiency 
Any resource allocation which causes at least one person to be made better-
off and no-one to be made any worse-off is Pareto superior to the status quo. 
When no Pareto superior state exists the situation is termed Pareto efficient, or 
Pareto optimal. The Pareto principle appears rather innocuous, but it is not devoid 
of value judgement since it relies upon the judgement that "social decisions be 
based exclusively upon individual preferences" (Russell and Wilkinson, 1979, p.400), 
and the judgement that everyone's preferences count (including those of the insane, 
criminals, and others whose preferences are currently often ignored by society). 
Pareto efficiency is determined by the initial distribution of goods or utility. 
If the initial distribution is unacceptable the Pareto principle is unable to provide 
guidance regarding desirable states, and "the choice of income distribution ... is a 
political matter that can be solved only by value judgements through the political 
process" (Just et ai., 1982, p.ll). It could be claimed that efficiency and 
distribution are separate matters, but "one cannot solve the problem of efficiency 
and distribution in two stages by first maximising the value of the social product by 
correctly allocating resources and then distributing the product equitably. The 
relative value of products depends on income distribution, which depends, in turn, 
on factor ownership" (Just et ai., 1982, p.29). 
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The Paretian definition of efficiency is limited in that a Pareto efficient 
state is not necessarily Pareto superior to states which are not Pareto efficient. 
Further, there is no way of judging between the many possible Pareto efficient 
states (or between non-efficient states). Since most actions entail negative impacts 
on some people, the concept of Pareto efficiency provides only a partial ordering 
of alternative resource allocations. The potential Pareto improvement, or 
compensation, criterion provides a complete ordering of resource allocations. This 
criterion labels proposals socially beneficial if the gainers could compensate the 
losers and still be made better-off by the proposed change whether 
compensation is made or not. 
The Pareto and compensation criteria have different distributional 
implications. While the Pareto criterion implicitly recognises that individuals have 
a right to at least their status quo level of utility (or income, or consumption) the 
compensation criterion has the potential to make people both relatively and 
absolutely worse-off. It is therefore capable of exacerbating existing inequalities 
(Sen, 1973). 
The compensation criterion is one version of utilitarianism, which is defined 
by Sen (1986, p.278) to have three elements: 
(1) Conscquentialism: The rightness of actions - and (more generally) of the 
choice of all control variables - must be judged entirely by the goodness of 
the consequent state of affairs. 
(2) Wclfarism: The goodness of states of affairs must be judged entirely by 
the goodness of the set of individual utilities in the respective states of 
aff airs. 
(3) Sum-ranking: The goodness of any set of individual utilities must be 
judged entirely by their "urn total. 
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Criticisms of utilitarianism are based on ethical concerns and practical 
concerns. The latter are raised by the need to make interpersonal utility 
comparisons. However, there is no theoretically defensible way of making 
interpersonal comparisons of welfare (Friedman, 1985, p.38). 
Utilitarianism concentrates solely on total utility and completely ignores 
distribution of utility. The implications of adopting a utilitarian criterion for 
resource allocation are unacceptable for many people. For example, under 
utilitarian decision rules it is acceptable to commit crimes as long as the benefits 
to the criminals outweigh the costs imposed upon the victims. In some cases there 
is partial support for such practices, as epitomised by the legend of Robin Hood. 
However, very few people appear willing to endorse the actions of gang rapists or 
murderers. The total of net individual benefits is not everything. Society IS 
concerned about the distribution of impacts under varying states of the world. 
Cost recovery for changes in provision of goods (but not for existing 
provision) ensures Pareto superiority, but not Pareto efficiency. Cost recovery is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for Pareto efficiency. The non-application of cost 
recovery to all activities where it is practical (examples include many health, police, 
and social welfare services) indicates that efficiency concerns are not always 
paramount in this country. 
5.2.2 Equity 
Ethical concerns arise over a variety of issues including: liberty, justice, and 
equality. They may be classified into two major areas, outcome equity and process 
equity (Friedman, 1985). The former is concerned with the equity of the 
distribution of goods, or welfare which actually occurs. It is not concerned with 
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why the distribution has come about. On the other hand, process equity is not 
concerned with final distributions, but is concerned with the equity of initial 
distributions and the equity of processes under which distributions change. 
It is not necessary to fully investigate theories of distributional morality 
here. A brief summary of some of the main schools of thought follows. Concepts 
of equity and efficiency can be defined in terms of goods, utility, income, or 
opportunity. The range of possibilities should be borne in mind throughout the 
ensuing discussion. 
5.2.2.1 Outcome Equity 
Outcome equity is most commonly described in terms of equality of final 
allocations, or in terms of the absence of envy for anyone else's allocation. 
(i) Equality as a basis for equity. 
The more alike are the allocations of goods (or whatever) to all individuals, 
the more fair is the distribution. This view of the world is often termed 
egalitarianism. A somewhat less rigid form is specific egalitarianism, which 
is "the view that certain specific scarce commodities should be distributed less 
unequally than the ability to pay for them" (Tobin, 1970: 448). Two main 
arguments support specific egalitarianism as an important goal in public policy. 
The first is the intuitive notion that it is inherently wrong that some people should 
have "less than a minimum of decency in terms of income, education, health care, 
or other basic needs" and the second is the observation that "an inequitable society 
is highly unlikely to function smoothly" (Nagc1, 1984: 86). 
The limiting case of egalitarianism arises when all individuals receive the 
same allocation. Suppose goods were distributed equally among all people. If such 
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an initial allocation is deemed "fair" there still remains a problem regarding the 
evaluation of other outcomes. If such a distribution were made, the differing tastes 
of individuals would imply that utilities would not be equal. Some people would 
be better-off than others. Immediately society is faced with the issue of 
determining whether it is concerned for equality of goods or equality of welfare. 
An alternative approach is to allocate goods to equate utilities of individuals. Such 
a proposal requires the interpersonal comparison of utilities, which is not possible. 
Differences in tastes imply that an equal distribution of goods or utility 
would not be stable. Individuals may make themselves better-off by engaging in 
trade, resulting in a non-equal distribution. There is no basis for judging the equity 
of outcomes subsequent to trade. Even if perfect markets exist and trade results 
in improvements to the welfare of some individuals without making anyone worse-
off, it is unclear how the increased efficiency resulting from trade should be traded-
off with the (possible) increased inequity. 
Egalitarianism is criticised for two main reasons, its perversion of incentives 
and the belief that society prefers unequal outcomes. On the former, Milton and. 
Rose Friedman question "what incentive is there to work and produce?" (Friedman 
and Friedman, 1980: 167). Since everyone obtains the same outcome, there is no 
incentive to work, let alone work hard or in an occupation that takes years of 
training. Consequently, total output is likely to be very low, reducing both total 
and individual welfare levels. 
While Kneese (1977: 21) claims western liberal societies "usually regard 
ourselves as striving for an egalitarian society, the main obstacle being the possible 
effects on incentives of extreme redistribution measures", Tobin (1970: 448) takes 
the view that "Americans commonly perceive differences in wealth and income as 
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earned and regard the differential earnings of effort, skill, foresight, and enterprise 
as deserved". Friedman and Friedman (1980) cite the preponderance for gambling 
in many societies and the unwillingness of most of the population to join communes 
or kibbutz as evidence that people often seek, or prefer, unequal outcomes. The 
divergent views of social commentators with regard to societies' acceptance of 
egalitarianism as a desirable outcome indicates that choice of an appropriate social 
welfare ordering is likely to entail some value jUdgement with respect to the 
importance of equality of the distribution of goods or utility, and any such 
judgement is likely to be controversial. 
(ii) Envy as a basis for equity. 
Another basis for determining outcome equity is envy, or more correctly -
lack of envy. Under this view of the world an outcome is fair if no individual 
envies the consumption bundle possessed by any other individual (see Feldman, 
1980 and especially Baumol, 1986 for discussion of this concept). The equal 
distribution of goods is theref ore f air under this criterion. The concept is appealing 
in that it does not rely on inter-personal comparisons of utility. However, starting 
from an equal distribution (or any other envy-free distribution), trade may bring 
about distributions which are not considered fair (Feldman, 1980; Baumol, 1986), 
bringing this concept of fairness into conflict with Pareto efficiency. 
This concept of equity may be criticised on the same grounds of lack of 
incentives and non-desirability as egalitarianism is. For example, "it is questionable 
whether the concept of lack of envy adequately captures the notion of fairness. 
One can think of cases where someone prefers the consumption bundle of someone 
else, yet everyone might agree that the economy is fair in the sense of being 
equitable. For example, I might envy a friend's 'lucky find' in an antique store yet 
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perceive no 'unfairness' in the fact that he, not I, owns it." (Boadway and Bruce, 
1984: 174·5). 
(iii) A general concept of outcome equity. 
Decision rules which are only able to order a sub-set of social states are 
termed quasi-orderings. There are several quasi-orderings which attempt to trade-
off efficiency and equity. These include the dominance, hull-of-dominance, 
modified Rawls, egalitarian hull, and other criteria (see Blackorby and Donaldson, 
1977; Russell and Wilkinson, 1979; Sen, 1986; for descriptions of some of these). 
The most general formulation of a social welfare function which trades-off 
efficiency and outcome equity is the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function 
(see, for example, Russell and Wilkinson, 1979; Just et ai., 1982). This approach 
maps a utility possibilities frontier in inter-personal utility space, and determines 
socially optimal outcomes by overlaying a set of social indifference curves. Such 
a social welfare ordering may be expressed mathematically as: 
W(x) = F(u!(x), u\x), ... ,uh(x» 
where: ui(x) is the utility derived by individual i from distribution x, and 
W(x) is the social welfare of distribution x. 
This general approach fails because of the lack of agreement on the correct 
specification of the social indifference curves! (selection of the function F), it is 
also unable to account for matters of process equity. 
That neither this approach nor any other is able to provide a ranking of states of the world 
based upon individual preferences, and consistent with some reasonable constraints that such a 
procedure would be required to satisfy, was first shown by Kenneth Arrow in the oft-cited Arrow's 
impossibility theorem: see K.l. Arrow Social choice and individual values. John Wiley and Sons. New 
York. 1951. 
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5.2.2.2 Process Equity 
Those concerned primarily with process equity are not concerned that 
allocations of goods or utility, per se, are unequal as long as the procedures under 
which the goods were obtained were fair. Differences in wealth or utility may have 
arisen because of hard work on the part of some individuals (and lack of it on 
behalf of others), or because some individuals were denied opportunities to 
participate in the workforce, or to obtain the skills necessary to do so. In these 
cases equality of outcomes may be considered unfair. Sen (1986, p.282) puts it this 
way, "it is possible to defend a persons rights not in terms of the goodness of its 
[sic] consequences, but on the grounds that these rights have intrinsic moral 
acceptability irrespective of the consequences of the exercise of these rights" and 
proceeds to cite Nozick (1974, p.166) "Rights do not determine the position of an 
alternative or the relative position of two alternatives in a social ordering; they 
operate upon a social ordering to constrain the choice it can yield". 
The principal notion of process equity is the concept of eqnal opportunity. 
For example, it may be considered unfair that some individuals are disadvantaged 
becanse of gender or race (say in ability to obtain finance or education), resulting 
in diminished welfare for the same amount of work as others. Policies which 
redistribute benefits toward the disadvantaged groups may then be considered 
advantageous. More contentious are concepts of equality of opportunity in terms 
of genetic characteristics and inheritance. Some authors claim that it is unfair that 
individuals can expect to obtain high utility levels simply because they are fortunate 
enough to be born into a wealthy family, or because they are an intellectual or 
sporting genius, while others are certain only of misery because of the 
circumstances of their births (Boadway and Bruce, 1984: 176). 
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The concept of process equity includes the rules for acquiring and 
transferring rights to goods. These rules provide the only means to obtain rights, 
and also provide a guarantee of obtaining a right if satisfied. Examples of such 
rules are provided by Locke (1690) and, more recently, by Nozick (1974). Sen 
(1986, p.285) notes that these rules have been widely criticised for the arbitrariness 
of the principles upon which they are based. The same criticism must also apply 
to all other notions of distributional fairness. Lottery alloca tion of scarce resources 
is one means of attaining equality of opportunity. All individuals retain a right to 
enter the lottery, but only successful entrants obtain rights to use the resource. If 
the lottery is run on an equal-chance basis (i.e. no individual has a greater 
probability of success than others) then the lottery can be viewed as a non-
discriminatory, or equal opportunity, method for allocating a resource. 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
Given that "in popular discourses fairness is an amalgam of a multiplicity 
of ad hoc desiderata that no simple and analytically tractable formulation may be 
able to capture" (Baumol, 1986, p.ll), and "no unique concept of equity is widely 
regarded as definitive for public policy making" (Friedman, 1984, p.40) it is not 
possible for the analyst to dctermine "the socially best" action or policy. Indeed, 
it appears that society may not apply the same criteria to all things. For example, 
many societies appear to cmphasise strict egalitarianism in allocating one vote per 
adult and taking considerable effort to prevent trade in votes, while specific 
egalitarianism is emphasised by the same societies in providing a minimum standard 
of health care [or all, equality of opportunity is emphasised in the concept of free 
and compulsory education, whereas liberty and the Pareto improvement criterion 
appear to guide allocation of most goods and services judged to be non-essentials. 
Somewhere in the decision making process some person, or group, must make a 
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value judgement regarding social morality with respect to target variables and their 
distribution. 
Friedman (1984, p.47) reaches the following conclusion regarding the role 
of economic analysis in the policy process: 
"The diversity of specific concepts of efficiency and equity should receive 
attention. Given the lack of any predetermined social consensus about 
which of them to apply and how to integrate those that do apply, policy 
analysis can usually best help users reach informed normative conclusions 
by clearly laying out its predictions and evaluating them by the different 
normative elements (e.g., efficiency, relative efficiency, equality, equal 
opportunity). Certainly, nontechnical users will find each of the elements 
more familiar or at least easier to understand than the concept of a social 
welfare function." 
Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) discuss a wide range of measures of 
equality. Atkinson concludes that: 
"a complete ranking of distributions cannot be reached without fullf 
specifying the form of the social welfare function ... examination of the 
social welfare functions implicit in these measures shows that in a number 
of cases they have properties which are unlikely to be acceptable, and in 
general there are no grounds for believing that they would accord with 
social values" (Atkinson, 1970, p.262). 
Summary measures of efficiency and equity are not free of value 
judgements, leading to the conclusion that, in the absence of detailed inf ormation 
on the social desirability of relevant states, the best that the analyst can do is to 
provide a description of the impacts experienced by individuals and groups, and/ or 
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supply summary measures while taking care to indicate the value judgements 
implicit in their adoption. 
In this context, this study investigates the implications of choice of one of 
two resource allocation procedures. As stated previously, the procedures chosen 
are price rationing, because it is efficient, and lottery rationing, because it is fair. 
The specific definition of efficiency adopted is the sum of willingness to pay for all 
individuals, while that for fairness is equality of opportunity. This study investigate 
the efficiency costs of lottery rationing of congestible resources. 
5.3 Resource allocation tools 
A variety of resource allocation tools is available. At the limits are the 
options of doing nothing (i.e. open access, or allocation by crowd-tolerance) and 
completely precluding access to resources. It is assumed here that the management 
agency wishes to allow some use of a congestible resource, but less than would 
occur under open access. Hence, while admitting that the polar cases are 
applicable management options they will not be investigated further here. 
Shubik (1970) identifies eight major means of resource allocation: 
(1) economic markets with prices 
(2) voting 
(3) bidding 
(4) bargaining 
(5) higher authority, fiat, or dictatorship 
(6) force, fraud, deceit 
(7) custom, including gifts and inheritance 
(8) chance. 
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Publicly-owned outdoor recreation resources are commonly only allocated 
by a sub-set of these alternatives (1,3,4,5,8; Hendee, Stankey and Lucas, 1990). 
Allocation methods are divided into two major categories; market and non-market 
allocation tools. Market tools are characterised by agreement between trading 
partners with regard to the amount of one good to be exchanged for another. 
5.3.1 Market allocation tools. 
5.3.1.1 Uniform prices 
Scarce goods may be allocated by setting a single, market clearing price, 
allowing everyone to consume as much as they desire at that price. Chapter 4 
identified how to find prices which maximise consumer, producer, and aggregate 
benefits from a congestible resource. 
If the market demand curve is known with certainty, the market clearing 
price (Po) may be chosen and the desired quantity (Qo) sold. However, demand is 
uncertain, at best, and for environmental commodities is often completely unknown. 
By choosing a price not equal to Po demand will vary from the target level of 
use,Qoo 
If a price greater than Po is chosen demand will be less than Q o and vice 
versa. The effects of divergences from Po depend upon where Po is in relation to 
the prices which maximise consumer and producer benefits and the magnitude of 
the divergence. Consumers and the producer could become better or worse-off by 
a price change in either direction, depending upon the particular circumstances. 
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When value is measured by willingness to pay, the market clearing price is 
known with certainty, and markets operate perfectly, uniform pricing is an efficient 
means of allocating a fixed quantity of a resource, since all those willing to pay at 
least the market clearing price obtain access to use, while those willing to pay less 
than this price fail to obtain access. In other words, no-one who fails to obtain 
access to the good has a greater willingness to pay than anyone who does obtain 
access. When benefits are measured by willingness to pay, pricing has the 
advantage of providing a measure of the value of additional capacity. 
Pricing may not be a feasible means of allocating some natural resources 
because of the inability to exclude non-payers from using the resource. Access to 
national parks and state forests are likely cases. Of course, this criticism applies 
equally to other methods, such as lotteries and reservations, but not to all (e.g. 
effort). A notable exception in New Zealand parks is provided by commercially 
operated guided tramping where capacity is limited by the terms of the concession. 
The ready identification of those who have paid allows these operations to charge 
prices which limit demand to capacity. 
The main distributional justice concerns are that pricing discriminates not 
only on grounds of willingness to pay, but also on grounds of ability to pay. 
Concern about discrimination on willingness to pay grounds is an expression that 
consumers' surplus does not provide a relevant measure of benefits, while concern 
about discrimination on ability to pay grounds is founded on the belief that the 
existing pattern of wealth distribution is inappropriate. 
5.3.1.2 Discriminatory pricing 
Discriminatory pricing is a term used to describe a variety of techniques 
which producers with some market power are able to apply to appropriate some of 
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the consumers' surplus that uniform pricing does not give them access to. This is 
done by charging different prices for different people purchasing identical goods, 
the price charged being dependent upon the individual's demand characteristics. 
Typical examples include: student and senior citizen discounts, season tickets, tied 
purchases, peak-load pricing, connection fees, quantity discounts, and minimum 
hire requirements. 
Price discrimination is inefficient unless it can be carried out perfectly and 
costlessly. Perfect price discrimination does not occur in practice (Phlips, 1983), 
although second and third degree price discrimination are common. Pre-requisites 
for application of discriminatory pricing are market power, the ability to distinguish 
members of the various types of user groups, knowledge of their demand 
characteristics, and the ability to preclude trade in the commodity between groups. 
5.3.1.3 Vouchers 
Prices may be set in terms of money, or some other form of currency, which 
mayor may not be exchangeable for money. Such other currencies are usually 
termed ration coupons, permits, or vouchers, and have commonly been used to 
ration foodstuffs and other basic requirements during wartime. Vouchers may be 
directly redeemable for goods, or may also require money transactions. Demand 
f or rationed commodities is restricted by the number of vouchers allocated. 
Distributional and efficiency impacts of vouchers are determined by their method 
of initial distribution and whether trade in vouchers is permitted. A white market 
occurs when trade in vouchers is permitted, while restrictions on trade often result 
in illegal trading (black markets) as individuals attempt to appropriate the gains to 
be made from transferring vouchers from low to high value recipients. 
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5.3.1.4 Auctions 
Auctions require the exchange of money for rationed goods, but the 
exchange price is not predetermined. Price is determined at the time of sale by 
bidding. Bids are offers to buy at stated prices. Cassady (1967) describes the main 
types of auction mechanisms used worldwide. These include the English, Dutch, 
and simultaneous auctions. Many other forms of auction exist, but they are 
essentially variations on one or more of the three main types. The different forms 
of auction have different implications for revenue generation and efficiency of 
resource allocation (Kerr, 1990). In general, auctions which allocate a single item 
are efficient, but those that allocate many identical or similar items are inefficient. 
Auctions are useful when there is uncertainty regarding demand for the 
goods being allocated, or when a quick sale must be made. If the seller knew buyer 
demand functions it would be possible to use discriminatory pricing schemes to 
obtain a better return than could be obtained from disposing of the same goods by 
auction. 
5.3.2 Non-market allocation tools. 
5.3.2.1 Lottery 
The lottery is a method of allocation by chance. In simple lotteries all 
participants have an equal probability of success, however it is possible to 
apportion successes amongst different categories of participants to alter the 
probability of success for the different categories. In its simplest form, all those 
wishing to consume the rationed good have their names recorded and at some 
predetermined time names are drawn randomly to determine successful applicants. 
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Pure lotteries are open to all ahd are free of any qualifying conditions or fees. 
Impure lotteries may require that applicants meet some merit requirement, queue 
for the limited number of ballots, or pay fees for entering or success in the lottery. 
Lotteries are impartial and therefore are often viewed as being "eminently 
fair" (Hardin, 1969). They are relatively simple for consumers to partake in once 
consumers are aware of their existence and structure), but impose high transaction 
costs on managers (for eaxample, to ensure all applicants are included in the draw, 
duplicate applications are not included, and all applicants are advised of the 
outcome). The uncertainty of outcomes may induce individuals to enter many 
lotteries simultaneously, when they are only able to benefit from one "win". This 
and the long lead times required to administer a lottery result in a large proportion 
of "no-shows" - people who are successful in a lottery but who do not exercise their 
rights to consume the rationed good. 
The no-show problem may be dealt with by increasing the number of 
successes in the lottery to obtain the same expected number of users, or by 
allocating no-shows on the day by some other method, such as queuing or pricing. 
The former approach is suitable for allocating services or goods where the quantity 
constraint is not strictly binding in the short-term. An example is provided by 
outdoor recreation areas where use is limited because of the ecological impacts of 
the total amount of use, and where the amount of use in anyone day (for example) 
may not be critical. This approach clearly does not work for other goods where the 
quantity constraint is strongly binding, such as access to a hunting block where 
safety and non-disturbance of game are prime concerns. 
Because "a lottery would not discriminate among users according to the 
relative value they place on the [resource,] persons who entered the lottery 
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frivolously or to whom [the resource I is relatively unimportaut would hold the same 
chauce of winning as the ... enthusiast" (Stankey and Baden, 1977:7), lotteries are 
inefficient however value is defined. 
5.3.2.2 Reservation 
Reservation is a commonly used tool (in association with pricing) for 
allocating accommodation and travel and (without pricing) hunting blocks. The 
first person to request consumption of a given unit of the good is allocated that 
unit. By reserving far enough into the future one may (almost) be guaranteed to 
obtain the rationed good. 
Several authors (e.g. Shelby and Danley, 1979; Stankey and Baden, 1977) 
have questioned the fairness of this system which favours those with long planning 
horizons. This is the main reason that in many cases where the reservation method 
is used not all units of the rationed good are allocated by this method. To better 
meet the needs of those who are unable to plan long-term some units may be 
allocated by pricing or queuing at time of use. An example is air travel. By 
reserving early it is possible to obtain low priced seats, while some sears are 
retained to satisfy the demands of urgent, short-notice travellers who are required 
to pay more for them. 
5.3.2.3 Queues 
Queues are similar to pricing in that they impose a time price for use of a 
resource. Reservations are an application of the first-come first-served principle 
prior to the time of use, and often remote from the physical location of the good. 
Reservations can result in instant confirmation of future use for the user. Queuing, 
on the other hand, is first-come first-served at time of use, usually at the physical 
location of the good. Queues therefore eliminate the problem of no-shows at the 
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cost to consumers of increased uncertainty. Queues may be either physical (e.g. 
waiting in line) or paper (e.g. waiting lists for state housing). In either case, the 
person who has been waiting the longest obtains the next unit of the good to be 
distributed. 
It is often argued that because everyone is equally endowed with time 
queuing is the fairest means of resource allocation. Fairness only comes' at the cost 
of efficiency however, as time spent queuing (and travel costs for physical queues) 
is wasted, those who obtain access to the resource do so by paying with their time, 
however those who do not obtain access also pay. Further, the marginal value of 
time is not the same for all individuals. Those who place a low value on their time 
(probably the unemployed, old people, and those in low earning occupations) will 
clearly be advantaged by physical queues relative to those who place a high value 
on their time (business executives, people on short holidays, etc), while paper 
queues will disadvantage those for whom time of use is important. 
Paper queues impose costs upon the management agency to deal with 
applications to j<:>in the queue, updating positions on the queue, and informing 
queuers of their position. Because a paper queue is essentially costless to the 
consumer, and there is uncertainty over the time of success, the paper queue will 
be subject to the same no-show problems as lotteries and reservations. 
Physical queues impose management agency costs to prevent queue 
jumping, to provide facilities for the queuers, and to administer the rationing 
mechanism, which will require the physical presence of an agency representative 
in many instances. 
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5.3.2.4 Merit 
Goods may be allocated only to people satisfying arbitrary qualifications. 
These qualifications may be related to past behaviour or skills in use of the good. 
For example, in introducing individual transf erable quotas to New Zealand fisheries 
the initial distribution of quotas was determined by historical involvement in the 
fishery. Alternatively, allocations may be made on any arbitrary basis, such as 
racial or socioeconomic background as a proxy for need or deservedness, or 
friendship with the decision making authority. 
5.3.2.5 Effort 
A special class of merit rationing is rationing by effort. It is common to 
find natural resources rationed by effort. In this country, wilderness area 
management guidelines indicate that these areas should require (even though they 
don't always) one day's walk to reach their boundaries. This, along with the 
difficulty of access to many publicly provided outdoor recreation areas has led 
Cullen (1985:7) to describe effort as "the New Zealand way of rationing", in respect 
to outdoor recreation. Effort need not be applied directly to the target activity. 
It could be regarded as a price which may be levied in any unit. For example, 
wa piti hunting blocks in Fiordland have been partly rationed by the requirement 
that applicants must have contributed to animal management operations in the area. 
Because df ort required to obtain access to a resource is often 'wasted' 
rationing by effort is inefficient. Effort rationing discriminates amongst those with 
diff erent abilities to supply eff ort. e.g. the old or physically, mentally, or financially 
less able members of society. If this method is applied as a once only requirement, 
it will work like a two-part tariff with a zero marginal price. This will effectively 
discriminate against casual or infrequent resource users. 
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In many instances, increases in demand will cause problems as effort 
requirements to meet any desired level of use will have to be amended upwards. 
This may be quite infeasible in rationing some resources. Public roads and rail 
services, for example, cannot be closed or rerouted simply to control access to a 
wilderness area. It may be equally as absurd to increase proficiency requirements 
to levels requiring extraordinny levels of knowledge, or extraordinary investment 
to obtain that knowledge. If, however, little investment is required to meet 
requirements, then effort is unlikely to provide a useful management tool. High 
eff ort requirements are therefore likely to be both discriminatory and inefficient. 
Low effort requirements are likely to be ineffective. 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
There is a wide variety of methods available for allocating congestible 
resources. Each method has different efficiency and distributional implications. 
This study has chosen to further analyse the relative impacts of simple pricing and 
lottery allocation mechanisms to increase understanding of the efficiency costs of 
furthering the objective of process equity. The pricing allocation method has been 
chosen because it is (theoretically) efficient and has long been championed by 
economists. It is not used in publicly provided wilderness recreation in New 
Zealand, or in the United States (Hendee, Stankey and Lucas, 1990). Pricing is 
commonly used to allocate privately provided wilderness recreation here and 
overseas. Lottery allocation is widely used in the United States and occasionally 
in New Zealand. It has been touted as the most fair allocation method. 
The focus on lottery and pricing allocation methods does not infer that 
similar consequences could not be achieved using other allocational methods. More 
complete analyses of the implications of adoption of specific allocation methods in 
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wilderness recreation are provided by Hendee, Stankey and Lucas (1990), Shelby 
and Danley (1979) and Stankey and Baden (1977). 
5.4 Comparison of price and lottery allocation methods 
Chapter 4 analysed efficiency conditions for price-rationing of congestible 
resources and provided measures of benefits under price-rationing. This section 
measures benefits obtained from a congestible resource under lottery-rationing and 
compares the efficiency of the two allocation schemes. For simplicity, unless stated 
otherwise, the following assumptions will hold throughout the analysis: 
(i) Transaction costs are zero f or producers and consumers. 
(ii) A fixed amount of a single type of use is permitted. That quantity of use 
is determined by the management authority with regard to whatever 
objectives it chooses to pursue. 
(iii) Marginal social cost of resource use is zero for all use levels. 
5.4.1 Lottery 
A pure lottery does not charge a fee for entering the lottery, or from the 
successful participants. Impure lotteries may charge for one or both of 
participation and success. These lotteries are a mixture of pricing and a pure 
lottery. Initial analysis will be limited to pure lotteries only, but will be extended 
at a later stage. 
Since no fees are charged under a pure lottery, there is no rent earned from 
the resource. All benefits accrue tn consumers in the form of consumers' surplus. 
Unlike pricing, it is not possible to determine a priori which potential consumers 
will obtain access to the resource under lottery rationing. If different consumers 
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obtain different benefits from use, total benefits of use under a lottery are 
uncertain. However, as long as the relevant constant crowding demand curve is 
known, so is the probability of any individual being successful in the lottery, and 
theref ore the distribution of total benefits is also known. By the law of large 
numbers, expected benefits are an appropriate measure of the benefits obtained 
from resource use when the number of potential users is very large for each 
allocation exercise, or when there are many allocation exercises. 
Suppose the resource manager chooses to employ a pure lottery in which 
there will be X successful participants. At zero price, and a constant level of 
crowding of X, there will be Q == F(O,X) units of use demanded (from Equation 4.2). 
Expected consumers' surplus is therefore equal to mean consumers' surplus with 
expected use level X, multiplied by the number of users (X), see Equation 5.1. 
E[B] '" E[CS] 
Q=F(O,x) 
X J <p(Xd,X)dX d 
Q 0 5.1 
XA 
= Q 
where X is the target level of resource use, 
Xd is the amount of resource use that people expect to experience, 
<I> is the inverse constant-crowding demand function, and 
Q is the amount of resource use that would occur if there were no 
rationing and expected use was X. 
The most efficient capacity for a lottery rationed resource is found by 
choosing X to satisfy Equation 5.2. 
as 
- =0 
ax 
= A + X aA _ XA aQ 
Q Q ax Q2 ax 
where 
aA 
ax 
Q;F(O,x) f <l>ix d,x)dX d 
o 
5.4.2 The linear case 
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5.2 
As an example of the divergence in impacts between pricing and lottery 
allocation consider the case of a linear constant crowding demand function. Let 
<I> = a + bXd + cX be the Marshallian constant crowding demand function, with b < 0 
and c< O. The market demand function is therefore 9 = a + (b + c)X. For 
simplicity, assume that supply costs are zero and that Marshallian surplus provides 
a close approximation to Hicksian surplus.· 
5.4.2.1 Lottery rationing 
With lottery rationing, expected consumers' surplus is equal to expected 
total benefits, and rent is zero. For any arbitrary capacity (X) less than the open-
access capacity: 
E[CS] = E[E] = X(a+cX)j2 
and the per capita consumer surpluses are: 
E[CSa] = -X(b+c)(a+cX)j2a 
E[CSbl = (a+cX)j2 
E[CS cl = -bXj2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
From 5.3, expected consumers' surplus is maximised when: 
x = -a/2c (if b>c) 
= -a/(b+c) (if b~c) 
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5.7 
The reason for the second part of Equation 5.7 is: maximum expected 
consumer surplus from a lottery occurs at X=-a/(2c). However, the case where 
b < c leads to the condition [-a/ (2c)] > [-a/ (b + c)], where the second term of the 
inequality is the open access level of use. The impossibility of using a lottery to 
obtain a use level greater than that occurring with open access justifies the second 
condition. Since a lottery is only able to increase consumer surplus when b > c, 
maximum expected consumers' surplus is: 
(E[CS])maxirnum = -a2/Sc 5.S 
5.4.2.2 Price rationing 
Benefit measures are found by substituting the demand function into 
Equations 4.5 to 4.10: 
R = aX + (b+C)X2 5.9 
B = aX + (bX2) /2 + CX2 5.10 
CS = B-R = _(bX2)/2 5.11 
CSa = bX2(b+c)/2a 5.12 
CSb = -bXj2 5.13 
CSc = X2(a +cX)/2 5.14 
Section 4.4 provides the following conditions for a linear demand 
specification: 
129 
Total benefits are maximised when: 
x ~ -a/(b+2c) l.e. P ~ ac/(b+2c) 5.15 
Producer's surplus is maximised when: 
x ~ -a/[2(b + c)] l.e. P ~ a/2 5.16 
Consumers' surplus is maximised when: 
x ~ -a/(b+c) l.e. P ~ 0 5.17 
5.4.3 Comparison of the outcomes of price and lottery rationing 
for the linear case 
The results of Section 5.4.2 allow comparison of benefits under lottery and 
pricing allocation schemes for the linear demand curve case. 
5.4.3.1 Revenue 
Clearly, since a pure lottery is unable to generate revenue. price allocation 
is superior at generating revenue. 
5.4.3.2 Total benefits 
The difference between total benefits under the two allocation schemes for 
some arbitrary capacity (X) is: 
E[Be] - Bp ~ -(X/2)(a+[b+c]X) 5.18 
which is less than zero for all X Jess than the open access level of use. For ill!lC 
capacity, price allocation is more efficient than lottery allocation. 
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5.4.3.3 Aggregate consumer benefits 
The difference between aggregate consumer surplus under the two 
allocation schemes for some arbitrary capacity X is: 
E[CSd - CSp = (Xj2)(a+[b+c]X) 5.19 
which is greater than zero for all X less than the open access level of use. For any 
capacity, price allocation provides fewer consumer benefits than lottery allocation. 
5.4.3.4 Per-capita consumer benefits with identical, 
arbitrary capacities 
For any arbitrary capacity (X) the difference between per-capita benefits 
expected under lottery rationing and those obtained under price rationing are: 
CSa : CSa CSjXoa where Xoa = the open-access use level 
Therefore, 
E[CSa,d - CSa,p = (E[CSd - CSp)jXoa 5.20 
which, from Equation 5.19, is positive. On average, those using the 
resource prior to rationing would expect to obtain greater benefits under 
lottery rationing than under price rationing. 
CSb : CSb CSjX where X is the rationed use level 
Therefore, 
E[CSb,d - CSb,p = [a + (b+c)X]j2 5.21 
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which is greater than zero whenever X is less than the open-access level of 
use. On average, those obtaining use of the resource wonld be better-off 
under lottery rationing than under price rationing. 
CS,: CS, = CS/XR where XR is the amount of use demanded at zero price with 
crowding equal to X 
5.22 
which is positive. 
5.4.3.5 Per-capita consumer benefits with efficient 
pricing and the most efficient lottery 
It follows directly from Equation 5.19 that expected CS, for the most 
efficient efficient lottery (E[eS,.r:]) is greater than CS; with efficient pricing (CS,.;). 
Comparison of Equations 5.7 and 5.15 indicates that the most efficient 
capacity for a lottery (X~) is greater than the most efficjent capacity for pric.ing 
(X;), so the relative magnitudes of CS~ arc not immediately_apparent. Comparing 
the definitions for these terms leads to the conclusion that: 
E[CSb.~] - CS b.; = [a(b+3c)I/[8(b+2c)] 5.23 
which is unambiguously greater than zerO. 
Because Xr: is greater than X; the number of people wishing to obtain 
access to the resource for the efficient capacity under a lottery is less than the 
number of people wishing to obtain access to the resource at zero price when 
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capacity is at the efficient price-rationed level. Therefore, E[CS,,~l is greater than 
CS,,;. 
5.4.4 Comparison of lottery-rationed outcomes with open-
access outcomes for the linear case 
Under both lottery and open-access allocation schemes all benefits occur 
in the form of consumer surplus. Neither scheme results in any revenue collection. 
The expected efficiency gains from implementation of an efficient lottery are: 
"B = E[ CS~] - CSOA 
(-a'/8c) - (-ba'/2(b+c)2) 
[a'( Cob )(b-c) ]/[8c(b+ c)'] 5.24 
"B = 0 when b=c 
"B > 0 when b*c 
Equation 5.24 indicates that, when demand curves are linear, it is possible 
to improve aggregate (expected) consumer welfare by appropriate usc of lotter." 
rationing. Further, since the open-access solution yields at least as much consumer 
surplus as any price-rationed solution, it is always possible to obtain more 
(expected) consumer welfare through appropriate use of lottery rationing than is 
possible with price rationing. 
By definition, an efficient lottery must increase aggregate conSUmer surplus 
above that obtainable with open-access, regardless of demand specifications (see 
Equation 5.24 for confirmation of this for the linear case). Therefore, CS, must 
increase upon implementation of efficient lottery rationing (es,.~>CS"OA)' No 
conclusion can be reached regarding the change in CSb or es, under lottery 
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rationing without specific demand information. For the linear case the outcomes 
are: 
From the definitions, the following two conditions must hold: 
(i) E[CSb.~l > E[CSa.{J 
(ii) E[ CSa.{] > CS,.OA = CSb.OA 
Which imply that: 
E[CSb.{] > CSb.OA 
E[CS,.I] - CS,.OA [ab(b-c)]/[4c(b+c)] 5.25 
which has a sign opposite to that of b-c. Since a lottery would only be used when 
b>c, the sign of Equation 5.25 must be negative. 
5.4.5 Comparison of price-rationed outcomes with open-
access outcomes for the linear case 
The price increase necessary to decrease use and shift the constanT 
crowding demand curve causcs a transfer of benefits from consumers to the 
producer. With liuear demand schedules, aggregate consumer surplus with price 
rationing is maximised at zero price. Since aggregate COnsumer surplus declines 
with the introduction of price rationing then CS, must be less than its open-access 
level whenever price rationing is used. 
CSa,p < CSa,OA 
Similarly, since a decline in capacity makes use mOre attractive, the number 
of people wishing to make usc of the resource if access were free at this capacity 
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increases. Consequently CS, is lower under price rationing than under open-access. 
Equation 5.26 indicates that CSb is reduced from its open-access level by 
efficient price rationing. 
CSb.; - CSb•OA = {ba(b+c)j[2(2c+b)2)} - {baj[2(b+c)]} 5.26 
which, upon rearranging, is: 
CSb.; - CSb•OA = - [bac(3c+2b)JI[2(b+c)(2c+b)2] 
which is less than zero. 
5.4.6 Summary and conclusions 
Sections 5.4.2 to 5.4.5 have summarised the impacts of price, lottery and 
open-access allocation methods for a congestible resource, where the demand for 
that resource is linear. Analysis of a specific Junctional form does not provide 
results which are applicable to other functional forms. The analysis of th0'linear 
function has been included here to indicate how different benefit,measures may be 
used to identify some of the equity implications of alternative allocation 
procedures. However, during the analysis of the relative magnitudes of impacts 
some results were able to be derived without making use ?f any specific demand 
data, they are generalisable to any functional form. The generalisable results are 
highlighted in Table 3. 
The analysis includes only a small number of benefit measures (6) and only 
three allocation procedures (price, lottery and open-access), but produced a large 
number of benefit comparisons. Clearly, the comparison of all outcomes from all 
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allocation methods would be a monumental task. The findings of the analysis of 
relative benefit measures for linear demand functions follows. 
The ranking of capacities at which various objectives are maximised (for 
linear demand specifications) is: 
price rationed capacity which maximises rent 
price rationed capacity which maximises total benefits 
lottery rationed capacity which maximises expected total 
benefits (and total consumers' surplus) 
open access use level 
price rationed capacity which maximises consumers' 
surplus. 
Table 3 summarises the relative magnitudes of benefit measures for the 
linear demand function case. If resource users are risk neutral, they will prefer a 
lottery to pricing because, while pricing may be efficient, the gains from efficiency 
will not flow to the resource users unless they are also the resource owners. 
Resource users with linear demand schedules will expect to lose from efficient 
pricing of the resource, and so can be expected to protest against the 
implementation of such policies. 
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TABLE 3 Relative benefit magnitudes for linear demand functions 
Category of Efficient Efficient Efficient Price vs Rankings 
benefits Lottery vs Price vs Price vs Lottery 
Open access Open access Efficient (Arbitrary, 
Lottery equal 
capacity) 
Revenue L·=OA=O /I P·>OA /I P·>L· 1/ P>L /I P>L=OA 
Total L·>OA /I P·>OA /I P·>L· /I P>L /I P>L>OA 
Benefits 
Aggregate C>OA /I P·<OA @ p. <L· @ P<L L·>OA>P· 
Consumer 
Surplus 
CS, L·>OA /I P·<OA @ p.<L" @ P<L C>OA>P· 
CSb C>OA /I P·<OA p·<C P<L L·>OA>P· 
CS, L·>OA P·<OA @ p. <L· P<L OA>Lo>P· 
Note: L> OA should be read to mean "The magnitude of benefits under lottery allocation is 
greater than the magnitude of benefits under open-access, for the relevant category of 
benefits. " 
/I 
@ 
5.5 
The asterisk signifies an efficient application of the relevant allocation method. 
These relative magnitudes are true for all negative sloping demand functions. irrespective 
of functional form. 
These relative magnitudes are true for all cases in which maximum consumer surplus under 
price allocation is attained with price equal to zero. 
Mixed price and lottery allocation methods 
Pure price allocation is efficient, while pure lottery allocation ensures 
equality of opportunity. Resource managers may not wish to pursue either of these 
objectives exclusively, or may be required to provide equal opportunity while 
earning revenue. A combination of the two approaches provides one way of 
reaching intermediate allocations. Two major classes of mixed price and lottery 
allocation methods exist, they are lotteries which charge a fee of successful 
applicants prior to allowing them access to a resource, and lotteries for which a fee 
must be paid to enter the lottery. The following sections analyse the outcomes 
under these two approaches. 
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5.5.1 Lottery with a fee for successful applicants 
Suppose that Xo units of a resource are to be allocated by a lottery. 
Further, suppose that a fee P, is charged for successful lottery entrants and all 
entrants are aware of the fee prior to entering the lottery. Only those potential 
users who would obtain per-unit benefits greater than or equal to P, would enter 
the lottery. This situation is illustrated in Figure 25. Mean benefits for those 
entering the lottery are raised from PL when there is a pure lottery to Ps when 
there is a success fee. The result of eliminating those obtaining the smallest use 
benefits in this way is an improvement in efficiency vis a vis the pure lottery. In 
the limit as the success fee is raised to the competitive price total benefits become 
identical to those obtained from a fixed, competitive price (Po) as only those willing 
to pay Po enter the lottery and the probability of success is unity. 
$ 
• 
. .......... _ .. ,.b 
h 
o 
Figure 25 Lottery with success [cc 
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At success-fee P, the number of people entering the lottery will be 
x, = H(P"Xo), where H(.) is the constant crowding demand function associated with 
x = Xo. Benefit levels are then: 
R = XoP, 5.27 
= area OP,hXo 
X, 
E[CS] { (Xo/X,). f P(X' ,X) dXd } - XoP, 5.28 
0 
area P,Psdh 
X, 
E[B] = (Xo/X,), f P(X' ,X) dXd 5.29 
0 
area OPsdXo 
5.5.2 Lottery with a fee to enter the lottery 
Analysis of outcomes resulting from a lottery 1fi which there is a non-
refundable participation fcc (p,) is complicated by the fact that the expected 
benefits of paying the fcc are determined by the number of people entering the 
lottery. If individuals do not have accurate information on the likely actions of 
others, choosing an optimal policy becomes problematical. Por the sake of analysis, 
assume that individuals know each others' preferences intimately, or there has been 
a long history of similar lotteries to provide an accurate estimate of the probability 
of success (It). 
Success in a lottery results in benefits to the individual equal to a-p" where 
a is the individual's willingness to pay for access to one unit of the good. Failure 
to win the lottery results in a loss of p,. The expccted benefit to the individual of 
entering the lottery is therefore: 
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The expected benefits of not entering the lottery are zero. Risk neutral 
individuals will enter the lottery as long as the expected benefits of doing so are at 
least as great as from abstaining. That is, a risk neutral individual will enter the 
lottery as long as 1t IX "'P4' Alternatively, only those individuals with marginal 
benefits (IX) at least as great as ~ (~= P4/1t) will enter the lottery, resulting in 
X4 = H(~,Xo) applicants (Figure 26). Note that the probability of success is 
determined by the number of applicants (1t =XO/X4), providing three equations in 
three unknowns; X4, /3, 1t. The three equations are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Figure 26 
$ 
o 
1t 
= P4/1t 
= F(X4,Xo) [or, X4 = H(/3,Xo)] 
= X O/X4 
Lottery with entry fee 
Solving this series of equations yields the equilibrium result: 
which may be solved for X4 in terms of the known parameters Xo and P 4. 
The resulting distribution of benefits is: 
Revenue 
E[CS] to 
successful applicants 
E[CS] to 
unsuccessful applicants 
E[B] 
{1t. 
X4 f F(Xd,X) dXd} - P4X O 
o 
area XOkjX4 
(N.B. this is a loss) 
1t. 
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5.30 
5.31 
5.32 
5.33 
Inspection of Figures 25 and 26 reveals that, for any positive price less than 
the efficient price, an entry fee lottery is more efficient than a success fee lottery, 
and both are intermediate on efficiency grounds between efficient pricing and a 
pure lottery. 
The efficiency costs and henefits of the mixed lotteries (relative to pricing 
and efficient pricing) are dependent upon the levels of the fees imposed. 
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5.6 Comparison of allocation methods 
Figure 27 illustrates all possible price/lottery combinations, and allows 
comparison of benefit measures under the pure aud mixed lottery and pricing 
strategies. The benefit measures are provided in Table 4. 
Figure 27 
$ 
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Comparison of mixed price/lottery allocation methods 
Average benefits under pricing are Pp. Under a pure lottery all people with 
marginal benefits from consumption greater than zero have an incentive to enter 
the lottery. These people have average benefits equal to PL' Since PL is less than 
P p for any nega tively sloping demand curve, the lottery is less efficient than 
competitive pricing. 
Lotteries which employ either entry or success fees rank between 
competitive pricing and the pure lottery on the efficiency criterion. For a given fee 
(P3 in Figure 27) expected per-capita benefits are PE and Ps respectively. The entry 
fee is expected to be more efficient than the success fee. As ~hefees increase, total 
benefits increase until efficient allocations occur when fees are set equal to the 
competitive price. 
Table 4 
Benefit measure 
Total 
Benefits 
Revenue 
Consumer 
Benefits 
:\"otes: 1. 
2. 
3. 
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Benefit measures for price/lottery rationing methods 
Allocation scheme Expected benefits Rank 
Pricing p p.Xo = area or pbXo 1 
Lottery PL"XO := area OPLfXo 4 
Entry fee lottery Pp.,Xo = area OPEcXO 2 
Success fee lottery Ps.Xo = area OPsdXo 3 
Pricing Po,Xo = area OPocXo 1 
Lottery zero 4 
Entry fee lottery P4·X4 = ~.Xo = area Op,gXo 2 
Success fee lottery P l'XO = area or 3hXO 3 
Pricing (Pp-Po).Xo = area PoPpbe 4 
Lottery PL.Xo = area OPdXo 
Entry fee lottery (PE-i3 ).Xo = area p,PEcg 3 
Success fee lottery (PS- P3)'XO = area P3Psdh 2 
Since P,.XO=P4'X4 • area OpgXo equals area OP4jX4 
The consumer benefit rankings arc derived by appeal to the fact that the average 
benefit curve is less steep than the marginal benefit curve (constant crowding 
demand curve for the rationed quantity) whenever the marginal benefit curve is 
negatively sloped, hence Pp-Po < PE -6 < PS-P3 < PL -0. 
The fce level is identical for entry fee lotteries and success fee lotteries. 
For these four allocation schemes the efficiency and revenue rankings are 
identical, and are the reverse of the consumer benefit rankings_ Hence resource 
suppliers wishing to maximise profits will prefer the competitive pricing scheme to 
any of the lottery schemes. while (risk-neutral) consumers would prefer a pure 
lottery which is inefficient, but which ensures consumers obtain all the benefits 
produced. 
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5.6.1 The linear case revisited 
By applying the definitions of total benefits for each rationing mechanism 
to a specific functional form it is possible to identify the efficiency costs of the 
mixed lottery/price allocation mechanisms relative to the pure lottery and pure 
pricing. 
For the linear constant crowding demand function for capacity Xo, 
P=a+bXd (where b<O) the total (expected) benefits from price and lottery 
allocation are, respectively: 
Bp = aXo + (bX%) /2 
E[Bd = (aXo) /2 
5.34 
5.35 
Applying the definitions of Equations 5.29 and 5.33 to the linear demand 
curve, expected benefits from a success fee lottery are: 
E[Bsl = (a + P 3)Xo/2 
while expected benefits from an entrance fee lottery are: 
E[BEl = aXo{1 + b/[2(P4/Xo-b)]} 
{since, 1t = (P4 - bXo)/a} 
= Xoa(2P 4-bXO) /[2(P 4-bXo) 1 
5.36 
5.37 
Substituting a price of zero for P3 and P4 confirms that one polar outcome 
of the mixed lotteries is identical to the pure lottery case. Setting Equations 5.36 
and 5.37 equal to Equation 5.34 and solving for P3 and P4 yields: P3 = P4 = 
a + bXo, which, by definition, is equal to the price needed to clear the market (the 
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efficient price) with pure price rationing. In these cases, the probability of success 
in the lottery is unity and the mixed cases collapse into pure price rationing. 
Appropriate choice of P3 or P 4 yields any desired level of total expected benefits 
between the polar cases of pure price and pure lottery rationing. 
The question now arises as to why one would prefer either a success fee or 
an entrance fee lottery over the other. One likely reason for adopting either of 
these rationing mechanisms is to earn revenue (cost recovery) while offering the 
most equal opportunity allocation mechanism compatible with the revenue 
objective. It is therefore instructive to compare the efficiency and equity outcomes 
of the two schemes when prices are set to obtain the same level of revenue. 
Equations 5.34 through 5.37 may be used to calculate the efficiency costs 
of mixed rationing schemes. These are: 
which are positive whenever P3 or P 4 are less than the market-clearing price (Po). 
In other words, there is an efficiency cost to implementing either of the mixed 
allocation schemes. 
Equations 5.27 and 5.30 yield the following condition for equality of 
revenue: 
5.38 
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Rearranging Equation 5.38 and subtracting P4 from each side provides a 
measure of the difference in prices necessary to generate identical revenue. 
5.39 
Equation 5.39 is always greater than zero when P4 is less than the market-
clearing price, indicating that (for the linear demand case) a success fee lottery will 
always have to charge a higher fee than an entrance fee lottery in order to raise the 
same revenue (still assuming risk-neutrality on behalf of consumers). The entrance 
fee lottery is therefore more equitable in the sense that, because the fee is lower, 
more people have the option of entering the lottery than would be willing to pay 
the fee in a success fee lottery. 
Substituting Equation 5.38 into the demand function and solving for X3, the 
number of people entering the success fee lottery, yields: 
= aXol (P o-bXo) 
= X4 
{since Xd = (P-a)/b = H(P,X) 
X4 = H(P4/1t,XO) 
1t = XO/X4} 
The same number of people enter each type of mixed lottery. 
5.40 
Substituting the value of P3 from Equation 5.38 into Equation 5.36 and 
rearranging yields: 
E[Bsl aXo(2P 4 -bXo) 1[2(P 4-bXo)] 5.41 
E[BB] (from Equation 5.37) 
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With a linear demand function and risk-neutrality there is no difference in 
expected efficiency between success fee and entrance fee lotteries which raise an 
equal amount of revenue. Since the two mixed lotteries provide identical revenue 
and expected total benefits, they must also provide identical expected aggregate 
consumer benefits. The entrance fee lottery must therefore provide greater 
expected benefits to those who obtain access to the resource. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed price rationing, lottery rationing, and two 
approaches which combine price and lottery rationing. It was found that pure 
pricing is the most efficient of these rationing mechanisms, while the pure lottery 
ensures equality of opportunity. Much of the efficiency gain obtained by 
implementing pure price rationing (vis a vis open-access) is captured by facility 
operators. While pure lotteries are not as efficient as pure pricing, consumers may 
prefer them because they can yield higher consumer benefits than pure pricing. 
Consumers may also view lotteries as being inherently fairer than pricing. 
Alternative outcomes may be obtained by combining pricing and lottery 
mechanisms, either through a success fee lottery, or through an entrance fee 
lottery. 
Once the demand function is known it is possible to evaluate relative 
benefits of alternative rationing schemes for the many different benefit categories. 
These procedures were illustrated using the simple linear demand function. In 
order to evaluate lottery related mechanisms it was necessary to address consumer 
attitudes to risk. Here it was assumed that consumers are risk-neutral, and 
expected values were consequently used for all benefit measures. 
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It was found that any value of total benefits or revenue between the polar 
extremes could be attained by selection of appropriate fees in association with a 
lottery. For the linear case with any level of revenue generation, the success fee 
is higher than the entrance fee, the same number of people enter each type of 
lottery, and the two mixed lottery types provide identical aggregate consumer 
benefits and total benefits. 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the choice of rationing 
mechanisms. In order to make progress it was necessary to make some rather 
heroic assumptions. The boldest of these are assumptions of zero transaction costs 
and risk-neutrality. The findings were illustrated with respect to a hypothetical 
constant crowding demand function. It is not possible to derive general rules 
regarding the relative benefits of alternative rationing mechanisms. Solution of 
real-world allocation problems will therefore depend upon obtaining knowledge of: 
transaction costs associated with each alternative, producer and consumer attitudes 
to risk, and the specification of the constant crowding demand function. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MEASURING DEMAND FOR CONGESTIBLE 
RESOURCES 
6.1 Information needs 
In order to allocate congestible goods efficiently, or to understand the 
efficiency implications of alternative allocation procedures, congestion-dependent 
demand information is needed. It is not possible to directly observe markets for 
different levels of congestion which exhibit a wide variety of prices, consequently 
estimation of constant crowding demand curves becomes an exercise in non-market 
valuation. Willingness to pay in terms of money, time, advance planning, or effort 
must be estimated as a function of the congestion parameter of interest (e.g. 
expected encounters, user density, etc.) and the amount of the good consumed. 
Alternatively, the quantity of usc may be estimated as a function of price and 
congestion parameters. 
6.2 Information sources 
Several approaches have been developed for estimation of non-marketed 
demands. Those approaches which enjoy wide conceptual support, published 
applications, and are potentially applicable to measuring demand for congestible 
recreation resources include \: 
Hedonic wage and price mndeb enioy wide conceptual and practical support. However, it 
is not theoretically possible to appiy ,hem in their pure form to valuing recreational resources. The 
hedonic travel cost method is an adupt<llion of the pure hedonic price method to allow its application 
to this class of valuation problem. 
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a) Travel cost method 
(i) Simple travel cost method 
(ii) Multiple site travel cost method 
(iii) Generalised travel cost method 
(iv) Hedonic travel cost method 
(v) Characteristics approach to demand estimation 
(vi) Gravity models 
b) Contingent valuation method 
c) Combined travel cost and contingent valuation approach 
This chapter investigates the ability of each of these methods of non-market 
valuation to measure congestion-dependent demand. No attempt is made to 
describe the methods in detail or provide critical analysis of them peT se, since 
there are now several books published that do this (Braden and Kolstad, 1991; 
Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze, 1986; Johansson, 1987; Mitchell and Carson, 
1989; Peterson, Driver and Gregory, 1988) as well as numerous articles that have 
appeared in academic journals addressing specific issues related to the methods. 
This chapter provides an investigation of the applicability of the various extra-
market demand estimation methods for measuring demand as a function of an 
endogenous site quality variable, in this case user density. 
6.2.1 Simple travel cost method 
The simple, or single-site, travel cost method can be applied to value 
resources in their existing states. The underlying concept is that the number of 
visits to a site is determined by the sum of travel cost and site entrance fee. By 
comparing visit rates for potential site users facing different travel .costs it is 
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possible to estimate how behaviour changes as costs change and therefore map out 
a demand curve for the site. 
The simple travel cost method may be applied to individuals or to groups, 
the group case often being referred to as "the Clawson approach" after the first 
person to apply the method (Clawson, 1959). Under the group approach the 
potential site user population is divided into zones based upon residential location. 
Visits per capita for each zone is then used as the dependent variable in an 
estimated function relating behaviour to travel cost. Individual travel cost 
approaches measure number of visits per individuaL The individual approach is 
more efficient and more robust in allowing estimation of the impacts of socio-
economic and other variables on facility use (Brown and Nawas, 1973; Gum and 
Martin, 1975). It requires either collection of data from people who do not use the 
facility, as well as those who do, to obtain an unbiased model, or use of advanced 
statistical techniques' to account for truncation effects which result from sampling 
only site users. The individual travel cost· model also requires more advanced 
statistical analysis because the number of trips an individual makes to a site is a 
discrete number, whereas the average number of trips for a large population can 
be any real number. The following discussion addresses the zonal approach to 
application of the travel cost method, but the arguments apply equally to the 
individual approach. 
Demand theory suggests that demand for any good is influenced by the 
prices of all goods. Unbiascu c:;timarcs of value are therefore only obtained when 
prices of substitute sites arc includcd as parameters in the demand function 
(Caulkins, Bishop and Bouwes. 19K5: Kling, 1989). To account for the existence of 
Techniques include: maxim til':1 iikcliilood estimation methods, random utility models, tobit 
models, and others (Smith <lnd Dcwnugcs. 1%5; Fletcher, Adamowicz and Graham-Tomasi. 1990; 
Smith,1988). Smith (1988) discuss(~-" ,his topic extensively. 
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substitute and complementary sites, more advanced forms of the single-site travel 
cost model (see, for example, Hof and King, 1982) estimate the primary stage of 
the model in the following form: 
where 
6.1 
visit rate to the study site by residents of 
origin zone k, 
cost of visiting site if or residents of zone k, 
A vector of socioeconomic and other 
characteristics for residents of zone k. 
The structure of the simple travel cost model implies that characteristics of 
all sites are fixed. This method is therefore unable to value characteristics (or 
changes in their levels). Initially, the fixed characteristics feature of the method 
was seen as a problem for resource valuation under conditions of congestion, 
especially in the context of revenue-based measures of value (WetzeL 1(77). The 
problem arose because the method did not produce a ·'market" demand curve, it did 
not predict the number of visits that would actually occur as site use costs were 
varied. When congestion exists at current use levels the simple travel cost method 
under-estimates use at higher prices. McConnell (1980) and Anderson (19RO) 
showed that the simple travel cost method estimates a single constant crowding 
demand curve, and therefore yields an appropriate measure of value of a site at its 
existing level of use. 
The simple travel cost method is easily applied, requmng lise data from 
only one site and inf orma tion on the characte ristics of poten t ia I si te user 
populations. However, there is no way of using the method to map out more than 
a single constant crowding demand curve, unless it is possible to conduct 
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longitudinal studies in which all other site and potential user characteristics are 
constant, but in which target facility use levels change (say in response to a growth 
of population). This situation is most unlikely to occur in practice. Consequently, 
the simple travel cost method is unable to offer sufficient information for 
managemene of congestible resources. 
6.2.2 Multiple site travel cost method 
It is possible to value a system of facilities, and to value additions or 
deletions to that system by extending the travel cost analysis to many sites (Burt 
and Brewer, 1971; Cicchetti, Fisher and Smith, 1976). By assuming that any of the 
sites attains the characteristics of any other site it is possible to value new sites, site 
closures, and some changes in site attributes. This approach could be used to map 
constant-crowding demand curves for any of a series of sites, within the range of 
observed densities. 
Existing site use data are used to estimate the following series of equations 
which describe use of all sites- in their present states: 
y. 
!j 6.2 
where per-capita visits to site by residents of 
regIOn j, 
Because the simple lrilve! cost method estimates only one constant crowding demand curve 
it is unable to be applied to ilccuratcly rrcdict actual use levels as a function of price. or to measure 
consumer benefits at different use !evels 10 those currently existing. It is therefore not possible to 
use simple travel cost demand informJtion \0 e~timate use levels and their consequences (such as 
environmental impacts). to CStill1illC ,-evenue or costs as functions of price. or to identify efficient 
prices and/or use levels. 
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minimum cost of visiting a site of type k for 
residents of region j, 
a site-specific relationship between per-
capita visitation rate, prices, and other 
(socia-economic) variables. 
Equation 6.2 is used to map out the demand curves for each of the sites by 
systematically varying the cost of using each site and predicting visit rates from 
each zone over a range of prices. When each site is unique the Pk/s refer to 
individual sites, but when several similar sites exist people are assumed to usc the 
cheapest site of any type and the Pk/s refer to the minimum cost of using a site of 
that type. 
Suppose that all sites arc unique (i.e. there is only one site of each type) 
and that management changes arc implemented at Site 1 so that it becomes 
identical to Site 2. After the changes are implemented the cost of reaching a type 
1 site is infinite. since Site 1 is no longer available in its type 1 form. However, 
Site 1 is now available as a type 2 site, reducing the cost of this type of site for 
some individuals4 • Some people who previously visited Site 2 will now visit Site 
1. Further. people who did not visit either Site lor Site 2 may now choose to visit 
Site 1 because the reduction in relative price makes activity type 2 relatively more 
attractive than other activity lypes. Of course, people who previously visited Site 
1 may still visit it. may redistribute usc to other sites, or may not usc any site. It 
is possible that demand for all sites may change because of changes implemcnted 
at one site. 
Some people (those who live closer to Site 2 than to Site 1) will still find it cheaper to use 
Site 2 rather than Site I to obtain a type 2 experience. while others will now find it cheaper to use 
Site! to obtain a lype 2 experience (those who live closer to Site 1 than to Sill' 2). 
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Even if interest is centred on demand for only one site, information is still 
required on the demand for the type of site into which it will be transformed to 
allow mapping of the demand curve for the site after the change in characteristics. 
For example, in the case where Site 1 is transformed to have characteristics 
identical to Site 2, the new demand for Site 1 is evaluated using Equation 6.3, in 
which the price of using Site 1 is infinite. 
6.3 
otherwise 
More generally, the new demands are predicted using the revised 
parameters in the previously estimated model, i.e. 
6.4 
where Pkj ' the minimum cost of visiting a site of type k for residents 
of region j after the change in characteristics a t the study 
site (Site 1). 
The value of a change in characteristics at anyone site may be estimated 
as the difference between consumer surplus at the site before and after the change 
(Samples and Bishop, 1995). In other words, welfare changes contingent upon 
changes in site characteristics may be evaluated using the demand curve for the site 
where the changes occur, there is no need to include demand impacts at other sites 
(Knetsch, 1977). However, a change in a site's characteristics entails at least two 
price changes5 • Unless cross-price terms are identical for each pair of goods for 
The cost of visi ting a si te WII h 1!1 C SI tidy site's original characteristics will increase for some 
people. while the cost of a visit 10 a site with the study site's final characteristics will decrease for 
some people. 
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which prices change, the change in consumers surplus is not independent of the 
order in which the prices are changed (Just et al., 1982; Hof and King, 1982). This 
path dependency problem means that the areas under demand curves "provide no 
information regarding the underlying change in utility" (Johansson, 1987: p.124). 
There is some evidence from empirical studies of inequalities in cross-price terms6• 
However, some authors argue that 6ven when equality of cross-price terms does not 
exist the discrepancy between true and estimated changes in value will be small 
(Hof and King, 1982). 
Use of the multiple site travel cost model to generate congestion-dependent 
demand functions is reliant upon the existence of several spatially separated sites 
with heterogenous crowding characteristics and which exhibit homogeneity of all 
other site characteristics. The identity of irrelevant characteristics requirement 
occurs because the means of valuing a change in characteristic (crowding) is to 
assume that the site under study becomes identical to an existing site. 
Consequently, use of the site with the new set of travel costs may be estimated 
using the existing set of site demand functions (Equation series 6.4). 
If demands for sufficient sites, exhibiting diverse levels of crowding, are 
modelled it is possible to map constant crowding demand curves for every crowding 
level currently encountered over the range of sites. However, the homogeneity of 
other site characteristics requirement is not easily satisfied, and the ref ore presents 
a severe practical difficulty in applying this method7. Further, the importance of 
the cross-price term symmetry assumption is not fully understood. 
For example, Cicchetti, Fisher and Smith (1976) and Hylland and Strand (1983, cited in 
Johansson. 1987) both found that symmetry conditions on cross-price terms were not satisfied. 
This difficulty should not be misinterpreted as a criticism of the multiple-site travel cost 
method pe·r se, since the method was developed to value new sites and not to value site characteristics. 
The method does, however, present the possibility of valuing changes in site characteristics. 
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Samples arid Bishop (1985) describe an alternative method for estimating 
the value of characteristic changes using the multiple-site travel cost model. A two-
stage process is employed, with the first stage being application of the usual 
multiple site travel cost model to estimate consumer surplus for each of a set of 
sites which exhibit a variety of characteristics. In the second stage the impact of 
changes in characteristics is measured by fitting a model which specifies site 
consumer surplus as the dependent variable, and site characteristics as independent 
variables (Equation 6.5). 
Value of site i == (01i> ... , Ok;' PI> ..• ,Pu) 
the level of characteristic j at site i, and 
the price of using site m. 
6.5 
This approach requires information on several sites to provide sufficient 
cases for statistical validity in the second part of the procedure, especially if there 
is a large number of characteristics. It can therefore only be expected to be 
applicable in a limited number of situations. 
Estimates of the parameters associated with each characteristic are biased 
if relevant independent variables are excluded from the right hand side of Equation 
6.5. Samples and Bishop (1985) provide a conceptual framework which indicates 
that all variables in Equation 6.S should be included. However, this is not possible 
because doing so causes the number of equations to be less than the number of 
independent variables. The approach adopted by Samples and Bishop is to exclude 
prices from Equation 6.5. Further. even if prices could be included, there is a 
problem with determining what the price of use for any site is when users face a 
range of prices, as recognised in the approach ?f stage one in this method. This 
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technique can therefore only be considered to be an ad hoc method for estimating 
the impacts of characteristic changes. 
6.2.3 Generalised travel cost method 
The generalised travel cost method' (Vaughan and Russell, 1982; Smith, 
Desvouges and McGivney, 1983; Smith and Desvouges, 1985) is designed to enable 
valuation of site attributes. The model may be estimated in either a single-stage 
or a two· stage structure. The two-stage model first estimates a travel cost model 
using data from several sites. The visitation rate model for each site uses own· 
price as an independent variable, and does not incorporate the prices of substitute 
sites. The functional form of the visitation rate model is identical for each site, but 
the coefficients on the parameters are not. For example, a linear form of the 
visitation rate model would be: 
6.6 
where ai and bi are parameters to be estimated for each site. 
The coefficients estimated in the first stage describe how use varies 
between sites, assuming no costs of site use (a i) and how use varies for each site, 
depending on the cost of using that site (bi). The coefficients of the first stage 
should therefore reflect site attractiveness, and consequently be dependent upon 
site characteristics. In the second stage of the two-stage generalised travel cost 
model, site characteristics are used as independent variables in models that 
estimate the coefficients (the ai's and bi's) derived in the first stage. 
Mendelsohn and Brown (1983) refer to the generalised travel cost model as the "own 
price/quality model". Many authors refer to it as the "pooled demand model" or the "varying 
parameter model". 
ai = f(Zil"",Zin) 
bi = g(Zib""Zin) 
where Zik is the kth characteristic of site i. 
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Substituting the second stage equations into the first stage equation yields: 
6.7 
Because the functional form for the first stage is identical for all sites, and 
the second stage models are site-independent, Equation 6.7 is site-independent. It 
is a general model that explains use of any site as a function of its own price and 
characteristics. Single-stage models estimate the reduced form model of Equation 
6.7 directly (see, for example, Loomis, 1989). 
The two-stage generalised travel cost model does not include prices of 
substitute sites. This results in logical inconsistencies because the user is able to 
choose the desired level of quality from several sites, but docs not use the cost of 
other sites in determining the optimal use strategy (Mendelsohn and Brown, 1983). 
The only cases in which applications of this model are theoretically defensible 
theref ore occur when consumers have no choice of quality. In other words, quality 
is homogeneous across sites, or the prices of substitute sites are so high that none 
are used. In these cases the assumption that quality of substitute sites does not 
influence the consumer's decision, implicit in the first stage, is valid, however there 
is also no variation in quality (0 value in the second stage. 
Some authors have included quality and prices of substitute sites in reduced 
form models (c.g. Menz and Wilton, 1983; Loomis, 1989), however quality and 
prices for all sites cannol be included as independent variables in the same 
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regression because of matrix inversion impossibilities (Samples and Bishop, 1985). 
One variable is used to represent the "availability" of substitute sites. The problem 
with this approach lies in constructing a single item index to satisfactorily represent 
the availability of several sites which display a range of characteristics and prices. 
The information necessary to construct this index is the target of the valuation 
exercise, namely the marginal values of characteristics, and is therefore unavailable. 
Kling (1987) reports use of a stacked regression technique to incorporate 
substitute site prices. However, she claims that it is not possible to include 
variables representing quality of substitute sites because that would eliminate the 
quality variation necessary to estimate the demand functions (Kling, 1987). 
Omission of substitute site quality variables does not present any error in estimates 
of welfare change from a quality change at a single site (Kling, 1989). 
6.2.4 Hedonic travel cost method 
The hedonic travel cost method (Brown and Mendelsohn, 1984) may be 
used to value attributes that are obtained as part of a package containing many 
attributes. It avoids the requirement of the multiple site travel cost method of 
having several substitute sites which exhibit homogeneity of all characteristics apart 
from the characteristic being valued. The hedonic travel cost method derives a 
marginal cost function for attributes from a comparison of the costs of visiting sites 
with heterogeneous attributes. Site choices for people facing different cost 
structures are then used to map out demand curves for attributes. If supply is 
inelastic and demand is spatially diverse (implying different marginal costs for 
individuals) the identification problem inherent in other hedonic models is not 
encountered. These conditions are often characteristic of outdoor recreational 
facilities. 
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The hedonic travel cost method introduces additional estimation problems 
beyond those encountered in other travel cost approaches. This method is sensitive 
to assumptions, and does not appear to give reliable estimates of value. For 
example, different methods of measuring site characteristics "dramatically altered 
the estimated characteristic demand functions" and "[t]he treatment of observations 
with negative prices also had a large effect on the estimated demand and inverse 
demand models" (Smith and Kaoru, 1987). 
In reviewing the status of the hedonic travel cost approach Smith and Kaoru 
(1987) conclude that the method has not reached the stage of development where 
it can be considered a straight forward application of the underlying theory. 
Consequently, while this approach is a potentially valuable method of valuing 
recrea tion site characteristics, including congestion, it is not curren tly available for 
this purpose. 
6.2.5 Characteristics approach to demand estimation 
U sing Lancaster's (1971) characteristics approach to demand theory, Morey 
(19R1) and Greig (1983) have developed modified versions of the travel cost 
method capable of valuing changes in site characteristics. 
Greig's method compares the characteristics of each site with the costs of 
site use (travel and other costs) to construct characteristic possibility f ron tiers for 
potential site users at a variety of locations. Observations of site use and activity 
budgets coupled with an assumed functional form for site users' utility functions are 
used to estimate specific utility function parameters. The estimation procedure 
entails trial and error to find the set of parameters yielding the closest predictions 
of observed behaviours. 
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Site demand curves can be estimated by systematically varying the cost of 
using a site. Changes in price result in changes in the characteristic possibility 
frontier. Estimates of site use are made by maximising the previously estimated 
utility function subject to the characteristic possibility frontier which prevails at 
each price. 
Changes in site characteristics result in new characteristic possibility 
frontiers, and may be valued by re-estimating site demand contingent upon the new 
characteristic possibility frontier, utilising the previously estimated utility function 
and observed budget. 
Greig's application of this model was only intended to be illustrative of the 
approach, and was successful to the extent that he was able to obtain estimates of 
the value of changes in characteristics. There was no attempt to verify results9, so 
it is not possible to draw any conclusions with respect to the ability of this method 
to accurately measure the value of characteristics. However, several underlying 
assumptions need further investigation before the method can be accepted 
uncritically. First, Greig assumed a fixed budget for the study activity, implying 
that changed characteristics do not result in a change in totat" expenditure on the 
activity, which is contrary to received economic theory. Second, a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function in characteristics space was assumed. While the Cobb-Douglas form 
may be appropriate, the strength of this assumption, the predictive power of other 
functional forms, and sensitivity to functional form were not tested. Third, Greig 
recognised that there are problems in measuring some types of characteristics. 
There remains the possibility that characteristics such as aesthetic beauty may not 
be delivered in proportion to the amount of use of a recreation site. This final 
There was no attempt to compare values to those obtained from applications of other non-
market valuation methods, or to apply the approach to make behavioural predictions which could be 
tested. 
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concern is irrelevant if the analyst wishes only to estimate congestion-dependent 
demand functions and does not want to value other site characteristics which 
exhibit such measurement difficulties. The first two assumptions do, however, pose 
real concerns for estimation of congestion-dependent demand functions. 
Morey's model assumes a fixed activity budget and employs prices 
numerated in time units in a model that describes how the time budget is allocated 
amongst a range of substitute sites. Morey uses a second-order approximation to 
a general, twice differentiable utility function which is additive and homothetic. 
The utility obtained from each site is determined by the amount of use of that site, 
the characteristics of the site, and the individual's ability to use site characteristics. 
Data from a cross-sectional survey of skiers were used to estimate the 
utility function, using maximum likelihood methods to predict site share equations 
as functions of the utility function parameters. Incorporation of new prices and/ or 
site characteristics could then be used to determine characteristic-dependent 
demand functions for each site in the manner employed by Greig. 
The characteristics theory of demand estimation provides a grounding in 
utility theory for valuation of characteristics. It is necessary to identify the 
underlying utility functions for policy determination or evaluation using this 
approach. Doing so requires the analyst to make strong assumptions about the 
nature of utility functions, specifically with respect to separability of utility for the 
activity under study and with respect to functional form for the utility function for 
that activity. Mendelsohn and Brown (1983) cite three major problems with the 
household production function (characteristics) approach to demand estimation. 
These are: econometric difficulties, the assumption that consumers share a common 
production function, and the extensive inf ormation needs - including a complete list 
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of commodities demanded by resource users. These difficulties lead to the 
conclusion that "the tool is an unnecessarily cumbersome approach to measure the 
value of sites or their qualities" (Mendelsohn and Brown, 1983 p.611). Further, 
until the necessary assumptions can be validated and/or sensitivity to functional 
form is shown to be inconsequential it is not possible to determine the validity of 
applying the characteristics approach to demand estimation. 
6.2.6 Gravity models 
Ewing (1980) summarises three types of gravity model that have been used 
to model recreational trips, and may therefore be used to value recreation facilities. 
These models all predict the number of trips to a site from origin zones as a 
function of origin zone population, travel cost, and attractiveness of the site. The 
simplest model (the unconstrained gravity model) does not account for costs or 
attractiveness of substitute sites. A more advanced model (the origin-constrained 
gravity model) partly addresses the existence of substitutes by "assum[ing] that a 
fixed number of trips emanate from [each origin] irrespective of the number, 
attractiveness, and accessibility of the destinations. ... it assumes that the 
proportion of trips from [origin] i terminating at [site 1 j is a function of the 
attractiveness and accessibility of j in relation to the attractiveness and accessibility 
of all other destinations in the system" (Ewing, 1980 pp.3-4). Ewing argues that 
this approach is unacceptable for modelling discretionary trip behaviour, which 
requires a supply-generated participation model. This model takes the form: 
where tij 
6.8 
the number of trips from origin i to destination j, 
the number of trips emanating from origin i 
irrespective of destination, 
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the proportion of trips originating in i that go to j. 
In this model ti is the trip generation element and mii is the trip distribution 
elementlO. In general, these models take the form: 
ti = Ni G; f l [ ~Ak f2(Cik)] 6.9 
mij = Aj f2(C;j)/[ ~Ak f2(Cik)] 6.10 
where G; intrinsic per capita trip generation potential of 
Ni 
origin (i.e. some function of socioeconomic 
characteristics of origin zone i), 
the "supply-generated participation" effect; 
population of zone i, 
cost of return travel from origin i to destination j, 
some function expressing the number of visits to an 
individual site, dependent upon the cost of visiting 
that site, and 
a measure of the attractiveness of site j. 
Operationalisation of this model requires estimation of G;, Aj and the 
functions f1 and f2 . Examples of application of gravity models to valuation of 
recreational resources include Cesario and Knetsch (1976) and Chan and Carroll 
(1985). 
This theoretical structure does not account for differences between origin 
zones in the availability of substitute activities in the trip generation section of the 
10 These are termed the accessibility and allocation functions respectively by Chan and Carroll 
(1985). 
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model, leading to the conclusion "the absence of such a term should evoke some 
doubt about the validity of the parameters estimated in existing generation models" 
(Ewing, 1980 p.8). This problem is overcome in the model adopted by Chan and 
Carroll (1985), which incorporates attractiveness and costs of all sites in the trip 
generation part of the model. 
Gravity models are expanded generalised travel cost models with a pre-
specified relationship amongst some of the parameters. To see this, Equation 6.8 
may be written in a general form (Equation 6.11) that shows that it has a 
specification that includes all the parameters of the generalised travel cost model 
(own-price and quality attributes), plus the prices and attributes of substitute sites. 
6.11 
Therefore, in theory, this approach avoids the substitute problem which 
precludes the generalised travel cost model from being used to value quality 
changes. 
There is no theoretical justification f or the specific form of gravity models. 
One problem with restriction of functional form is that it may result in less 
explanatory ability than models which allow selection of functional farm on 
statistical grounds. This may be one reason for the finding that "the goodness of 
fit of such models, calibrated using real world data, leaves a lot to be desired .... 
models do not fit the data as well as is necessary to place faith in the validity of the 
model. ... At present, then, there ,HC sufficient sources of misspecification of spatial 
interaction models to bc wary about placing strong reliance on exact parameter 
estimates" (Ewing, 1980 pp. li'\-19l. 
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Apart from this practical concern, there are two major theoretical concerns 
with gravity models. First, is the need to estimate a measure of site attractiveness 
prior to estimation of the model. In this sense gravity models embody similar 
problems to the generalised travel cost model. The impact of site characteristics 
on site attractiveness is the desired end product of the exercise and cannot be an 
input to it. Typically, gravity models use researcher-defined proxies for site quality, 
such as park area, in order to estimate site demands. Estimation of constant 
crowding demand curves requires a model that can predict the impact of crowding 
on site attractiveness and thereby on site demand. The only solution is to estimate 
the attractiveness scores endogenously and then use them as dependent variables 
in a separate model relating them to site characteristics 11. A method for 
endogenous estimation of attractiveness scores is provided by Baxter (1979). 
Second, is the inability to estimate models that include both quality and price 
variables as exogenous terms, as discussed in the generalised travel cost section. 
6.2.7 Contingent valuation 
Contingent valuation may be applied to allow either direct estimation of 
welfare changes and/or estimation of site demand curves. The technique asks 
survey respondents to either value their change in welfare directly, or to indicatc 
their purchasing behaviours given a purchase price for the good being valued. 
The first applications of the contingent valuation method required 
respondents to nominate the value of welfare changes (Davis, 1963). However, it 
is becoming increasingly common to use price as an independent variable, and to 
ask survey respondents to indicate whether they would purchase a specified 
11 Assuming that characteristics other than crowding also impact on site attractiveness. 
otherwise the crowding measure may enter directly. 
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environmental commodity at a specified price 12, or to ask how much use of a 
facility the respondent would make (if any), contingent upon having to pay a 
specified use fee. This independent-price approach is more like everyday market 
transactions that survey respondents aref amiliar with than the original (dependent-
price) contingent valuation approach. Consequently, this "quantity-estimating" form 
of the contingent valuation method is more likely to satisfy Cummings et al.'s 
(1986) reference operating conditions f or successful application of the contingent 
valuation method than the "value-estimating" form. 
In the value-estimating form, contingent valuation of a quality change 
entails asking survey respondents to reveal their maximum willingness to pay to 
obtain a nominated improvement in quality, or minimum compensation demanded 
to agree to a nominated decrease in quali ty 13. Quantity of use at the new quality 
level is not normally estimated. This approach measures relative total values of 
alternative states of the resource. These relative values represent the difference 
in areas under compensated constant crowding demand curves, and do not provide 
inf ormation on the location of those constant crowding demand curves. If 
sufficient quality changes are evaluated this approach may be used to estimate a 
relationship of the form: 
6.12 
where $cv social compensating variation of a change to quality 
level Q, 
Qo current site quali ty 14. 
:vI:itchcll and Carson ([()S'») I-Ci'cr 10 this as the referendum approach. 
Assuming that lIicksian ('ompcnsJling variation is the target measure of welfare change, 
\4 In order to provide L'Ompcl1silling measures of value, the function f measures changes in 
value relative to the status quo. 0 0 , fhcl'dore, Oil is fixed. while Q is variable. 
168 
This approach is not amenable to estimation of constant crowding demand 
curves. Some authors have attempted to use contingent valuation-like approaches 
to map ordinary demand curves (e.g. MacCrimmon and Toda, 1969; Sinden, 1974; 
Findlater and Sind en, 1982) by using hypothetical markets to map indifference 
curves, which may then be combined with budget data to estimate demand curves. 
The methods used encountered some conceptual difficulties, which can be 
overcome (Bennett and Smith, 1985); some conceptual problems which cannot be 
easily resolved, most notably allocation of budget to a sub-set of utility-yielding 
activities and a cardinal utility measurement requirement (Bennett, 1987); and 
severe practical difficulties. The practical difficulties involve the requirement for 
each survey subject to undergo a lengthy, repetitive process to identify indifference 
curves, even for a small number of goods (Findlater and Sinden, 1982). Survey 
respondents are typically unwilling to subject themselves to this type of experience, 
and those who do quickly tire of it. Consequently, to the author's knowledge, there 
have not been any recent applications of these indifference curve-mapping 
approaches. 
To simplify the valuation procedure for respondents, analysts are 
increasingly adopting contingent ranking, dichotomous choice and multinomial 
(independent-price) techniques for application of contingent valuation. In these 
cases individuals are not required to furnish a full preference map, or identify 
relative values. The aggregate demand curve is estimated from the reported 
behaviours of many respondents who face a variety of combinations of independent 
variable values. Dichotomous choice approaches ask whether the behaviour would 
occur or not (would you visit this art gallery today if it cost you $2 to get in?), 
while multinomial response models ask how often the behaviour would occur (how 
many days would you use this skifield this winter if the tow fee was $40 per day?). 
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Contingent ranking approaches ask respondents to nominate their preferred 
price/quality combinations from a limited set of choices. 
The dichotomous and multinomial approaches may be used to estimate 
constant crowding demand curves by including quality (total use, user density, 
encounters, etc.) as an independent variable, along with price. The questions posed 
to survey respondents take the form: how much use would you make of facility X 
if user density was Y and price was Z? For example, how many days would you use 
this ski field this winter if tow queues averaged 10 minutes and the tow fee was $40 
per day? Hence, aggregation of individual responses to a variety of fee/quality 
combinations allows estimation of aggregate demand curves with the following 
form: 
q f($,O) 
where q 
$ 
o 
amount of usc of the facility, 
facility usc fee, 
6.13 
total amount of use (or other crowding measure, 
e.g. average time in tow queues). 
Clearly, Equation 6.13 is the constant crowding demand curve specification. Logit 
and probit models are commonly used for analysis of dichotomous and multinomial 
choice models. 
Whereas the value-estimating and contingent ranking forms of the 
contingent valuation method yield Hicksian estimates of welfare change, the 
dichotomous and multinomial choice. quantity-estimating forms yield estimates of 
Marshallian demand curves. Hicksian measures are the theoretically preferred 
alternative, as they allow application of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. The problems 
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arising from use of Marshallian measures III place of Hicksian measures are 
addressed in the following chapter. 
The contingent valuation method is theoretically applicable to any valuation 
scenario, as long as survey respondents are willing to comply with the rules of the 
game; placing themselves in the contingent situation described to them, carefully 
evaluating their optimal behaviours under those circumstances, and reporting those 
behaviours honestly. 
There is a growing body of evidence on the ability of the contingent 
valuation method to provide meaningful measures of value for extra-market 
resources. These studies generally take one of two forms, they either compare the 
results of contingent valuation studies with the results obtained from other types 
of non-market valuation studies of the same resource (convergent validity), or they 
compare the results of contingent valuation studies with the results of simulated 
market studies (criterion validity). Simulated markets are markets in which real 
resources change hands in order to obtain access to the (excludable) good being 
valued. A further area of research has concentrated on measuring the degree to 
which people free-ride in contingent valuation settings. 
Both of the validation approaches are limited in their applicability. 
Comparative studies are restricted to goods and services which may be valued by 
more than one method, and for which the different methods can be used to value 
identical components of total value. For example, a travel cost method/contingent 
valuation method comparison may not be possible if people hold significant option, 
bequest, or existence values for the resource being valued. These values would not 
be measured by the travel cost method (since it measures use values only), but it 
may not be possible to exclude them from some forms of contingent valuation 
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estimates of value15 • Simulated market studies can only be conducted on goods 
and services which are excludable (quasi-private). There is an open question over 
whether the results of such studies can be applied to the many non-marketed and 
public goods and services which are not exc1udable16• 
Mitchell and Carson report that "Overall, the comparisons between true 
payment conditions and those which encourage free riding suggest that under 
experimental conditions free riding accounts for a modest downward bias in the 
[willingness to pay] amounts of about 10 to 30 percent" (Mitchell and Carson, 
1989:150-151). It should be noted that these results were obtained from value-
measuring approaches to contingent valuation and that "the discrete-choice 
eferendum model was incentive-compatible '" This finding offers the possibility 
)f framing contingent valuation questions so that they possess theoretically ideal 
md truthful demand-revelation properties" (ibid:151), suggesting that free riding 
;hould not cause significant difficulties in conducting contingent valuation non-
market valuation studies, especially the quantity-estimating variants. Tests of 
contingent valuation studies failed to detect the presence of strategic behaviour 
(i bid, pp.16S-168), suggesting that respondents to contingent valuation surveys will 
report their intended behaviours honestly. 
There remains the issue of whether contingent valuation survey respondents 
fully evaluate their behavioural choices under the conditions detailed by the analyst. 
This issue is often referred to as one of hypothetical bias. Mitchell and Carson 
conclude: "laboratory and field experiments that compare the results obtained by 
15 Convergent validity studies do not prove that either study is accurate - both may be equally 
inaccurate! 
16 Carson and :vI:itchell (1989:208) go further in claiming "Because the simulated market-
hypothetical market studies are based on a consumer market model, their findings are not directly 
relevant to the use of CV studies to value genuinely public goods". 
172 
treatments using a hypothetical payment structure with those involving a nontrivial 
payment in real dollars '" revealed similar patterns of behaviour whether a 
hypothetical or a real payment was involved" (ibid:187). 
The results of validation studies are reported by Cummings et al. (1986) 
and Mitchell and Carson (1989). After reviewing convergent validity studies, 
Mitchell and Carson conclude: "The large number of comparison studies show a 
reasonably high level of convergent validity", but they proceed to caution "the 
absence of a clear-cut criterion against which to compare [contingent valuation] 
values for public goods means that the validity of individual studies cannot be 
established in a definitive fashion" (ibid:208-209). The conclusion to be drawn is 
that, while it is not possible to definitively test whether contingent valuation values 
represent "true" values, the body of evidence suggests that people responding to 
contingent valuation surveys generally do evaluate the situation presented to them 
and report their intended behaviours honestly. 
Application of the contingent valuation method to measure demand for 
(benefits obtained from) usc of congestible facilities presents few conceptual 
difficulties. Survey participants could be presented with a variety of 
price/congestion level scenarios and asked to nominate their intended behaviour 
under those hypothetical scenarios. This approach could entail dichotomous choice 
by investigating whether usc of the facility would be made during a time period 
which precludes the possibility of more than one unit of use per person. 
Alternatively, annual or seasonal usc frequencies could be elicited by requiring 
respondents to nominate the number of trips they would make in the specified time 
period. Each approach allows constant crowding demand curves to be mapped and 
a congestion-dependent demand function to be estimated. To the author's 
knowledge, no studies of this Lype have heen published. 
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If constant crowding demand curves per se are not of interest, efficient 
capacity under lottery allocation may be identified by use of value-estimating forms 
of contingent valuation. Survey participants are asked to nominate their maximum 
willingness to pay for use of a facility, during a nominated time period, under given 
congestion conditions. It is then possible to estimate mean willingness to pay as a 
function of congestion. Multiplying the number of users creating the level of 
congestion with the mean willingness to pay at the congestion level for all 
congestion (use) levels yields the relationship between total benefits and use level. 
This approach is relevant only to estimating expected benefits under lottery 
rationing because it measures mean benefits under alternative congestion 
conditions, and not the distribution of benefits. The parameter estimated is the 
height of the average willingness to pay schedule at the point where marginal 
willingness to pay (the height of the constant crowding demand curve) is zero. The 
whole of the average willingness to pay schedule is mapped out by varying the 
congestion level (moving to a new constant crowding demand curve) 17. The 
inability of this approach to appropriately recognise inframarginal surplus when 
more than one unit of use per time period is possible is noted by McConnell 
(1977:190). 
Several authors have used contingent valuation to estimate the influence of 
congestion on willingness to pay, all have used willingness to pay as the dependent 
variable, rather than use frequency. Cicchetti and Smith (1973, 1976) estimated 
mean willingness to pay for a once-per-season wilderness outing. Independent 
17 The location of constant crowding demand curves could be plotted by limiting the demand 
period so that only one unit of use per person is possible in that time. Information on maximum 
willingness to pay for use under stated congestion conditions could be used to determine the 
proportion of the population that would use the facility under a variety of price/congestion 
conditions. This procedure could therefore be used to derive the congestion-dependent demand 
function for that period. To the author's knowledge this has not been attempted. 
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variables included: length of the outing, numbers of camp and trail encounters, and 
the nature of those encounters (whether with parties on foot or with parties on 
horseback). This study found that encounter levels had significant impacts on mean 
willingness to pay. McConnell (1977) used on-site interviews to measure 
willingness to pay for beach use on the day of the interview. By measuring site 
congestion and other site quality variables McConnell was able to estimate a 
function relating "the average individual's surplus per day" to site use levels. The 
congestion variable was found to be significant at some beaches, but not at others. 
Walsh and Gilliam (1982) conducted a similar study on wilderness recreators, but 
extended their questioning to determine willingness to pay for the day's recreation 
at a variety of encounter levels. Number of encounters had a significant impact on 
willingness to pay, allowing the authors to estimate "the relationship of willingness 
io pay to number of persons encountered per day ... f or the representative 
individual" (Walsh and Gilliam, 1982:6; emphasis not in original). Total 
willingness to pay at each facility use level was identified by multiplying mean 
willingness to pay at each level of congestion with total use18 • The efficient 
capacity was identified as the capacity at which marginal willingness to pay was 
equal to marginal management costs. 
The procedure adopted by Walsh and Gilliam does not identify efficient 
ca pacity. Firstly, it estima tes willingness to pay only for those individuals currently 
using the facility. If a change in facility capacity brings about a change in 
expectations regarding the number of encounters while recreating at this facility it 
would also be expected to change the total number of users. If the people attracted 
to or displaced from the [acility have different demand functions than current users 
who continue to use the facility then the Walsh and Gilliam estimates of mean 
willingness to pay as a function nf congestion are wrong. Secondly, Walsh and 
18 A separate relationship was used to convert encounters to total daily usc. 
175 
Gilliam estimate the mean height of constant crowding demand curves for current 
users. However, efficient allocation requires estimation of the mean heights of 
constant crowding demand curves out to the capacity consistent with the level of 
congestion implicit in each constant crowding demand curve. The Walsh and 
Gilliam procedure therefore underestimates mean willingness to pay for reductions 
in capacity and vice versa, 'when the use that does occur is allocated efficiently 
(say through price-rationing). Consequently, the Walsh and Gilliam approach is 
only appropriate for measuring expected benefits under rationing which allocates 
use randomly amongst existing users. These conditions could be satisfied under 
lottery rationing with a pre-requisite to entering the lottery being past facility use. 
A variation on the methodology employed by Walsh and Gilliam was used 
by Walsh, Miller and Gilliam (1983) to estimate the impacts of queue length and 
skier density on mean willingness to pay for lift tickets at Colorado skifields. In 
this case "skiers reported values for each of the three levels of lift-line wait with 
each of the three levels of slope congestion, assuming that all other conditions 
remain unchanged, including the number of days skied at the study sites per 
year" (ibid:199; emphasis added). The assumption of constant use is equivalent 
to the focus on single day values employed in the other contingent valuation studies 
of congestion. Further, mean willingness to pay is estimated for all existing facility 
users, leading to identical conclusions regarding applicability to estimation of 
efficient capacity. 
In summary, it can be seen that all existing empirical contingent valuation 
studies have adopted the value-estimating form of the method. This approach 
precludes the mapping of constant-crowding demand curves, but is potentially 
applicable to estimation of efficient capacities under a variety of rationing 
mechanisms. The existing empirical applications have all used flawed methodology 
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to estimate efficient capacities. Use-estimating forms of the contingent valuation 
method have the potential for mapping constant crowding demand curves directly, 
and simplifying the estimation of optimal capacities. The cost of adopting the use-
estimating forms is that Marshallian measures of welfare change are obtained, 
rather than the preferred Hicksian measures. 
6.2.8 Combined contingent valuation and travel cost method 
Combining the travel cost method with contingent valuation simplifies the 
requirements on survey respondents compared to a pure contingent valuation 
approach (see e.g. Narayanan, 19R6). The combined approach is also applicable to 
\Oaluing characteristics for cases where information is only available for a single 
site, greatly reducing data requirements in comparison with the multiple-site travel 
cost approaches. 
In order to apply this approach the travel cost method is used to value a site 
In its existing state. A contingent market is then applied to reveal individual 
demands at a range of user densities, hut with the present site uose fee remaining 
unaltered. Application of the simple travel cost method to this new set of visit 
ratc/travel cost data allows estimation of Marshallian constant crowding demand 
curves for the existing user density and for each of the user densities proposed in 
the contingent market scenarios. 
The combined appr(){lch simplifies the multinomial choice contingent 
valuation method because it Jncs !lol require survey respondents to consider money 
values. Whereas in the multinlimial approach respondents are required to consider 
their behaviour at a given price /quality combination in which the price may be 
different to that currently l:lCC-l. ~hc combined approach requires respondents to 
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consider their behaviour at hypothesised quality levels at the prices they currently 
face19• Consequently, the combined approach has identical incentives to indulge 
in strategic behaviour as the quantity-estimating contingent valuation approach and 
the respondent also has a simpler task because one less parameter is varied. 
The costs of this simplification are that the analyst has a much more 
difficult task than applying contingent valuation directly. As well as the greatly 
increased data manipulation required by the combined approach (relative to both 
the contingent valuation and travel cost approaches), the assumptions inherent in 
any travel cost model (such as choice of functional form, treatment of multiple-
purpose trips, and the value of travel time) introduce many potential sources of 
error into the pure contingent valuation approach. The validity of single-site travel 
cost models is questioned earlier in this chapter. Those concerns apply equally to 
the combined approach. 
6.3 Choice of approach 
In a survey of hedonic and travel cost models Mendelsohn and Brown 
(1983) conclude: 
If the purpose of the analysis is to examine the value of changing 
a characteristic of a site, the advanced travel costs methods are 
most useful. If individuals can choose only one site from their 
residence, the [generalised travel cost] model is best. However, if 
individuals can choose from a variety of sites, either the hedonic 
travel cost or [multiple site travel cost] approach is best. The 
hedonic travel cost is relatively more adept at handling system-wide 
changes in characteristics and in dealing with a large number of 
attributes. The [multiple site travel cost] approach, on the other 
hand is more appropriate when there are a limited number of site 
types and when the quality of only a single or few sites are to be 
altered. (Mendelsohn and Brown, 1983: p.618) 
19 Because some people may begin to use a site after improvements in site quality it is 
necessary to survey non-users. as well as site users, in the contingent market prior to application of 
the second travel cost model when the zonal travel cost method is used. This is not a problem with 
reductions in site quality, which lead to use by a sub-set of existing users. 
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However, the recent work of Smith and Kaoru (1987) indicates that the 
hedonic travel cost method may not justify the support that Mendelsohn and Brown 
offer it. The characteristics approach is a potentially useful tool, but it harbours 
many strong assumptions and remains unvalidated. The multiple site travel cost 
method remains as the only revealed preference technique which may be 
appropriate to value endogenous quality changes, however this approach has 
difficulties in accounting for mUltiple dimensions of quality, requiring aggregation 
of site attributes into a single quality index. 
The value-estimating form of the contingent valuation approach is not 
applicable to estimating constant crowding demand curves, but is applicable to 
identification of optimal capacities under specific rationing mechanisms. Ouantity-
estimating forms of the contingent valuation method offer a means of estimating 
Marshallian constant crowding demand curves. These techniques may be 
susceptible to a variety of biases, but existing evidence shows that these are likely 
to have minimal effect, and are likely to be less than the biases arising from the 
value-estima ting forms of con tingent valuation. Ouantity-estima ting contingent 
valuation techniques have not been used to identify constant-crowding demand 
curves. 
The combined travel cost/contingent valuation approach introduces the 
problems associated with the travel cost method while offering no real advantage 
,)Vcr the contingent valuation method. 
The value-estimating f(;rm of the contingent valuation approach appears to 
offer the best possibilities for estimating constant crowding demand curves, 
although the characteristics approach. hedonic travel cost approach, multiple-site 
travel cost approach, and comhi;lcJ. If:.tvcl cost/contingent valuation approach also 
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offer potential methods. All of these approaches yield estimates of Marshallian 
demand functions, except for the characteristics approach which, because it 
estimates parameters of the utility function, can be used to derive Hicksian demand 
functions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WELFARE THEORY OF QUALITY CHANGES 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the efficient level of use of a 
resource when that level of use is controlled by pricing policy. To this point the 
economic analysis has assumed tha t da ta reg uirements for determining efficient use 
levels can be met, but this will not always be the case. Utility functions cannot be 
observed, nor can Hicksian-compensated demand functions in many circumstances. 
Neither utility functions nor Hicksian-compensated demand functions can be 
estimated from observed Marshallian demand functions (Bockstael, McConnell and 
Strand, 1991). 
Measures of welfare impacts are exact when they are made with respect to 
Hicksian-compensated demand functions (in this case the relevant constant 
crowding demand function). The findings of the previous chapter indicate that, in 
many circumstances, Hicksian demand information is unavailable. However, it may 
sometimes be possible to obtain Marshallian demand information when Hicksian 
information is unavailable. It is well known that if there are no income effects the 
use of Marshallian data causes no error in the measurement of welfare impacts of 
price changes. In general, however, utility functions cannot be assumed to take the 
l' orm necessary to preclude income effects. Willig (1976) has provided a method 
l' or estimating the discrepancies introduced into measures of welfare change, 
contingent upon a price change. when there is no change in quality. In many 
instances of practical signifiC:.lncc ~ he error introduced by use of Marshallian data 
is small in comparison to measurement errors. 
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This chapter progresses towards its goal in a series of steps. The first 
involves identifying the impact of a quality change in Hicksian compensating terms 
(Section 7.2). In this step the quality change is assumed to be exogenous and price 
for use of the resource is held constane. Chapter Four showed how total use can 
be controlled via prices. The next step is to introduce a price change and 
determine the impact on (compensated) demand. Section 7.3 derives the Hicksian 
compensating measure of benefit change contingent upon a price-induced quality 
change. The following step is to identify the change in price necessary to attain any 
desired quality level (which in this case is signified by the total level of facility use). 
Section 7.5 addresses the magnitude of errors contingent upon the use of 
Marshallian data in place of Hicksian compensating data for determining efficient 
use levels and measuring the welfare impacts of price changes. 
7.2 Effects of a quality change 
Following Just et a1. (1982, Appendix B), it is possible to derive an exact 
measure of the change in an individual's welfare for a quality change, given that 
prices are constant. 
Hicksian compensating variation is the change in income necessary to attain 
the initial utility level, after a change in quality. Compensating variation (C) may 
be found by solving the following equality, where P is a vector of prices, K is 
quality of the congestible good2 , and M is income. The subscripts denote variable 
This line of analysis allows discrepancies from equilibrium. Clearly, price can not be held 
constant while expected use declines and actual use increases. When quality is an exogenous variable 
(such as the quality of walking tracks in the wilderness) this problem does not surface. Section 7.3 
will address the issue of the price change needed to reattain equilibrium. The concept of exogenous 
quality is completely artificial, but serves an important heuristic process in linking analysis of 
congestion with existing analyses of the impacts of changes in quality. 
Note that there are minor changes in notation in this chapter. Whereas previously the level 
of actual resource use (X) was used as the measure of quality, in places in this chapter the concept 
of quality is somewhat more general and is denoted by the letter K. 
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levels before ( = 0) and after ( = 1) the quality change. V is the individual's indirect 
utility function. 
7.1 
C may be found by solving the dual of the utility maximisation problem. 
That is, it is possible to identify the minimum expenditure (m) necessary to attain 
any level of utility (U), given price (P) and quality (K) parameters; 
n 
m m(p){,U) L PiCL(P,K,U) 7.2 
i=1 
where the q/s are compensated demands, found by solving the cost minimisation 
problem3 • 
Trivially; 
7.3 
Compensating variation for a quality change is then; 
C 7.4 
The change in income necessary to compensate for a change in a single 
price is found by differentiating Cl1Qdition 7.2 with respect to the changed price; 
The qis are the tii'S which soh".' !he following cost minimisation prohlem: 
\'jinillll'" P.') subject to U(Q,K)=U 
where P is a vector of CGnSla:~[ [lfIl'CS, Q is a vector of compensated demands, and K is the 
(scalar) quality of the COllC!:_',liblc sooo. See Appendix A for a worked example. 
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- - ~ aq; (P,K,U) 
qj (p,K,U) + {;;t Pi Opj 7.S 
However, the first-order, necessary conditions for utility maximisation 
subject to a budget constraint (the dual of the cost-minimisation problem) include, 
au 
aqj 
where A is the marginal utility of income. 
Hence, 
7.6 
7.7 
as long as quality is independent of prices (since dU =0 along an indifference 
surface). Therefore, the change in income needed to compensate for a change in 
price is the value of Hicksian compensated demand: 
am -
ap. == qj (p ,K,U) 
J 
7.8 
It is now possible to employ the compensated demand functions to evaluate 
welfare impacts of price changes. Consumer welfare change contingent upon 
change in prices is; 
nam 
C == -1 I:- dpj 
L j=i apj 
7.9 
where L is the path of integration (the order in which prices are changed). 
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For a single price change this is; 
7.10 
PI 
- f q;(P,KU) dpj 
Po 
This measure is interpreted graphically as the area to the left of the 
compensated demand curve, between the price lines. 
Similarly, consumer welfare change contingent on a quality change is; 
p' 
I 
f 2m(p,K,U) d 2K Pj 7.11 
where Po is the original price vector. and P j ' is the "choke price", at which 
(compensated) demand for good j falls to zero, i.e.; 
7.12 
Alternatively, using the inverse compensated demand function: 
7.13 
The welfare measure identified in Equation 7.11 can be represented 
graphically as the area between L\vn compensated demand curves, above the price 
line. 
185 
Total benefits obtained from resource use include those benefits already 
identified, which belong to consumers, and those appropriated by resource suppliers 
(producer benefits). For a resource that is costless to supply, producer benefits (B) 
are simply equal to compensated revenue. 
B 7.14 
The change in producer benefits contingent upon a quality change in good 
7.15 
More generally, 
7.16 
Adding the producer and consumer welfare changes contingent on a quality 
change yields; 
dW 
p(O,K,V) aq. 
f -' d aK Pi 
Po 
aqj 
+ Po'-
aK 
7.17 
In other words. total benefit, which is the sum of consumer and producer benefits. is the 
total area under the Hicksian-compensated constant crowding (or constant quality) demand curve. 
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The second term of the second line in Equation 7.17 disappears because the 
second part of that term [qJ.) 1 is identically zero. 
Alternatively, the inverse demand function may be used to measure the 
total welfare change contingent on a quality change; 
7.18 
If the Utility function is known, it is possible to measure welfare impacts 
of quality changes by solving either Equation 7.17 or Equation 7.18. 
7.3 Effects when quality and price both change 
In the situation where a less-congested recreational experience is provided 
by means of increasing prices to reduce demand for a facility, two parameters are 
changed concurrently. The increase in price induces a concurrent increase in 
quality whenever quality is related to user density. A money measure of the 
welfare impacts of a price-induced quality change may be evaluated by comparing 
the areas under Hicksian compensated constant crowding demand curves at the 
initial and final states. The compensating variation for consumers for such a 
change is; 
c 7.19 
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Exact measures of benefits accruing to consumers and producers are the 
areas under Hicksian-compensated constant quality demand curves. Benefits 
obtained before a quality change are: 
ql 
WI = f cp~ d,K1)dX d 
o 
where cpH is the Hicksian constant quality demand function, 
xd is the actual level of facility use, 
Ki is a measure of quality, and 
qi is Hicksian-compensated demand at quality K i . 
Benefits received after a quality change are: 
q2 
W2 = fCP~d,~)dXd 
o 
The change in benefits contingent upon a quality change is therefore: 
'h ql 
!l.W = W2 - WI = f4>H(Xd~)dXd - fcp~d,Kl)dXd 
o 0 
7.21 
7.22 
which is an exact way of stating Equation 4.11 in the absence of supply costs5 . 
A price-induced change in the actual use level of a congested resource may 
be considered as a series of steps. These are: 
Step 1: Set new quality level (amount of use expected). 
Equation 4.11 is the condition which maximises the sum of consumer and producer benefits. 
it is: 
X' 
4>(x',x') + f 4>2(Xd,x')dX d - MC(X')= 0 
o 
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Step 2: Determine the price that will sustain the new quality level (from 
the market demand curve). 
Step 3: Change the price of resource use to the level identified in Step 2. 
Although the change in price causes the change in quality, analysis of 
consumer welfare impacts is simplified by considering the two welfare-changing 
steps (Steps 1 and 3) separately. The welfare changes are; the change in area 
under the demand curve because of a change in quality (holding price constant), 
and the change in area under the demand curve because of a change in price. The 
first change is a result of a shift in the demand curve because of the change in 
quality, while the second is a result of a move along the (new) demand curve 
because of a change in price. 
7.4 Errors from use of Marshallian demand functions 
If the utility function or the compensated demand functions are known it 
IS possible to evaluate a price-induced quality change directly through Equation 
7.19. However, such information is not usually available, but Marshallian constant-
crowding demand functions may be available and could be used as approximations 
to the Hicksian constant-crowding demand functions. 
The question of the accuracy of the Marshallian approximation therefore 
anses. Willig (1976) has shown that, in most practical cases, usc of Marshallian 
demand information to estimate consumer welfare changes contingent upon price 
changes introduces very little error. The Marshallian approximation error is 
usually considered to be insignificant when compared to errors in demand 
estimation. Willig provides methods for estimating Hicksian welfare m'easures from 
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Marshallian measures in those cases where the error in approximation is judged to 
be too great to be ignored. 
Change in prices for congestible goods provides more sources of 
approximation error than the constant quality case addressed by Willig. Firstly, it 
is well known that there is a path dependency problem with use of Marshallian 
estimates (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982), evaluating the change along a path 
which changes quality and then changes price will yield a different estimate of 
welfare change than if that change were evaluated along a change of price, then 
change of quality, path. Secondly, as indicated by Bockstael, McConnell and Strand 
(1991), a change in quality which does not have an associated price change cannot 
be evaluated as the sum of two Willig-like errors because the price at which the 
Marshallian and Hicksian-compensated constant quality demand curves for the new 
quality level intersect (Px) will not be the initial price (Pl)' Thirdly, price-induced 
changes in quality compound the foregoing problem by adding an additional source 
of error. 
The second and third additional sources of approximation error are 
illustrated in Figures 28 to 32, assuming a path which first changes quality, then 
price. Figure 28 illustrates the quality change step. Point G represents the initial 
conditions, where qo units of good i are consumed at price po. The Marshallian 
(X~) and Hicksian-compensated (X~) constant quality demand curves for good i 
intersect at G, with the Hicksian curve being the steeper of the two. A change 
(improvement) in quality induces a change in consumption (increase) of good i. 
Because quality has improved consumers can attain higher indifference curves at 
their initial incomes, resulting in improved consumer welfare. If consumer incomes 
are reduced to compensate for this wealth effect, their consumption of good i will 
reduce (as long as good i is a normal good). The Hicksian, income-compensated, 
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demand curve at the higher quality level (X~) therefore intersects the price line 
(po) at a lower quantity of good i than does the Marshallian demand curve at the 
higher quality (X~). Because the Hicksian demand curve is steeper than the 
Marshallian demand curve, the two will intersect at a price for good i (Px) which 
is greater than the current price (Po). There is, however, no reason to believe that 
this intersection occurs in the first quadrant. 
Figure 28 Welfare impacts of a constant-price quality change. 
The true change in consumer wclfare6 of a constant-price quality change 
is measured by Area (D + C) - the area between the two Hicksian demand curves -
in Figure 28. The Marshallian estimate of this change is Area (B + C + E). The 
.. error introduced by usc of Marshal1ian data to estimate the welfar.e change is 
And social welfare if Po = \!arginal cost = average cost. 
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therefore Area (E+B-D). Willig's method can be used to estimate areas like B, 
and Area D if Px is known, but is not applicable to estimating Area E. 
When the intersection of the new constant quality demand curves occurs in 
the fourth quadrant, Area D does not exist and Area E is large. In this case the 
estimation error from using Marshallian constant quality demand curves is Area 
(B + E), which is positive, implying that the change in Marshallian surplus is an 
overestimate of true consumer welfare change. In this case, if Marshallian 
estimates were used, quality would be set too high for consumptive efficiency and 
the resource would be underutilised. 
Similarly, if the intersection of the new constant quality demand curves 
occurs at the current price (Px = Po), Area E does not exist and Area D is large. 
Use of Marshallian data will lead to overestimation of total weIf are change equal 
to Area (B-D). In this case it is possible that Area D is greater than Area Band 
consequently change in Marshallian surplus could be an underestimate of welfare 
change7• However, the sign of the error is indeterminate a priori whenever the 
intersection occurs in the first quadrant. 
The demand curves at the new quality level will intersect at the initial price if there is no 
income effect, or if quality is irrelevant. i.e. Initially, XM(p,q,m(p,q,U)) = XH(p,q,U) 
Letting q change, 
ax M ax M am ax H 
--+--.-
<XI amaq aq 
Rearranging, 
ax H ax M axMam 0 iff ----- am . aq = ilq <XI 
(i) ax
M 
(no income effect) -- =0 or, 
am 
(ii) am = 0 (quality is irrelevant) aq 
Otherwise, for normal goods, 
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Figures 29 to 32 illustrate the third error source, the price change step. The 
price (PI) needed to sustain the new quality level (Step 3) is identified from the 
market demand curve, so is invariant to whether Hicksian or Marshallian constant 
crowding demand curves are used for evaluating welfare changes. Four cases are 
possible: 
CASE 1, the new price is greater than the price at which the Hicksian and 
Marshallian demand curves intersect at the new quality level, PI> Px; 
CASE 2, the new price is less than the intersection price and the 
intersection occurs in the first quadrant, PI <Px; 
CASE 3, the new price is less than the intersection pnce and the 
intersection occurs in the fourth quadrant, PI < Px; 
CASE 4, the new price is equal to the intersection price, PI = Px' 
Figure 29 
\ 
x ' 
E 
A 
H 
The price which sustains the quality change is greater than the price 
at which the demand curves intersect. 
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The price change step of Case 1 is illustrated in Figure 29. After the 
quality change, the increase in price from Po to Pi results in a decrease in consumer 
benefits of Area (A+B+C2 +D2), equal to the change in area beneath the relevant 
Hicksian-compensated constant quality demand curve. The Marshallian estimate 
of this loss is Area (A + B + C2 + E). When the price and quantity changes are 
combined it is seen that the Marshallian estimates of consumer welfare change 
overstate true change in consumer welfare by Area (B-Di)' which is of unknown 
sign a priori. 
P" -------cr----------
Figure 30 
B 
A 
The price which sustains the quality change is less than the price at 
which the demand curves intersect. 
For case 2, illustrated in Figure 30, the post quality change increase in price 
from Po to Pl results in a decrease in consumer benefits of Area (A + B + C2). The 
Marshallian estimate of this loss is Area (A+B+C2 +E2). When the price and 
quantity changes are combined, it is seen that Marshallian estimates overstate 
consumer welfare change by Area (B + El-D), which is of indeterminate sign. 
Figure 31 
1'1 
B 
B 
1 
c 
~ 
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The demand curves intersect in the fourth quadrant and the price 
which sustains the quality change is less than the price at which the 
demand curves intersect. 
Figure 31 illustrates case 3, in which the post quality change increase in 
prIce results in a decrease in consumer benefits of Area (A + B + C2). The 
Marshallian estimate of this loss is Area (A + B + C2 + E3). Combining the price and 
quantity changes, it is seen that Marshallian estimates overstate total consumer 
welfare change by Area (Ez + B), which is unambiguously positive. 
Figure 32 illustrates Case 4, the increase in price results in a decrease in 
consumer benefits of Area (A + B + Cz). The Marshallian estimate of this loss is 
Area (A + B + C2 + E). Marshallian estimates of total consumer welfare change 
caused by the price and quality changes are overstatements by Area (B-D), which 
is of indeterminate sign. 
Figure 32 
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D 
B E 
A 
The price which sustains the quality change is equal to the price at 
which the demand curves intersect. 
It is possible to put an unambiguous sign on the errors introduced by using 
Marshallian demand functions in place of Hicksian-compensated demand functions 
to evaluate consumer welfare changes contingent upon price changes for non-
congestible goods. However, the same is not "true for congestible goods. The sign 
of the error is only known if the utility function or both types of demand function 
are known. In either of these cases the Hicksian demand functions may be used 
directly. If the two types of demand curves for the new quality level intersect at 
the initial price, there is no error in using Marshallian demand information. This 
condition only occurs if there is no income effect, implying that the Hicksian and 
Marshallian demand curves are identical, or if quality is irrelevant, in which case 
a change in price does not influence gross user benefits. 
If the Marshallian and Hicksian demand curves at the new quality level 
intersect in the fourth quadrant (CASE 3), the Marshallian measure of consumer 
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welfare change of a reduction in capacity is an unambiguous over-estimate. Use 
of Marshallian data in this case would result in setting a level of quality which is 
too high (too little use) for consumptive efficiency. In all other cases, the errors 
introduced to estimates of consumer welfare change by use of Marshallian data are 
of indeterminate sign. 
The error in estimated consumer benefit change may be estimated as the 
difference between two Willig-like areas in the case where the intersection of the 
Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves at the new quality level occurs at the 
price which sustains the new quality level (PI = Px). Knowledge of whether Px and 
PI coincide and, if so, what their value is may therefore allow use of Marshallian 
demand data alongside Willig correction factors to identify the consumptively 
efficient price for a congestible good. 
However, in general. p! is not equal to px8• To see this, consider Figure 
29. Points G and K are two points on the market demand curve. Utility varies 
along the market demand curve. therefore Points G and K will only provide the 
same utility coincidentally. However. every point on the Hicksian-compensated 
constant crowding demand curve at the new quality level (X~) has identical utility 
to Point G. If Point G has different utility to Point K, then X~ cannot pass through 
Point K. The only cases in which PI = Px are when utility does not change along the 
market demand curve, or when Points G and K "straddle" the social welfare 
maximising point on the market demand curve. identified in Chapter 4. In other 
words, po<p·<P j or PO>P';"P i is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
An example of a case in willeil i', j, not equal to Px is presented in Appendix A. 
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704.1 Slutsky identity for quality changes 
Let h.(P" k" U") J ' , the amount of good j consumed to obtain utility U", 
at prices pO, and quality k". 
"(P"k"U") Y " the minimum income needed to reach utility U", at 
prices pO, and quality k". 
the amount of good j consumed with income yO, at 
prices pO, and quality k". 
Then, by definition: 
7.23 
Consequently, 
7.24 
which is the Slutsky identity. It is the same as for the case in which quality is not 
a parameter. Further, 
7.25 
is an identity similar to the Slutsky identity, but having meaning only when quality 
is a determinant of utility. 
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7.4.2 Finding the intersection of the new demand curves 
It was illustrated earlier that when quality improves, the Hicksian and 
Marshallian demand curves at the new quality level intersect at some price (Px) 
greater than the price before the quality change (Po). In order to identify Px, 
totally differentiate the Marshallian and Hicksian constant quality demand 
functions: 
00. ab. ab. 
_I. dp. + _I. dk + _1.dU 
apj 1 ak; 1 au 
ax. 
_'.dy 
Oy 
7.26 
7.27 
At Px, dh i = dxi. Letting: dh i = dXi, dU = 0 on the Hicksian demand curve, 
dy 0 on the Marshallian demand curve, and rearranging terms yields: 
[
Ox. ax. Oy ab.] dp. _I + _1. ___ I 
1 api Oy api apj - abi ] akj 
7.28 
It is known from the Slutsky identity that the bracketed terms on each side 
of Equation 7.28 equal zero, so it is not possible LO identify dpi as a function of dki 
using this approach. Consequently, the point of intersection of the Hicksian and 
Marshallian demand curves for the new quality level cannot be identified. 
While it may not be p(ls::,ih!c to identify Px exactly without information on 
the particular form of the uliiil\' function or constant quality demand functions, it 
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is possible to identify whether Px is greater or less than Pl. If utility at PI is less 
than at Po, consumers will need to be compensated for the price increase with 
increased income, to enable them to attain their initial welfare level. Such 
compensatory income would increase demand for the congestible good (assuming 
it is a normal good), indicating that Hicksian-compensated demand is greater than 
Marshallian demand at Pl. Since Hicksian demand curves are steeper than their 
Marshallian equivalents, the two demand curves must intersect at some price below 
Pl. In other words Px < Pl. Similarly, if utility at PI is greater than at Po then PI 
< Px, by the same reasoning. 
7.5 When may Marshallian data be used without error? 
There are no universally applicable rules which determine the relationships 
between the true (Hicksian) change in consumer welfare (a U) and the Marshallian-
based estimates of those changes (a 0), i.e. 
aU> 0 
aU < 0 
aO > 0 
aO < 0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
aO > 0 
aU < 0 
aU> 0 
aU < 0 
Consider, for example, the first of these conditions: 
aU> 0 - PI> Px, implying that Case 1, illustrated in Figure 29, must apply. 
In that case; 
a 0 = Area (CI-A) 
aO > 0 
By definition, aU 
iff 
Area (C I + DcA-B) > 0, but this is not sufficient 
information to place a sign on Area (CI-A). aU could be positive, 
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negative, or zero when AU>O (or, for that matter, when AU <0 or AU =0). 
Consequently, the conclusion follows that AU> 0 + A 0 > O. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that knowledge of Marshallian 
demand functions does not allow evaluation of the sign of welfare impacts of a 
price change for congestible goods. The question remalllS as to whether 
Marshallian constant crowding demand functions can be used to identify the 
socially efficient price and/or use level. 
Total benefits (W) equal the area under the Hicksian-compensated constant 
crowding demand curve for the current level of use9 • 
7.29 
The socially efficient outcome occurs when Condition 7.30 is satisfied. 
oW 
oX 
X· 
~ (f ¢H(Xd,x*)dX d) 
oX 0 
X' 
¢H(X*,X*) + f ¢~(Xd,X')dXd 
o 
o 
7.30 
Note that the demand curve in I:quation 7.29 is a constant crowding demand curve, and not 
a constant.9.lli!li!Y demand curve. Consequently the variable X, representing the level of use, replaces 
the variable K. which represented qUJlity in earlier demand functions 
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The Marshallian counterpart to this condition is: 
x' 
oX 
o~ (J cpM(X d,x*)dX d) 
o 
X' 7.31 
cpM(X*,X*) + J <P~(Xd,X')dXd 
o 
o 
F or the Marshallian demand curves to identify the socially efficient use 
level, X· must satisfy Conditions 7.30 and 7.31 simultaneously. Since cpH(X',X') = 
cp:-.l(X·,X·), the necessary condition is: 
X' J <p~(X d,X ') dX d 7.32 
o 
where X· satisfies Condition 7.30. Clearly, Condition 7.32 will not be universally 
satisfied. implying that Marshallian demand functions cannot be relied upon to 
identify the socially efficient use level lD • 
7.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the implications of using Marshallian demand 
information to make allocation decisions for congestible goods. It initially 
developed the theory of welfare change for an autonomous quality change, then 
10 There are some special eu,es '-"hien satisfy Condition 7.32. These include those cases in 
which (i) \larshallian and Hickslan-col11pcn,atcd constant crowding demand curves have identical 
derivatives with respect to actual usc LH all levels of expected use. and 
(ii) \larshallian and Hicksian-comr~l1s~tcd constant crowding demand curves are both quasi-linear 
(demand curves for different CXpCClCU ~iSC levcis are identically shaped. but are vertically shifted) 
and their derivatives with respect to 'lctual use are identical (at any level of actu.al use) for the 
socially efficient level of expected l"(. 
These special case~. C:1J~n',", :~()'·vevcr. be identified without knowledge of the Hicksian-
compensated constant crowding demand functions. If this knowledge were available the Hicksian 
functions could be used directly '.() iuc:"ii\ lile socially efficient use level. 
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extended that analysis to situations in which quality is autonomous. Conditions for 
optimality and the measurement of welfare changes were developed using both 
Marshallian and Hicksian demand information. Those conditions were then 
compared to determine whether it is necessary to use Hicksian demand information 
to obtain social efficiency, and whether there are any consistent biases in use of 
Marshallian data - as there are in the simple case of a price change with quality 
exogenous. 
The findings of this chapter are that knowledge of Marshallian constant 
crowding demand functions does not allow identification of the sign of consumer 
welfare change contingent upon price changes, and does not allow identification of 
the socially efficient level of use, for congestible facilities. 
These findings have senous im"plications for managers of congestible 
resources. Managers who wish to maximise revenue or profits from a congestible 
resource have only to be concerned with the Marshallian market demand function, 
which is relatively easy to identify. Managers concerned with maximising social or 
consumer welfare require information on either the utility function(s) which 
underlie demand, or with the Hicksian-compensated constant quality demand 
functions themselves. Efficient congestible resource allocation is therefore reliant 
on the ability to apply non-market valuation techniques to congestible resources, 
the difficulties of which were identified in Chapter 6. Consequently, a serious 
problem exists for those who wish to manager congestible resources to maximise 
social welfare. In effect, even when there is agreement on social values (i.e. a 
decision has been made to manage to maximise social welfare) because the 
"scientific facts" (location of compensated demand curves in this case) are 
unknown, decisionmaking is currently unable to escape from the judgemental realm 
identified in Figure 6. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
203 
This thesis was motivated by the concern that congestible resources are 
possibly not being managed in ways that are compatible with some common 
management objectives. The usual, tragedy of the commons, justification of the 
need for management of congestiblc goods is provided in the introduction to this 
thesis. It takes the line that individuals acting in their own best interests undertake 
actions which cause reductions in others' welfare. The consequence is that social 
welf arc, measured using the potential Pareto improvement criterion, is less than it 
would be if people's actions were constrained in some optimal way. 
Following cha pters reviewed current methods for identifying the levels that 
constraints to backcountry recreation resource use should be set at, and identified 
problems with those methods. Economic analysis was developed to identify 
efficient rcsource allocations, to explain observed behaviours, and to understand 
the impacts of some management parameters. Non-efficiency objectives were 
introduced, and the efficiency and revenue costs of pursuing an equal opportunity 
objective were analysed. Finally, the ability to measure demand for congestible 
backcountry recreation facilities was analysed and the efficiency costs of using an 
approximation to the true welfare change were investigated. 
Section 8.1 summarises the main findings of this study and the contribution 
they make to current understanding of congestion management. Policy implications 
204 
arising from this analysis are presented in Section 8.2, research limitations and the 
implications for future research are discussed in Sections 8.3 and 8.4 respectively. 
8.1 Main findings 
Several weaknesses m existing models of backcountry recreation were 
identified. These models were able to be extended to include objectives for 
management and demand for use of recreational resources. The revised model 
shows the limits of existing economic analyses, and indicates potential areas for 
future research. 
Economic models were developed to investigate the positive and normative 
aspects of managing congestible resources. These models built upon existing forms 
of analysis to analyse aspects of congestible resource management. They are 
reduced form models of some of the aspects incorporated in the revised model of 
backcountry recreation developed in Chapter Three, and so are not capable of 
being used to determine "optimal" resource allocations, except in some extremely 
simple special cases. The economic analysis does, however, provide some general 
principles which are likely to provide guidance to managers of congestible 
resources. The principles to emerge are: 
1) A profit maximising monopolist would not in general allow an efficient level 
of access to congestible resources. Consequently, privatisation of unique 
backcountry recreation resources or leaving their management "to the market" 
would be inefficient. This argument provides a prima facie case for some form 
of social management but, without knowledge of the relative transaction costs and 
the potential for government failure, cannot be taken as a complete justification for 
such management. 
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2) Where several types of congestible use may be made of a single resource, 
too much use of each type occurs (given the level of the other activities) under 
open-access conditions. If one use is limited, the other use(s) will occur at snper-
efficient levels, implying that all uses must be managed to attain efficiency (again 
within limitations imposed by transaction costs). 
3) Displacement is the result of unconstrained use and may result in satisfied 
users, but can concurrently result in a reduction in aggregate use benefits. 
"Satisfaction" on its own is not a suitable management goal when there are 
efficiency and/or distributional objectives. Efficient management requires 
knowledge of crowding-dependent demand functions for all users, existing and 
potential, to determine how much use of the resource each potential user should 
be permitted to make. Distributional concerns require definition of who should be 
satisfied. 
4) The process of rationalisation implies there may be no observed change in 
expressed satisfaction with an increase in user density, but this observation should 
not be taken to imply that increases in user ~ensity are efficient. The nature of the 
experience may have changed, possibly resulting in diminished individual (and 
aggregate) user benefits. Once agam it IS apparent that efficient resource 
management requires knowledge of crowding-dependent demand functions for all 
users, existing and potential, so that the efficient combination of user type(s) and 
use levels may be identified. 
5) When choosing betwecn pricc rationing, lottery rationing and no rationing 
of a congestible resource, an open-access use policy will often (but not always) 
maximise the benefits obtained by resource users, but will never maximise total 
(consumer plus producer) benefits. In the absence of transaction costs, open-access 
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use IS not compatible with efficient management of congestible resources. 
However, if the management objective is to "maximise the benefits obtained ~ 
resource users" then open-access will often be the optimal policy. 
6) The efficient capacity for a congestible resource is dependent upon the 
method that will be employed to ration use. There is no single efficient carrying 
capacity for a congestible resource. Consequently, it is not possible to meet 
efficiency and distributional goals by determining the efficient amount of use and 
then allocating that use according to some independently determined distributive 
criteria. It is, however, possible to ensure efficiency given the allocation method. 
For example, the lottery may be chosen as the preferred allocation method because 
it ensures equality of opportunity, the objective of resource allocation in this case 
being to maximise total benefits subject to the constraint of equal opportunity. 
Satisfaction of the objective could be attained by identifying the efficient carrying 
capacity under lottery rationing. 
7) There are no universal rules relating the magnitudes of benefit measures 
under pure price, pure lottery and open-access allocation schemes. It is only 
possible to derive these once the form of the crowding-dependent demand 
functions, transaction costs, and attitudes to risk are known. 
(i) In the absence of transaction costs, with consumer risk-neutrality or risk-
seeking, consumers will prefer an efficient lottery to efficient pricing. This 
occurs because the efficiency gains from pricing will not flow to the 
resource users unless they are also the resource owners, but efficiency gains 
from lottery rationing are all captured by consumers. This result is not 
generalisable to risk-averse resource users, their preferred outcome being 
dependent upon the degree of risk aversion, the chances of success in the 
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lottery, and the benefits obtained from use under the two allocation 
schemes. 
(ii) Current, risk-neutral and risk-seeking consumers will prefer an efficient 
lottery to open-access. 
If management objectives require the maximisation of expected user 
benefits (rather than total benefits) then, III the absence of transaction cost 
differences, lottery rationing is preferable to both price rationing and open-access. 
8) Chapter Five analysed the implications of mixing price and lottery rationing 
mechanisms. The trade-offs in outcomes (efficiency, aggregate expected consumer 
benefits, expected producer benefits, and per-capita expected consumer benefits) 
were illustrated for the specific case of a linear functional form. While not all of 
the findings are generalisable, some general rules emerged. 
The mixed mechanisms were found to intermediate between pure price and 
pure lottery rationing on expected efficiency, expected aggregate consumer 
benefits, and expected revenue criteria. Pricing performed best on 
efficiency and revenue criteria, while lottery rationing performed best on 
the expected consumer benefit criterion. 
These rules imply that there is no single, dominant allocation method. 
Choice of an appropriate allocation method depends upon the elements of the 
objective function and the weightings they are given. 
9) Chapter Six reviewed existing methods of estimating demand for congestible 
recreation resources. No method was found to be without some form of problem, 
but the most promising methods (in terms of theoretical consistency and practical 
applicability) appear to be the quantity-estimating forms of the contingent valuation 
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approach. Only one potentially usable method (the characteristics approach) 
provides the theoretically correct Hicksian measures of welf are change. The others 
all provide Marshallian approximations to Hicksian demand curves. 
These findings have senous implications for demand information based 
management of congestible resources if Marshallian approximations to congestible 
demands are unable to provide useful approximations to welfare changes. They 
suggest that the basic information on which economic decisions are based is 
currently unobtainable, effectively ruling out the use of economic approaches to 
decision making. 
10) Chapter Seven investigated the errors introduced by the use of Marshallian 
demand information to manage congestible resources. It was found that 
Marshallian demand functions cannot be relied upon to identify the socially 
efficient resource use level or price. Further, Marshallian demand information is 
not even able to indicate the true sign of the welfare change contingent upon a 
price change far a congestiblc good. The conclusion to follow from this finding is 
that, until new approaches to measuring Hicksian demands for congestible goods 
are developed, or the characteristics approach is further developed, it is not 
possible to apply the economic theory developed here to understand the welfare 
changes contingent upon changes in management of congestible resources. 
11) Appendix A found that, even for the most basic case of a two good world, 
utility functions able to satisfy some simple, widely-accepted axioms are unable to 
take simple functional forms. The corresponding Marshallian and Hicksian demand 
functions are consequently not in easily estimable forms. One of the most simple 
functional f arms satisfying the aXill111S was used to illustrate this and to confirm the 
welfare theoretic problems Cls:,l)ci:llcd with using Marshallian demand information 
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in place of Hicksian demand information. It follows that attempts to estimate 
demand and utility functions for congestible goods using the commonly applied, 
simple functional forms are likely to be theoretically inconsistent. 
While these principles are not all completely new, they all add to the 
existing body of knowledge regarding the management or theory of congestible 
resources. For example, Principle 1 is already widely known, however the analysis 
of Chapter Four corrects a fault in an earlier analysis. Principles 3 and 4 are also 
already known, but the analysis of Chapter Four models them from a new 
perspective and clarifies the economic reasoning behind the displacement and 
rationalisation phenomena. Principle 2 and Principles 5 through 11 are all 
extensions or additions to existing knowledge. 
8.2 Implications for the management of congestible 
backcountry recreation resources 
The principles of the preceding section suggest that, at present, economics 
can play only a limited role in the management of congestible recreation resources. 
Principles 1 through 4 justify the need for management, and identify the need for 
congestion-dependent demand information to allow efficient management. 
Principles 5 through 8 introduce the possibility of management objectives other 
than efficiency and illustrate some of the implications of adoption of those criteria. 
Here again it was found that whenever revenue or efficiency enter the objective 
function congestion-dependent demand information is necessary to determine the 
optimal management strategy. 
The theory of efficient congestible resource management is well developed, 
and has been extended here to allow consideration of some other management 
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objectives. However, Principles 9 through 11 indicate that this theory cannot be 
implemented at present. There are currently no theoretically acceptable methods 
for measuring demand for congestible non-market goods, methods which provide 
approximations have errors of unknown direction and magnitude, and theoretically 
acceptable functional forms take much more complex structures than the forms 
commonly estimated in non-market valuation studies. 
The preceding analysis does not bode well for the input of economic advice 
f or the management of congestible backcountry recreation resources. Chapters 
F our and Five illustrate the possibility of developing economic models Once 
decision criteria are known. If appropriate demand information were available, 
demand-based models could be developed to illustrate the positive consequences 
of employing different resource allocation methods and parameters, allowing the 
normative evaluation of alternative policies. The models deVeloped in this thesis 
do not specify all of the links described in the model developed in Chapter Three. 
However, there appears to be no reason why those models could not be adapted to 
include the additional linkages. Whether this is worthwhile depends upon the 
ability to apply the knowledge that. is presently available. 
Problems arise in the practical implementation of the existing economic 
models. Implementation requires knowledge of demands for extra-market 
congestible resources. While non-market valuation is a rapidly developing area of 
economic research which has discovered procedures for valuing many things, it has 
not specifically addressed the development of methods suitable for providing the 
information needed for management of congestible resources. The review of non-
market valuation methods cllnducted in Chapter Six concluded that there is 
currently no practical way of identifying Hicksian-compcnsated demand curves for 
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congestible goods. The best tha.t can be done is to estimate the related Marshallian 
demand curves. 
For non-congestible goods Marshallian demand curves provide close 
estimates of Hicksian-compensated demand curves, and the biases in measures of 
benefit introduced by use of Marshallian measures are of known sign, are usually 
small, and may be closely approximated. The same does not hold for congestible 
goods. It is not possible to use the approximation techniques for normal goods to 
identify whether errors are large or small, or even to place a sign on them. 
Consequently, it is not possible to identify whether specified changes in price or 
permitted use levels result in an increase or decrease in aggregate social welfare. 
8.3 Limitations of the analysis 
Theoretical studies which attempt to apply or extend economic analysis to 
relatively new topic areas typically make vast simplifications to ease the analytical 
burden. The cost of these simplifications is that the analysis may not be able to 
predict real world outcomes well, or approaches derived may not be practically 
applicable. This study is no different from most others in that it has made some 
rather heroic simplifications. It is important to identify explicitly what those 
simplifications are in order that the findings are treated with an appropriate degree 
of caution and to indicate where progress may be made in ensuing studies. 
A major limitation of this study is the assumption of a fixed-size facility. 
Clearly, an important concern for management is determination of the quantity of 
resource to allocate to congestible uses relative to other uses. The theory for 
making this allocation decision on efficiency grounds is relatively straightforward. 
In fact, the shadow price for resources allocated to congestible uses was derived in 
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Section 4.6. This shadow price could be compared to the value of resources in 
alternative uses to determine which is oversupplied. Alternatively, a more general 
model, incorporating congestible and non-congestible resources could be developed. 
However, until Hicksian demand information for congestible resource uses is 
available application of such models remains problematical. 
Much of the analysis conducted in this thesis was aimed at developing the 
underlying economic concepts for management of congestible resources and did not 
attempt to carry this analysis through to a level suitable for practical 
implementation. The main areas neglected because of this approach include: 
transaction costs, the role of risk, and costs external to users. 
Transaction costs are likely to vary on a case by case basis, both in their 
magnitude and distribution, allowing them to be treated only in the most general 
way in this theoretical analysis. However, transaction costs are important 
determinants of efficiency, profitability and equity so need to be considered in any 
applied analysis of alternative resource allocation scenarios. It is relatively 
common to see "management costs" addressed in this manner, and that IS 
appropriate if enterprise efficiency or profitability are the only objectives of 
concern. If a more general definition of efficiency is adopted, or equity concerns 
are important, then transaction costs falling on resource users should also be 
included in analysis. Care must then be taken to identify whether estimated 
demand functions are net of transaction costs or not, which will depend upon the 
estimation method employed. 
Pure price allocation means that everyone who wants to use a resource at 
the known price can obtain access to it by paying that price. However, risk is an 
inherent element in many allOCalilll1 ~ystcms. For example, with lottery allocation 
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some potential users will be disappointed because the probability of success is less 
than unity, but their identity is not known until after the lottery takes place. With 
physical queues the length of time potential users must queue is not necessarily 
known before joining the queue. Even if demand is known with certainty, the 
benefits obtained under lottery and physical queue allocations cannot be. 
Consequently, in order to compare benefit measures some adjustment for risk must 
occur whenever people are not risk-neutral. This thesis simplified the problem by 
assuming risk-neutrality throughout. Real-life applications need to consider how 
benefit measures should be adjusted to account for the attitudes to risk of the 
various actors involved. 
The economic analysis conducted in this thesis assumed that the only 
externality imposed by resource use is congestion costs on 
other resource users. Other externalities may also exist. Examples of these for 
backcountry recreation include external benefits, such as mental and physical health 
benefits, and management costs, which have largely been ignored in this study. 
The analysis here did not explicitly deal with the equity objective, because 
it could not be defined. Consequently, it was not possible to investigate 
combinations of allocation methods and their parameters which optimise some 
chosen objective function. The initial approach adopted to deal with equity was 
extremely narrow in that it treated one allocation method (lottery) as a constraint 
put in place to address equity concerns. Later analysis reviewed the impacts of 
mixed price and lottery allocation mechanisms, this approach is able to provide 
positive outputs useful to decisionmakers, but is unable to reach normative 
conclusions. The investigation undertaken represents a start in understanding the 
role of allocation mechanisms in the magnitude and distribution of benefits from 
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use of congestible resources, but clearly would benefit from expansion to address 
the many other allocation mechanisms available. 
The economic analyses of Chapter Four contain some elements which may 
limit practical applicability of the findings. The characteristics approach was 
developed in graphical rather than mathematical terms, restricting analysis to two 
characteristics. The graphical approach is useful heuristically, but is limited in 
analytical ability. Of prime importance is its inability to analyse the effects of 
increased use on the slopes of resource characteristic rays. Consequently, analysis 
by the characteristics approach was descriptive and was not developed to a 
prescriptive level, even for the single (efficiency) objective case. Mathematical 
modelling of the characteristics approach is one way to achieve prescriptive results 
f or management of congestiblc resources, the ,other is further development of the 
usual "goods approach". The latter course of action was adopted here. 
Clearly, impacts of resource use can be both intra and inter-temporal, but 
this study has focused on intra-temporal effects. The analysis of inter-temporal 
eff ects was restricted to the dynamics of reaching equilibrium, it did not investigate 
the role of the physical impacts of resource users in one period affecting the 
benefits obtained by resource users in other periods. Such impacts are likely to 
occur in backcountry recreation because of longlasting user-density dependent 
impacts such as: trampling of vegetation, littering, and displacement of wildlife. 
Much of the economIC modelling was restricted to analysis of resources 
subject to a single, congestiblc usc. Backcountry recreation resources are typically 
subject to several types of usc Jnd w'ithin each use there may be many types of 
user, from solitude seeking to crowd seeking. The implications of management 
actions in such settings arc nOl inherently more difficult to model than the simple 
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cases analysed so far. Such analysis could be conducted along the lines of the 
general approach of Section 4.6. The modelling exercise does not present any 
special difficulties, but as the number of arguments in the objective function 
increases so does the number of arguments in the demand functions necessary to 
run the model. The more arguments in the demand functions, the more difficult 
they are to estimate. Consequently, practical application to such situations is even 
further distant than for the simple single use cases. 
8.4 Implications for research 
The inability to apply the economic models developed so far suggests that 
it is fruitless, at this stage, to further develop the economic models to account for 
all of the interactions specified in the model of backcountry recreation developed 
in Chapter Three. Such research may satisfy intellectual challenges, but would be 
of little use in the management of congestible resources. 
Further application of economICS to the management of congestible 
backcountry recreation resources relies on the development of methods for 
identifying Hicksian-compensated demand functions for those resources. Many of 
the non-market demand revelation techniques analysed in Chapter Six are suitable 
only for identifying Marshallian demand functions. Consequently, the search 
should be focused on discovering new methods of non-market valuation, or on 
development of the characteristics approach pioneered by Greig and Morey. 
Appendix A indicates that the Cobb-Douglas utility function is not 
compatible with commonly accepted axioms which apply in the presence of 
congestible goods. A starting point for future research may therefore be to identify 
estimable forms of utility functions which are consistent with the axioms. The 
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parameters associated with these functions could be estimated from observations 
of recreational facility choice behaviours. In order to validate such a model it 
would be necessary to observe its predictive ability under alternative conditions, 
such as when prices, or quality conditions (including crowding) change. This 
approach would be extremely useful because when utility functions are known it is 
possible to derive both Marshallian and Hicksian-compensated demand functions. 
With knowledge of these it is possible to measure the direction and magnitudes of 
biases introduced by use of Marshallian demand curves to provide information on 
efficiency of resource allocation options. It may be true that there are no 
significant differences between the allocations indicated by the two types of 
demand function. 
If the characteristics approach is to be advanced it is important to obtain 
an improved understanding of the budget allocation process and which activities fall 
into more or less homogeneous groups competing for budget allocations. A starting 
point for this field of research (and an indication of the likely pitfalls) could be 
provided by the gravity trip generation and distribution models. Budget allocation 
to (say) outdoor recreation is analogous to modelling the total number of trips 
generated in the gravity models. 
In the short-term there is no way to implement economIC analyses of 
congestible resource use and be certain that such analyses lead to optimal resource 
allocations. One approach to circumventing this potential problem is to obtain a 
better understanding of the salient objectives for management of congestible 
recreation resources. For example, if economic efficiency is not an objective, or 
is not salient, the current inability to apply methods analysing efficiency of 
alternative facility use levels and allocation methods is of no or little importance. 
Alternatively, if revenue objectives are salient, then Marshallian demand data 
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provide all the information necessary to meet resource allocation performance 
targets. Research could be targeted at identifying whose preferences are important 
with respect to particular facilities. and what those people think are important 
outcomes of facility management. areas of research which may potentially be 
addressed by disciplines such as political science, law, and social sciences. This 
approach has the potential to sidestep the difficulties of application of economic 
theory, but may equally reinforce the need to discover ways to allow its application. 
Without Hicksian demand information it is not possible to know if use of 
a facility is being allocated efficiently. However, it may be possible to identify 
"indicators" of efficient allocation. Such indicators may be able to be constructed 
by extensions of the satisfaction model to indicate "how satisfied" facility users are 
:llld "how dissatisfied" are those not ohtaining access to facilities. One immediate 
candidate for such a measure is Marshallian demand. Alternatively, other measures 
of need or merit may be used to allocate facilities. One such method is that 
proposed by Bryan (1979) whereby facilities arc allocated preferentially to the most 
specialised classes of facility users. who usually have the greatest dependence on 
a specific mixture of resource characteristics to obtain satisfying recreational 
experIences. 
An important aspect of aliocational efficiency which has not been addressed 
here is transaction costs. A first step in determining whether management of use 
(If a congestiblc resource is efficient is to understand what the potential benefits 
and costs of that management 'iJ"::. This is an area in which empirical work may be 
able to give some initial guici:L,c(; .. md which has not been addressed in New 
Zealand. Management costs ;n(::!~'.;,:" .:dministration of the selection procedure (e.g. 
costs of running a lottery ,.;1'" :-',lilciing and staffing fee collection facilities), 
policing, and enforcing rc~t!i., -:-11(;:-c is obviously a problem in determining 
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optimal levels of policing and enf arcement, but it may be possible to identify 
approximate costs of an "acceptable" system. Some small-scale contingent valuation 
studies could be conducted to obtain approximations to average benefits if use 
levels were reduced. These "potential benefits" could then be compared to the 
"likely costs" to provide an indication of whether any management is likely to 
provide net benefits. It is possible that management costs are so high that open-
access remains the most efficient allocation method, at least in the short-term. If 
this approach were to be initially targeted at the "most crowded" facilities or "the 
places to avoid", an indication of negative net benefits would be indicative of a 
situation in which there is unlikely to be any potential gain from managing 
congestion at any facility. If positive net benefits were indicated, facilities which 
are lesser problems could be examined to provide some guidance on the conditions 
which signify potential gains from congestion management. 
A further potential area of useful research is in understanding attitudes 
toward risk. The clearest policy guidance with respect to lottery-based allocation 
mechanisms was obtained by making an assumption of risk-neutrality over the 
chances of obtaining access to use specific facilities. In cases where resource users 
are risk-loving or risk-neutral and a facility is managed to maximise benefits 
obtained by facility users, the lottery is preferred to pricing as an allocation 
mechanism. It is therefore useful to undertake research to identify (potential) 
resource users' attitudes to risk, firstly to indicate their general attitudes to risk, 
and secondly to gain some indication of the strengths of risk-aversion and risk-
seeking where they exist. Only in this way can a true evaluation of the efficiency 
costs of lottery allocation mechanisms, and the efficient capacities under those 
mechanisms, be obtained. 
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In conclusion, at present we have well developed economic theory for the 
efficient allocation of congestiblc recreation facilities, but do not have the ability 
to measure demand to put this theory into practice. If economists want to see a 
more rational approach to allocation of congestible resources they must devise new 
methods for measurement of non-marketed demands. However, the importance of 
undertaking the research needed to do this can only be gauged once the salience 
of efficiency as a management objective is known. 
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APPENDIX A 
A \VORKED EXAMPLE 
Introduction 
This appendix presents an example of a two good world in which one good 
IS congestible and the other not. All demand curves are derived from a utility 
function. In general terms, for an individual this function takes the form!: 
where XI is the quantity of the congestible good consumed by the 
individual. 
X 2 is the quantity of the "normal" good consumed by the 
individual. and 
Z is the total quantity of the congestihle good which is 
expected to he consumed - i.e. "expected use", crowding, or 
quality of good l. 
To he consistent with economic theory a utility function must satisfy some 
simple axioms. These arc: 
l) Utility increases with ;J(lditi(mal consumption of any good, 
2) Marginal utility tl[' cc;fiC,umption declines with increased consumption, 
.3) Utility declines \vith ;;Jc:rc:lsed "expected use" of the congestible resource 
(ceteris paribus). 1n 'lher words, since quality is inversely related to 
expected usc. ulilil\ :UC:-::i\CS \vith quality, 
:\otc that, to simpli!:, 
used elsewhere in this tllcsis. '.-
'ile :lOtation used in this appendix is different to that 
,','. '.,C:"'lh :n ,~<i. and Z corresponds to X in other places. 
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4) If the congestible good is not consumed, utility is independent of expected 
use of the congestible good. 
These conditions may be expressed mathematically as: 
au 
->0 
aXi 
&-u < 0 
ax~ 1 
au 
< 0 
oz 
aXz\ - =0 
oz X,=o 
i = 1, 2 
1, 2 
Al 
A2 
A3 
A4 
Many utility functions satisfy these conditions. The following function is 
chosen because of its mathematical tractability. It is of separable form, which is 
not fully realistic. This form has been chosen purely for convenience. Utility 
functions of the form U = f(Xl>Z) + g(Xl>X2) would be more realistic, but greatly 
increase the computational difficulties without adding further insight. 
Let. AS 
Marshallian demand curves 
The individual's Marshallian constant crowding demand functions are found 
by choosing Xl and X2 to maximise utility, subject to the budget constraint and 
expected usc. The first-order, necessary conditlOns for an internal maximum are: 
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1,2 where A is the Lagrange multiplier A6 
where Y is income A7 
Solving Conditions A() and A 7 for XI as a function of the other parameters 
yields the individual's Marshallian constant crowding demand function 2 • For the 
congestible good this is: 
x M I 
(Y + 2P 2 - 2.jP; y1+Z jP;) 
(PI + .jP;/1+ZJPI) 
A8 
Alternatively, this function may he inverted to yield marginal willingness 
to pay as a function of actuai and expected usc: 
A9 
The partial derivatives :Jr'c' 
au 3 
ax! (1+Z)(2+X/ 
au 3 
aXz (2+Xzf 
cJ2u -6 
< 0 when :;., 1:.>·-1 
axt (2+Xj)l(l+Z) 
cJ2u -6 0 ",vheD. - = -- < 
ax; (2+Xz)l 
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Market demand curve 
The market demand curve is obtained by setting Z equal to X~ in the 
aggregate Marshallian constant crowding demand function and solving for X';'. 
Suppose that Equation A9 represents aggregate Marshallian demand for a 
congestible resource, then Equation AIO must be solved for Xl to obtain the market 
demand curve. 
AlO 
Equation AIO is clearly difficult to' solve. It is much easier to solve for PI 
by setting Z equal to Xl in Equation A9, yielding a quadratic function in Pl' 
Restricting interest to the smaller roots, the inverse market demand curve f or the 
congestible good is: 
Al1 
Hicksian demand curves 
The Hicksian-compensated constant crowding demand curves are found by 
choosing Xl and X, to minimise expenditure, subject to obtaining a predetermined 
level of utility. The first-order, necessaryconditions for an internal minimum are: 
as before A12 
where Uo is the base level of utility A!3 
Solving Conditions Al2 and A13 for Xl yields: 
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2(Uo-l) + 3 P2 
XH 
(I+Z)P1 A14 
1 3 1+ 
- Do 
2(1 +Z) 
or, inverting: 
A15 
[n the terminology of Chapter 4, P! in Cll11dilion A15 is equal to <I>(X~,Z). 
Plotting particular values 
Table 5 identifies some points on representative aggregate constant 
crowding demand curves with initial parameters Y=lOO, P)=2, P2 =50. The 
underlined entries in Table :5 represent points on the market demand curve. The 
shaded cells represent the reference point from which the Hicksian-compensated 
constant crowding demand curves are derived. 
All demand curves cxhihit negative slopes, with the Hicksian-compensated 
constant crowding demand curves being steeper than their Marshallian 
counterparts. The markel demand curves intercept the Marshallian constant 
crowding demand curves 1"[('[11 :lbovc. indicating that points on the market demand 
curve do indeed represent :ouhk;quilibria. 
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Table 5: Demand for a congestible good as a function of the expected level 
of use (Z) and own-price (P l ). 
P l Z=5.45 Z=4.50 Z=O.OO 
Hicksian Marshallian Hicksian Marshallian Hicksian Marshallian 
Demand Demand Demand Demand Demand Demand 
8.71 9.49 9.41 23.03 
2 5.75 6.02 6.48 15.00 
3 4.18 4.04 4.44 4.50 5.18 11.51 
4 3.43 3.21 3.66 3.60 4.41 9.47 
9 1.80 1.47 1.98 1.71 2.74 5.22 
12 1.36 1.02 1.52 1.23 2.30 4.14 
16 0.98 0.64 1.13 0.82 1.91 3.24 
200 0.12 0.00 
Social welfare maximisation 
Knowledge of the aggregate Hicksian-compensated demand function allows 
estimation of the price and use levels which maximise social benefits (from 
Equation 4.11). The necessary condition for such a maximum when Equation 15 
represents aggregate Hicksian demand is: 
z· (%X1-(l+Z*)(l-UJ(X1+2») J ~l 
o (1+Z*)(1-UJOC1+2) + %X1r A16 
-(l+Z*)-l [Z*(l-Uo+ 3 ) + 2(l-UJf + MC(Z*) 2(1+Z*) 
Solution of this condition requires elimination of the unknown Vo. This is 
achieved through use of the market demand curve (Condition All) and the budget 
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constraint (Condition A7) to substitute for X; in terms of Z' in the utility function 
u* = U(Z·,X;,Z*). Solution of Equation AI6 is clearly not straightforward, even 
. when marginal supply costs are zero, so is not pursued here. Equation AI6 is 
presented to show that identification of the efficency maximising point is possible, 
however, it's format indicates that numerical approaches to identification of this 
point may often be simpler than the differential calculus route. 
Effects of a price change 
This section determines the effects of a change in price for the congestible 
good. Initial parameters arc: 
Y = 100, PI = 2, Pz 50 
From the market demand curve it is found that, with these parameters, 
5.4475 units of good 1 and 1.7821 units of good 2 are consumed. Substituting these 
parameters in Equation A5 reveals that utility equals 0.3770 units. 
The consequences of changing the price of good 1 are now investigated. 
Let P! = 3. From the market demand curve: 
Xl = 4.4959 
Letting Z = 4.4954 and Uo = 0.3770, the relevant constant crowding demand 
curves arc: 
200 - 33.I539y'I\ 
PI + 16.5769,j'P; 
AI7 
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Al8 
Evaluating these demands at PI =2 gives X~ = 6.02 and X~ = 5.75 (see 
Table 5). In this case the partial derivative with respect to quality of the Hicksian-
compensated constant crowding demand curve is indeed less than the Marshallian 
version of the same derivative, in accord with the analysis of Section 7.4. 
At PI=3 the quantities of good 1 demanded are X~ = 4.50 and X~ ;" 4.44. 
While the difference between Marshallian and Hicksian demands is small (less than 
1.5%) in this case, it is not due to rounding error. The difference illustrates that 
the two constant crowding demand curves for the new quality level (Z = 4.4959) do 
J!..Ql intersect at the price necessary to sustain that quality level. An alternative 
method of arriving at the same conclusion is to derive the Hicksian-compensated 
constant crowding demand curve through Xl =4.4959, X,= 1.7302 - the market 
demands when PI =3. Under these conditions Uo= 0.3847, and the Hicksian 
constant crowding demand curve is: 
10.1877 
- 1.3856 A19 
.fP; 
Clearly, since there is no real intersection of the two Hicksian constant crowding 
demand curves (Ho and HI), they cannot intersect at PI =3. 
